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# The Platonist.

"Platonism is immortal because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart."

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## THE PLATONIST.

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EDITED BY . . . . . THOS. M. JOHNSON.

*The Platonist is devoted chiefly to the dissemination of the Platonic Philosophy in all its phases.*

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In this degenerated age, when the senses are apotheosized, materialism absurdly considered philosophy, folly and ignorance popularized, and the dictum, "Get money, eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we die," exemplifies the actions of millions of mankind, there certainly is a necessity for a journal which shall be a candid, bold, and fearless exponent of the Platonic Philosophy—a philosophy totally subversive of sensualism, materialism, folly, and ignorance. This philosophy recognizes the essential immortality and divinity of the human soul, and posits its highest happiness as an approximation to, and union with, the Absolute One. Its mission is to release the soul from the bonds of matter, to lead it to the vision of true being,—from images to realities,—and, in short, to elevate it from a sensible to an intellectual life.

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### PEARLS OF WISDOM.

[GATHERED FROM PLATONIC SOURCES.]

An extremely small number is left of those who engage worthily in philosophy,—men of that noble and well-cultivated nature which somehow seeks retirement, and naturally persists in philosophic study, through the absense of corrupting tendencies; or it may be in a small state some mighty soul arises, who has despised and wholly neglected civil honors;—and there may be some small portion perhaps, who, having a naturally good disposition, hold other arts in just contempt and then turn to philosophy. . . .

And even of these few they are such as taste, and have tasted, how sweet and blessed is the acquisition of philosophy, and have withal sufficiently observed the madness of the multitude, and that none of them as I may say, does what is wholesome in state matters, and that a man can get none to aid him in securely

succoring the just, but is like one falling among wild beasts, neither willing nor able to aid them in doing wrong, as one only against a host of wild creatures, and so without doing any good either to the state or his friends perishes unprofitably to all the world. Quietly reasoning on all these things and attending to his own affairs, like a man sheltered under a wall in a storm of dust and foam borne along on the wind, by which he sees all about him overwhelmed in disorder, such a one is content any how to pass his life pure from injustice and unholy deeds, and to effect his exit hence with good hopes cheerful and agreeable. Aye,—and he will make his exit without having done even the least of them. Nor the greatest either, because he has not found a suitable form of government; for in one that suits him he will both make greater progress himself, and together with the affairs of private persons, will preserve those of the public also.

Do you think it at all less scandalous when a man not only consumes the greater part of his life in courts of law as plaintiff or defendant, but actually has the vulgarity to plume himself on this very fact, boasting of being an adept in crime, and such a master of tricks and turns, of manouever and evasion, as always to be able to wriggle out of the grasp of justice and escape from punishment, and that for the sake of worthless trifles, not knowing how much nobler and better it were so to order his life as never to stand in need of a sleepy judge? This is a greater scandal than the other.

And do you not hold it disgraceful to require medical aid, unless it be for a wound or some incidental epidemic complaint,—to require it I mean owing to our sloth and the life we lead, and to get ourselves so stuffed with humors and wind-like quagmires as to compel the skilful sons of Aiskulapios to call diseases by such names as dropsy and catarrh?

Then do you think that there is a particle of difference between the condition of blind persons and the state of those who are absolutely destitute of the knowledge of things as they really are, and who possess in their soul no distinct exemplar, and cannot like painters fix their eye on perfect truth as a perpetual standard of reference, to be contemplated with the minutest care before they proceed to deal with earthly canons about things beautiful and just and good, laying them down where they are required; and where they already exist, watching over their perservation? Indeed there is no difference.

But, I imagine, whenever a man's personal habit is temperate and heathful, and when before betaking himself to rest he has stimulated the rational part of him, and feasted it on beautiful discussions and high inquiries, by means of close and inward reflection; while on the other hand he has neither stinted nor gorged the appetitive part in order that it may sleep instead of troubling with its joys or its griefs that highest part which may thus be permitted to pursue its studies in purity and independence, and to strain forward till it perceives something till then

unknown either past, present, or future; and when in like manner he has calmed the spirited element by avoiding every burst of passion, which would send him to sleep with his spirit stirred, — when, I say, he proceeds to rest with two elements out of the three quieted, and the third, wherein wisdom resides, aroused, you are aware that at such moments he is best able to apprehend truth, and that the visions which present themselves in his dreams are then anything but unlawful.

#### SPECIAL NOTICE.

THE PLATONIST having failed to pay the expenses of publication will be discontinued as a monthly with this issue, which completes volume first.

In this connection we desire to return our sincere thanks to the kind friends who have aided us in our arduous work by subscriptions or otherwise. The many generous words of encouragement and appreciation sent us have been, we trust, fully valued.

THE PLATONIST will be continued as a quarterly publication of fifty pages a number, at the price of \$5 per annum, provided that subscriptions to an amount sufficient to pay the expenses of publication for one year are received within three months from date. In case an adequate sum is not received within the specified time, the money that may have been sent will be returned.

THE PLATONIST can be continued only in the manner indicated. It is absolutely necessary that the expenses of publication be guaranteed.

We have for sale a few bound copies of Vol. I. of THE PLATONIST, at \$5 per copy, postage prepaid.

In order to complete Vol. I. of THE PLATONIST we were compelled to make considerable pecuniary sacrifices. Under the circumstances, we hope that all our delinquent subscribers will promptly remit us the amount they respectively owe. The money is badly needed.

#### LIFE OF HAI EBN YOKDAN, THE SELF-TAUGHT PHILOSOPHER.

BY ABUBACER IBN TOPHAIL.

[Translated from the original Arabic by Simon Ockley. Revised and modernized by W. H. Steele.]

(Continued.)

The roe lived in good pasture, and furnished milk in abundance to maintain the child. She was very careful of his comforts and never left him, except when hunger forced her to seek food. As the child grew older it exhibited great attachment to the roe, and would cry pitifully when she left it to go in search of food. In this manner the child was reared until it reached the age of two years; when it began to walk, and had cut its teeth. As time progressed it grew in strength, and was soon enabled to follow the roe in her rambles through the wood. She was very tender in her attention to the child, and often conducted it to spots where the richest and choicest fruits grew. Here she would select the ripest kinds that fell from the trees, and feed her

charge to complete satiety. She still nourished him with her milk, and when he thirsted would conduct him to the water.

Now, when they were out in the morning, and when they returned home again at evening, they were accompanied by an herd of deer, which frequented the grove where they made their abode. The boy was always amongst them, and by degrees learned to imitate their voice so exactly that there was scarcely any sensible difference. As he grew older, his apprehension became so acute that he could readily imitate the notes of the various species of birds in the island. But he was most master of the deer's voice, and could express himself as they do, either when they call for help, want their mates, or would have them remain away. He soon became so well acquainted with these animals that he had no fear of them, nor they of him. The boy had now arrived at that age when the mind can entertain some idea of the nature of things. He began to consider all the various sorts of animals, and observed that they were all clothed either with hair, wool, or several sorts of feathers. He considered their great strength and swiftness, and observed that they were all provided with weapons of defence: as horns, teeth, hoofs, spurs, nails, etc. He now observed, also, that he himself was naked and defenceless; and, in comparison to those animals around him, was greatly inferior both in point of strength and powers of speed. This he saw the more readily when there happened any controversy about gathering the ripe fruits that fell from the trees. On these and like occasions he was always overpowered; for they could both keep their own, and take away his, as he could neither beat them off, nor run away from them. He further observed that the fawns, though their foreheads were smooth at first, yet afterwards budded forth horns; and that though they were feeble at first, soon grew to be very vigorous and swift. These things, he perceived, were not natural to himself; and, when he had considered the matter, could not imagine the reason of this difference. He next turned his attention to such animals as have any defect or natural imperfection; but among them all he could discover none like himself. He saw many essential points of difference between them and himself; and it appeared to him that those animals were superior to him in every respect. The consideration of these things furnished a source of great grief to him; for he utterly despaired of growing like those animals around him, and this thought made him uneasy.

He was now near seven years old, and resolved to assist himself, where nature had failed to provide him. He first procured some leaves of a palm tree, and rushes, which he twisted together in such a manner as to form a girdle for his waist. This, however, did not last long, for the leaves soon withered and dropped away. He was compelled to procure more leaves; and after a little thought contrived a covering for his body much more durable than the first, yet this was not of a very strong texture. The thought, now, of a weapon for his defence presented itself to his mind; for he began to perceive that the employment of some artifice was necessary to place him upon a footing of equality with the animals about him, in point of physical power. He therefore selected a tough bough from a tree, and breaking it to the proper length, stripped the branches from it, and thus provided himself with a weapon dangerous enough if properly wielded. With this club he went forth, and began at once a general attack upon all the beasts that came in his way; assaulting the weaker, and defending himself against the stronger. By this means he began to know his own strength, and perceived that his hands were better than the natural weapons of strife with which nature had provided the animals in the island. His hands he found were wonderful specimens of nature's mechanism; for with them he had made a covering to hide his nakedness, had shaped a weapon of war for his protection, and withal

discovered that he needed not the horns, hoofs, etc., which he so much desired at first.

As the renewal of his garment of leaves required considerable time and trouble, he formed the design of taking the tail of some dead beast and wearing it himself. But, observing that all beasts constantly avoid those which are dead, — especially if the dead animal be of their own kind, — he began to doubt whether his project would be safe or not. While his mind was thus preplexed, by chance he found a dead eagle, and observing that none of the beasts evinced any aversion to this carcass, he concluded that a portion of it would be suitable for his purpose. He first took off the wings and tail, and spread the feathers open; then drew off the skin and divided it into two equal parts, one of which he wore upon his back, and with the other he covered the lower part of his body. The tail he wore behind, and the wings he placed upon his arms. This dress, he found, answered several ends: it covered his nakedness, kept him warm, and his appearance in this garb so terrified the beasts that they fled from him in alarm.

His old nurse, the roe, was still his constant companion, and when she grew old and feeble he would bring her the best fruits and nuts the island afforded, for her sustenance. Although he cared for her as tenderly as possible, she soon grew lean and weak; refused to eat, and finally, after languishing for a short period, died.

When the boy saw her in this condition, his grief was very great. He called to her in the same voice she was accustomed to answer, but there was no response, no motion, and all action had ceased.

He then examined her eyes and ears, but could perceive no visible defect in either. In like manner he observed closely all the parts of her body, but found nothing amiss. After pondering a short time upon the change of state he had witnessed in the roe, he felt a strong desire to discover, if possible, that part of the body where the defect was, that he might remove it, and he thought that she would then return to her former state of life and vigor.

That which induced him to this search was what he observed in himself. He noticed that when he closed his eyes, or held anything before them, he could see nothing till the obstacle was removed. When he put his fingers into his ears he found that all sense of hearing was obstructed; and so, again, when he closed his nostrils, he could smell nothing until they were opened. From this he concluded that all his senses and actions were liable to obstruction, and that when the obstacles and impediments were removed, the natural operations returned to their former course. Therefore, when he had examined every external part of the roe, and found no visible defect, and yet, at the same time, perceived an universal cessation of motion in the whole body, — not peculiar to one member, but common to them all, — he began to imagine that the cause of death must be in some part hidden within the body. He concluded that this part must be of such nature and use, that without its assistance none of the external parts of the body could exercise their proper functions. He supposed, furthermore, that if this part suffered any injury, that the effect must be universal, and a cessation of all motion must necessarily ensue.

He now had a great desire, as before, to discover this internal organ, and if possible to remove the defect therein, and so produce the same course of action or animation that he observed in the roe while living. His previous examinations of the bodies of dead animals had revealed to him the fact that all their members are solid, and that in every body there are only three cavities. These cavities are embraced in the skull, the breast, and the abdomen. With this knowledge he concluded that the

affected part of which he was in search must be situated in one of these cavities; and, from certain indications he had previously noted, he was strongly persuaded that it was in the breast, or middle cavity. He reasoned that this part for which he searched must be the principal and therefore the most important one of the whole body; and that, as all the members of the body found this part essential to their own existence, its location in the body must be in that place most convenient for easy and proper communication with all these members. From observations, likewise, upon his own person, he was convinced that this vital organ must be situated in the breast, or center cavity. For he reflected that it was possible for him to subsist without some of the members of his body, viz.: the hands, feet, ears, nose, eyes, etc.; but that it would be impossible for him to exist without this vital organ he felt fully convinced. Having by this mode of reasoning assured himself that this organ lay within the breast, he resolved to make search for it without delay. At this juncture an alarming idea presented itself: that in his undertaking to discover this part, he might do more injury than good to the body. He could not remember to have ever seen any animal in this condition recover its former action, and he concluded from thence that if he would bring the roe back to life he must proceed without delay. He resolved to open the breast of the roe, and endeavor to ascertain the exact seat of this vital organ, that he might remove any impediment there found, and thus restore her to her former state of action. With this view he provided himself with sharp flints and small pieces of cane, almost like knives, and with these made an incision between the ribs. Cutting through the flesh he came to the *diaphragm*; and finding this to be very tough, and not easily pierced, he felt assured that such a covering must necessarily belong to that part for which he searched. With such dull instruments as he possessed, he experienced much difficulty before he reached the cavity. The first organs he found were the lungs, and these he examined carefully, to discover the cause of death; but after dissecting the lobes, failed to find anything wrong. His next attempt, however, was more successful; for he found the heart, and this he felt convinced, from its appearance, must be the seat of disease. He saw that it was enclosed with a very strong covering, and tough ligaments, and was protected by the lungs upon that side where he made the incision. He now proceeded to lay the heart bare; and to do this he first severed the *pericardium*, which, when accomplished, revealed to him the true structure of this organ. He examined it closely, but could discover no external injury. By pressing it firmly between his hands he perceived that it was hollow, and therefore concluded that in this hidden cavity he would probably find the cause of death. Having opened it he found the interior divided into two cavities, or parts: one on the right side, the other on the left. The right cavity, or ventricle, was filled with clotted blood, while the left one was quite empty.

With this discovery, he thus reasoned to himself: "Without doubt one of these cavities must needs be the receptacle of what I look for. As for this one on the right, there is nothing in it but congealed blood, which I am sure was not in that state till the whole body was subjected to its present condition." (He had observed that all blood congeals when it flows from the body, and he now saw that this blood did not differ in the least from any other.) "Therefore, I conclude that this is not what I am in search of; for that is peculiar to this place, and without it I am satisfied I could not exist for even a moment. As for this blood, I have often lost quantities of it in my skirmishes with beasts, and yet the loss never rendered me incapable of performing any action of life. From this I am convinced that what I searched for is not in this cavity. This other cavity I find altogether empty; and I have no reason to think that it was made



in vain, as I observe that every part of the body is made and appointed to the performance of some particular function. How then can this ventricle of the heart, of such excellent frame, be of no use? I am forced to think that the animating principle of this body, whatever it may be, once dwelt in this place; but, now that it is gone, its absence occasions this privation of sense and cessation of all motion." He now perceived that the being which inhabited this place had deserted it, while it yet remained whole and entire; whence he concluded that it was not probable that being would ever return to its habitation, in its present mangled condition.

Reasoning thus, the whole body, in the absence of this being, seemed to him an inconsiderable thing; and he therefore resolved to devote his mind entirely to the study of this being: *What it was, and how it subsisted? What joined it to the body; and whither it went, and by what passage, when it left the body? What was the cause of its departure, and whether it were forced to leave its mansion, or departed of its own accord? If it left voluntarily, what was it that rendered the body so disagreeable to it as to make it forsake it?* With these and similar questions perplexing his mind he laid aside all concern for the carcass, and threw it away. He clearly perceived that it was this being—this principle of existence—in the roe, from whence proceeded all her kindness and affection for him; and saw that the body was a mere instrument, or tool, by which these actions were shown. He therefore now desired to consider only that which governs the body, and by the power of which all its actions are regulated.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

In his Commentary on the Symposium of Platon, Marsilius Ficinus gives the names of the nine guests who, in imitation of the nine muses, assembled one 7th of November, at the house of Bandinus, and shared among them the parts of the interlocutors in that dialogue.

#### ON THE BEAUTIFUL.

Lib. VI., Enn. I.

[Translated from the original Greek of Plotinos. Taylor's Version Revised.]

I. Beauty exists, for the most part, in objects of sight; it is also perceived through the sense of hearing in the accordant composition of words, and in every harmony—for melodies and rhythms are beautiful. Moreover, if we proceed from sense to the supersensuous we will there find beautiful studies, actions, habits, sciences, and the beauty of virtues. If there is a beauty superior to these it will appear in this investigation. What, therefore, is that which causes bodies to appear beautiful to the eye, sounds beautiful to the ear, and intelligibles beautiful to the mind? How do all these become beautiful? Are all things beautiful through one and the same beauty, or is there one beauty in body and another in soul? Again, what are these beauties if they are two? And what is beauty if it is one? For some things, as bodies, are beautiful, not from their subjects but from participation; others are essentially beautiful, and such is the nature of virtue. For the same bodies appear at one time beautiful and at another not beautiful, as if the natures of body and beauty are different. Primarily, then, we must consider what that is which by its presence causes bodies to become beautiful. What is that which attracts the eye of the beholder and draws him with rapturous delight to the spectacle? If we dis-

cover what this is we can perhaps use it as a ladder which will enable us to ascend and survey other and higher things. It is the general opinion that a certain commensuration of parts to each other, and to the whole, with the addition of color, produces that beauty which is the object of sight; and that in the commensurate and moderate alone the beauty of everything consists. According to this opinion not the simple but the compound only, the whole itself, will necessarily be beautiful; the single parts will have no individual beauty, and will only be beautiful so far as they contribute to the beauty of the whole. It is certainly necessary, however, that a beautiful whole should consist of beautiful parts; for beauty can never originate from deformity—all the parts therefore must possess beauty.

On this theory, however, beautiful colors and the light of the sun, since they are simple and do not receive their beauty from commensuration, will be destitute of beauty. Moreover, on this hypothesis, how will gold be beautiful? Or the glittering of night and the glorious spectacle of the stars? Similarly the most simple musical sounds will lack beauty; though every note of a song wholly beautiful must be beautiful.

Again, since the same proportion existing, the same face is to one person beautiful and to another the reverse, is it not necessary to call the beauty of the commensurate one kind of beauty, and the commensuration another kind; and to say that the commensurate is beautiful from something else? If, however, transferring themselves to beautiful studies and discourses they posit as the cause of their beauty the proportion of measure,—what is that which in beautiful sciences, laws, and disciplines is called commensurate proportion? Or how can speculations themselves be called mutually commensurate? If it be said because of the inherent concord, we reply that there is a certain concord and harmony in evil souls in regard to believing that temperance is folly and justice generous ignorance. The beauty of soul, therefore, is every virtue; and this species of beauty is truer than any of those previously mentioned. But how in this beauty will commensuration exist? For it is neither like the symmetry in magnitude or in numbers. And since the parts of the soul are many, in what proportion and synthesis, in what temperament of parts or concord of speculations, does beauty exist? Finally, what will be the beauty of intellect itself existing alone and apart from all things?

II. Again beginning, we ask what is corporeal beauty? Primarily it is something which at first view presents itself to sense, and which the soul apprehends and eagerly embraces as if it were allied to itself; meeting with the deformed, however, it hastily retires from the sight and retreats abhorrent from its discordant and alien nature. For since the nature of soul ranks according to the most excellent essence among beings, when it perceives any object related to itself, or the trace of a relationship, it rejoices and is astonished, enters deep into its essence,<sup>1</sup> and finally perfectly recollects the object and its characteristics. What, therefore, is the similitude between sensuous beauty and intelligible beauty? For if their be any similitude, the respective objects must be similar. But in what manner are these two beautiful? For we affirm that every sensible object is beautiful by participation of form. Thus, since everything void of form is naturally prepared for its reception, so far as it is destitute of reason and form it is base and separate from the divine reason; and whatever is entirely remote from the divine reason is perfectly base and deformed. And such is matter which is naturally destitute of form. Whenever, therefore, form accedes,

<sup>1</sup> The Platonic Philosophy insists much on the necessity of retiring into our selves in order to discover truth, and on this account Sokrates in the First Alkibiades says, that the soul entering into herself will contemplate whatever exists, and the Divinity himself.



it conciliates in amicable unity the parts which are about to constitute a whole; for since it is itself one it is necessary that the subject of its power should become one so far as the nature of a compound will admit. Hence, beauty is established in multitude, and in this case form communicates itself both to the parts and to the whole. But when form finds a particular one composed of similar parts it gives itself to the whole without losing the integrity of its nature. Thus at one and the same time it communicates itself to a whole building and its several parts, and at another time confines itself to a single stone. But in this case the first participation arises from the operation of art, in the second from the act of nature. Thus body becomes beautiful through the communion proceeding from Divinity.

III. But the soul by her innate power, than which there is nothing more powerful in judging its proper concerns, when another soul concurs in the decision, recognizes the beauty of forms. Perhaps its knowledge in this case arises from judging form by its innate idea of beauty and using this as its criterion, in the same manner as a rule is employed to ascertain what is straight. But how can that which is in body accord with that which is superior to body? We may reply by asking how the architect pronounces the building beautiful by accommodating the external structure to the fabric in his soul? Perhaps because the outward building, when entirely deprived of the stones, is the intrinsic form divided by the external mass of matter, but indivisibly existing, though appearing in the many. When therefore sense beholds the form in bodies, binding and vanquishing its contrary nature which is destitute of form, and sees form gracefully shining forth in other forms, it collects together the scattered whole, reduces it to itself, and to the indivisible form within; and renders it consonant, congruous, and friendly to its own internal form. Thus to the good man, virtue shining forth in youth is beautiful because consonant to the true internal virtue. But the simple beauty of color is produced when that which is obscure in matter is irradiated and formed by the presence of light, which is something incorporeal and reason and form. Hence, fire surpasses other bodies in beauty because compared with the other elements it obtains the order of form, for it is superior to the rest, and is the most subtle of other bodies, bordering as it were on an incorporeal nature. Moreover, though non-receptive itself it is intimately participated by others; for it imparts heat but admits no cold. Hence, it first receives color and is the source of it to others, and therefore shines forth like some immaterial form. But when it cannot dominate its subject as participating only a meagre light it is no longer beautiful, since it does not receive the whole form of color. Again, vocal music excites the latent harmonies of the soul, and causes the soul to become perceptive of beauty existing in another than itself. But it is the attribute of sensuous harmony to be measured by numbers; not, however, in every proportion of number, but in that alone which is obedient to the production and conquest of its form. And this much for the beauties of sense, which as images and shadows of intelligible beauty flow into matter, adorn it, and strike their respective recipients with wonder and delight.

IV. But it is necessary, leaving every object of sense far behind, to contemplate by a certain ascent a superior beauty—a beauty not visible to the corporeal eye,—but alone manifest to the eye of the soul independent of all corporeal aid. However, since without some previous perception of beauty it is impossible to express by words the beauties of sense, but we must remain in the state of the blind; so neither can we ever speak of the beauty of offices and sciences, and whatever is allied to these, it deprived of their possession. Thus, we shall never be able to tell of Virtue's brightness, unless we perceive the fair countenances of Justice and Temperance, and are convinced that neither

the evening nor the morning star is so beautiful. But it is requisite to perceive objects of this kind with that eye by which the soul beholds things that are truly beautiful. Moreover, it is necessary that he who perceives this species of beauty should be seized with much greater delight and more vehement admiration, than any corporeal beauty can excite; since he now apprehends real and substantial beauty. Such emotions as admiration and sweet astonishment, desire and love, and a pleasant agitation ought to be excited about true beauty; for all souls, so to speak, are thus affected about invisible objects—those being the most affected who have the strongest desire for the object of their love, as it likewise happens about corporeal beauty. For all equally perceive beautiful corporeal forms, yet all are not equally excited, but lovers in the greatest degree.

V. But it is necessary to interrogate those who rise above sense concerning the effects of love. Of such we inquire: What do you suffer respecting beautiful studies, beautiful manners, wise customs, and in short the works and habits of virtue and the beauty of souls? What do you experience on perceiving internal beauty? In what manner are you roused as it were to a Bacchanalian fury; striving to converse with yourselves and separating yourselves from the body? For thus are true lovers affected. But what is that about which these are affected? It is neither figure, nor color, nor magnitude; but the soul itself, destitute of color, and beautiful through wisdom and the light of virtue. This you experience whenever you contemplate your genuine self, or behold in another the magnitude of soul, righteous custom, pure temperance, the venerable countenance of fortitude, and modesty and honesty walking with an intrepid step and a tranquil and steady aspect; and moreover constantly receiving the irradiations of a divine intellect. In what respect then shall we call these beautiful? For they are such as they appear, nor did ever any one behold them and not pronounce them realities. But what are these realities? Perhaps beautiful things. However, reason desires to know how they cause the loveliness of the soul; and what that is in every virtue which shines forth to the view like light? Are you willing then that we should consider the other side, and speculate what in the soul appears deformed? For perhaps it will facilitate our investigation if we can discover what is base in the soul and the cause of this baseness. Let there be supposed a soul deformed, intemperate, and unjust, filled with a rabble of desires, a multitude of troubles, and vexed with idle fears; through its diminutive and avaricious nature the subject of envy; employed solely in thoughts of what is mortal and vulgar; bound in the fetters of impure delights; living the life, whatever it may be, peculiar to the passion of body; and so totally merged in sensuality as to esteem the base pleasant and the deformed beautiful. But may we not say that this baseness approaches the soul as an adventitious evil, which renders it impure and pollutes it with much depravity; so that it neither possesses true life nor true sense, but is endued with a slender life through its admixture of evil, and worn out by the depredations of death,—no longer perceiving the objects of psychical vision nor permitted any more to dwell within itself, because it is ever impelled to things external, inferior, and obscure? Hence, thus becoming impure and being carried in the unceasing world of sensible forms, it is covered with corporeal stains, and wholly given to matter, contracts deeply the material nature, loses all its original splendor, and almost changes its own species into that of another; just as the pristine beauty of any form would be destroyed by its total immersion in mire and clay,—but the deformity of the first arises from inward pollution of its own contraction; of the second of the accession of some foreign nature. If any one therefore desires to recover his pristine beauty it is necessary to remove all impurity, and thus by thorough

purgation to resume his original form. Wherefore if we assert that the soul by her mixture, confusion, and commerce with body and matter becomes base, our assertion will be right; for the baseness of the soul consists in not being pure and sincere. And as gold is deformed by the adherence of earthly clods which are no sooner removed than it shines forth in its native purity, and then becomes beautiful, — when separated from alien nature and content with itself alone, — so the soul, when separated from the sordid desires engendered by its immersion in body and liberated from all other passions, can then, and then only, blot out the base stain imbibed from its corporeal union, and thus becoming alone will doubtless expel all the turpitude contracted from an alien nature.

VI. Indeed, as the ancient oracle declares, temperance, fortitude, prudence, and every virtue are certain purgatives of the soul; and hence the sacred mysteries truthfully yet obscurely prophecy that the soul not purified lies in Tartaros immersed in filth, since the impure is from his depravity the friend of filth; as swine from their sordid body delight in mire alone. For what else is true temperance than not to indulge in corporeal delights, but to fly from them as things which are neither pure nor the offspring of purity? And true fortitude is not to fear death — for death is nothing more than a certain separation of soul from body; and this he will not fear who desires to be alone. Again, magnanimity is the contempt of every mortal concern. And lastly, prudence is intelligence in the turning away from inferior objects and elevating the soul to the supernal region. The soul thus purified becomes form, and reason is entirely incorporeal and intellectual; and wholly participates of the divine nature from whence is the fountain of beauty and all kindred things. Hence the soul reduced to intellect becomes wonderfully beautiful. But intellect and whatever emanates from intellect is not the alien but the proper beauty of the soul. Since the soul only truly exists when in intellect. Wherefore it is rightly said that the beauty and good of the soul consists in her similitude to the Deity; since from hence flows all her beauty and her superior allotment (destiny). But the beautiful itself is that which is called being and beings; and turpitude is of a different nature. But perhaps the good and the beautiful are the same, and must be investigated by one and the same process; and in like manner the base and the evil. And in the first rank we must place the beautiful, which must be considered the same as the good; from which immediately emanates intellect as beautiful. Then we must posit the soul as receiving its beauty from intellect; and all other beautiful things, whether in actions or studies, as deriving their beauty from the formative power of the soul. Lastly, bodies are made beautiful by the soul which being divine, and as it were a part of the beautiful itself, renders the objects which it supervenes and dominates beautiful as far as their nature is receptive of beauty.

VII. Let us therefore again ascend to the Good itself, which every soul desires. If anyone therefore becomes acquainted with this fountain of beauty he will then know what I say, and perceive in what manner he is beautiful. Indeed, whatever is desirable is a species of good, since to this desire tends. The acquisition of the good itself is attained by an ascent to the intelligible world, and the casting aside of those deformed vestments of matter which souls received in their descent. In the same manner as those who enter the Penetralia of sacred mysteries are first purified, and then divest themselves of their garments and thus proceed until some one progressing in the ascent, having dismissed every thing alien to the Divinity, by himself beholds the solitary principle of the universe, sincere, simple, and pure; from which all things depend and to whom all natures look as the proper cause of being, life, and intelligence. He who beholds

the Good itself will be affected with ardent love and strong aspirations, while vehemently desiring to become one with this supreme beauty. For thus it is ordained, that he who does not yet perceive him yet desires him as good; but he who beholds him is enraptured with his beauty, and is equally filled with admiration and delight. Hence such a one is agitated with salutary astonishment, is affected with the highest and truest love, derides vehement affections and inferior loves, and despises the beauty which he once approved. Such, too, is the condition of those who, on perceiving the forms of divinities or dæmons, no longer esteem the most beautiful of corporeal forms. What, then, must be the condition of that being who beholds the Beautiful itself? The Beautiful itself, which is in itself perfectly pure,<sup>1</sup> not confined by any corporeal bond either existing in the heavens or in the earth; since these are all adventitious and mixed, and mere secondary beauties proceeding from the first beauty.

If, then, anyone should ever behold that which is the source of munificence to others, remaining in itself, while it communicates to all and receives nothing; and should so abide in the intuition as to become similar to its nature, what more beauty can such a one desire? For thus beauty, since it is supreme in dignity and excellence, renders its votaries amiable and beautiful. Moreover, since the object of the greatest contest to souls is the Supreme Beauty, we should strive for its acquisition with unabated ardor, lest we should be deprived of that felicitous contemplation which whoever rightly pursues becomes blessed from the happy vision; and which he who does not obtain will be unavoidably unhappy. For the miserable man is not he who neglects to pursue fair colors and beautiful corporeal forms; who is deprived of power and loses dominion and empire; but he alone who is destitute of this divine possession, for which the ample dominion of earth and sea and the empire of the heavens must be relinquished, — if, despising and leaving these things, anyone proposes and desires to behold the Beautiful itself.

VIII. What mode, therefore, what machine shall we employ in order to contemplate this ineffable beauty — a beauty abiding in the most divine sanctuary without ever proceeding forth, lest it should be beheld by the profane and vulgar eye? We must as far as possible enter into our inner nature and, relinquishing the objects of corporeal sight, no longer look back after any of the accustomed spectacles of sense. For it is necessary that whoever beholds this beauty should ignore the most beautiful corporeal forms; and convinced that these are nothing more than images, vestiges, and shadows of beauty, should eagerly soar to the beautiful itself. For he who rushes to these shadows of beauties as if grasping realities when they are only like beautiful images appearing in water, will doubtless, like him in the fable, by stretching after the shadow sink into the lake and disappear. Thus, he who embraces and adheres to corporeal forms is precipitated not so much in his body as in his soul into profound and terrible darkness, and there blind like those in Hades, associates only with phantoms, lacking the perception of reality. Here, then, we may more truly exclaim, "Let us depart from hence and fly to our native land." What, therefore, shall be our flight, and how can we avoid the magic power of Kirke and Kalypso? For this the fable of Odysseus obscurely signifies, which represents him abiding an unwilling exile, though pleasant spectacles were con-

<sup>1</sup> This is analogous to the description of the Beautiful in the latter part of Diotima's Speech in the Banquet; a speech which is surely unequalled both in elegance and sublimity of sentiment. Indeed, all the disciples of Platon are remarkable for nothing so much as their profound and exalted conception of the Deity; and he who can read the Works of Plotinos and Proklos in particular, and afterwards pity the weakness and erroneousness of their opinions on this subject, may be fairly presumed to be himself equally an object of pity and contempt.



tinually presented to his sight, and every inducement offered him to remain. But our true country is from whence we came and where our father lives. Where, therefore, is the ship by which we can accomplish our flight? For our feet are unequal to the task, since they only take us from one part of the earth to another. But it is in vain that we prepare horses to draw, or ships to transport us to our native land. But neglecting all these, and excluding them entirely from our sight, having now closed the corporeal eye, we must awaken and employ a purer, internal, intellectual eye, which all men possess, but which very few use.

IX. What is it, therefore, that this internal eye beholds? Indeed, suddenly awakened it cannot perceive an object exceedingly bright. The soul therefore must become accustomed to contemplate beautiful studies and then beautiful works, not those produced by art, but by worthy men. And next it is necessary to view the soul which originates these beautiful things. But it will be asked, in what manner is this beauty of a worthy soul to be perceived? Thus: recall your thoughts inward, and if while contemplating yourself you do not perceive yourself beautiful imitate the statuary, who when he desires a beautiful statue cuts away what is superfluous, smooths and polishes what is rough, and never desists until he has given it all the beauty his art is able to effect. Thus you must exterminate the superfluous, rectify moral deviations, and by purification illuminate what is obscure; and do not cease to beautify your statue until the divine splendor of Virtue shines upon you, and Temperance seated in pure and holy majesty rises to your view. If you thus become purified, residing in yourself, and having nothing any longer to impede this unity of mind and no internal mixture, but perceiving your whole self to be a true light, and light alone, — a light which is not measured by any magnitude, not limited by any circumscribing figure, but is everywhere immeasurable as being greater than every measure and more excellent than every quantity; if perceiving yourself thus purified and trusting solely to yourself, as no longer requiring a guide, fix now steadfastly your mental view, for with the intellectual eye alone can such immense beauty be perceived. If, however, your eye is still infected with sordid concerns and not thoroughly purified, while it intently endeavors to behold this shining spectacle, it will be immediately darkened and incapable of intuition, though some one should declare the spectacle present which it might otherwise be able to discern. For it is here necessary that the perceiver and the thing perceived should be similar to each other before true vision can exist. Thus the sensitive eye cannot survey the sun unless it becomes solar formed. Neither can any soul perceive beauty unless it becomes beautiful, and it must become deific if it proposes to view a divinity and the Beautiful itself. Proceeding rightly, therefore, he will first ascend to intellect and there contemplate all beautiful forms, the beauty of which he will perceive to be no other than ideas themselves; for all things are beautiful by the supervening irradiation of these because they are the offspring and essence of intellect. That which is superior to intellect is the nature of the Good. Everywhere widely diffusing beauty, and hence called the Beautiful itself, because beauty is its immediate offspring. However, if you accurately distinguish intelligible objects you will denominate the Beautiful itself the receptacle of ideas, and the Good itself which is superior the fountain and principle of the Beautiful itself. Or you may place the first Beautiful and the Good in the same principle, independent of the beauty which subsists in the intelligible world.

[Before I take my leave of Plotinos I cannot refrain from addressing a few words to the Platonical part of my readers. If such, then, is the wisdom contained in the works of this phi-

losopher, as we may conclude from the present specimen, is it fit so divine a treasure should be concealed in shameful oblivion? With respect to true philosophy, you must be sensible that all modern sects are in a state of barbarous ignorance: for Materialism and its attendant Sensuality have darkened the eyes of the many with the mists of error, and are continually strengthening their corporeal tie. And can anything more effectually dissipate this increasing gloom than discourses composed by so sublime a genius, pregnant with the most profound conceptions, and everywhere full of intellectual light? Can anything so thoroughly destroy the phantom of false enthusiasm, as establishing the real object of the true? Let us then boldly enlist ourselves under the banners of Plotinos, and by his assistance vigorously repel the encroachments of error, plunge her dominions into the abyss of forgetfulness, and disperse the darkness of her baneful night. For, indeed, there never was a period which required so much philosophic exertion; or such vehement contention from the lovers of Truth. On all sides nothing of philosophy remains but the name, and this is become the subject of the vilest prostitution; since it is not only engrossed by the naturalist, chemist, and anatomist, but is usurped by the mechanic in every trifling invention, and made subservient to the lucre of traffic and merchandise. There cannot surely be a greater proof of the degeneracy of the times than so unparalleled a degradation, so barbarous a perversion of terms. For the word "philosophy," which implies the love of wisdom, is now become the ornament of folly. In the times of its inventor, and for many succeeding ages, it was expressive of modesty and worth; in our days it is the badge of impudence and vain pretensions. It was formerly the symbol of the profound and contemplative genius; it is now the mark of the superficial and unthinking practitioner. It was once revered by kings and clothed in the robes of nobility; it is now (according to its true acceptance) abandoned and despised and ridiculed by the vilest plebeian. Permit me, then, my friends, to address you in the words of Achilles to Hector:

Rouse then your forces, this important hour;  
Collect your strength, and call forth all your power.

Since, to adopt the animated language of Neptune to the Greeks:

On dastards, dead to fame,  
I waste no anger, for they feel no shame;  
But you, the pride, the flower of all our host,  
My heart weeps blood, to see your glory lost.

Nor deem the exhortation impertinent and the danger groundless.

For lo! the fated time, the appointed shore;  
Hark! the gates burst, the brazen barriers roar.

Impetuous ignorance is thundering at the bulwarks of philosophy, and her sacred retreats are in danger of being demolished through our feeble resistance. Rise then, my friends, and the victory will be ours. The foe is indeed numerous, but at the same time feeble; and the weapons of truth in the hands of vigorous union, descend with irresistible force, and are fatal wherever they fall. — THOMAS TAYLOR.]

## IAMBlichos: A TREATISE ON THE MYSTERIES.

A NEW TRANSLATION, BY ALEXANDER WILDER.

### PART II.

#### THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN SUPERNAL ORDERS.

I. It is necessary, likewise, to point out besides to you this particular thing: "In what respect a tutelary spirit, a half-god, and a soul differ from each other, whether in essence, potency,



or active energy." I say, therefore at once, that the tutelary dæmons have their origin through the generative and creative potencies of the gods, in the outmost limit of emanation, and the last distribution; but the hero-gods have theirs through the principles of life in the gods; and that by these the superior and matured orders of souls are brought to the last point, and to their ulterior differentiation.

As the nature of the tutelary dæmons and the half-gods is thus derived from distinct sources, the necessity also exists that they differ correspondingly in essence. Indeed, that of the tutelary spirits is of an active property and works the perfection of cosmical natures, and the complete development in turn of the things produced. That of the half-gods is life-sustaining and rational, and predominant over souls. The potencies of the dæmons are procreative, and relate to the care of the nature-sphere and of the connection of souls with bodies. It is proper to ascribe to the hero-gods potencies which are life-giving, conferring dominion over mankind and freeing from the sphere of phenomenal existence [γενέσεως].

#### SUPERIOR ORDERS DISTINGUISHED BY ENERGIES.

II. There follows, then, the differentiation according to their active energies. Those of the tutelary dæmons circulate through the universe, and are more widely extended in the results effected by them; but those of the hero-gods are less diffused, and are bestowed upon the directing of souls. Thus are they differentiated. The soul (or psychic essence) is last, and comes in at the end of the divine groups. It has obtained from these two orders just enumerated a specific allotment of potencies, and of itself augments the apportionment by other more abundant additions. At one time it evolves other ideals and principles entirely different from each other, and at another time other forms of life, making use of various living principles and ideas, according to each region of the universe. It unites itself with such as it chooses, and withdraws from what it pleases. Being like all of them, and yet distinct from them by reason of intrinsic diversity of nature, it manifests principles (λόγος) allied both to the things that are and to those which are subject to change, and is of itself connected with the gods, according to harmonies of essence and potency different from those according to which the tutelary spirits and hero-gods are united to them. It possesses in a less degree the eternal condition of similar life and energy; nevertheless, through the good pleasure of the gods and the illumination imparted from them, it often rises higher and attains to a superior condition, even to the angelic plane. It thenceforth continues no more in the limits of psychic being, but through its entire essence is matured into an angelic soul—a living principle absolutely pure from every grosser element. Hence it is that the psychic nature appears to contain in itself the innumerable higher essences, the various rational principles, and all manner of ideal forms; but if it is necessary to state the truth in the matter, it is always assigned its place according to one specific idea, but it is capable of making itself a participant in the other essential causes, and so is at other times united with them.

The difference being so great among them generally, it is therefore no longer necessary to discuss what it is that causes them to differ among themselves, but what nature characterizes each of them respectively, by which they are distinguishable from each other; and also in so far as they are able to constitute one assemblage, their co-partnership is so far to be contemplated. One will be able in this way only to comprehend truly and define distinctly the proper understanding of them.

#### DIVINE AND SPIRITUAL MANIFESTATIONS AT THE INITIATIONS.

III. Let us go on, however, to their visible manifestations

[ἐντεταμέναι] at the sacred initiations. In what respect do they ever differ? You ask: "What is the certain evidence of the presence of a deity, angel, archangel,<sup>1</sup> guardian spirit, or of any potentate or soul?" In a single sentence, therefore, I lay down the proposition that their visible manifestations are analogous to their essences, potencies, and active energies. Such as they indeed are, such also do they appear to those who invoke them, and they exhibit energies and forms consonant with themselves and display their proper tokens of identity. In the way, however, of defining each one particularly, [I will state that] the visible forms [φάσματα] of the gods are alike throughout in appearance; those of the tutelary dæmons are variegated, those of the angels are more simple than those of the dæmons, but inferior in aspect to those of the divinities; those of the archangels approach nearer to the divine causes. Those of the potentates—if indeed those that govern the sublunary elements are regarded by you as the rulers of the universe—will be variegated but disposed in proper order; but if they are those that preside over material substance, they will be indeed more varied, but at the same time more imperfect than the former. Those of the souls will appear to belong to every region of the world. Those of the gods will be witnessed in the vision, shining with a wholesome influence; those of the archangels will be awe-inspiring and at the same time gentle; those of the angels, more mild; those of the tutelary spirits, inspiring with dismay; those of the hero-gods, which matter was omitted in your inquiry, but to which we will vouchsafe an answer for the sake of the truth, are gentler than the apparitions of the tutelary spirits; those of potentates are terrifying, if we refer to those in authority in the cosmic universe; but injurious and distressing, if they are the rulers in the sphere of matter. Those of the souls are like those of the half-gods, except that the latter are superior to them.

#### DIFFERENT CHARACTER OF THE APPARITIONS.

Again, these apparitions of the gods are entirely unchangeable in regard to size, aspect, external appearance, and everything about them. Those of the archangels are closely similar to those of the gods, but come short in exact identity of appearance. Those of angels are inferior to these, but are unchangeable. Those of the tutelary spirits are seen at different times under a diverse visible form, sometimes great and sometimes little, but the same manifested essence. Those of the potentates that are leaders are unchangeable, but the apparitions of those of the material sphere are liable to change into innumerable forms. Those of the half-gods resemble those of the tutelary dæmons, and those of souls yield in no small degree to the tendency of the tutelary spirits to change their aspect.

Besides, with the deities, order and tranquillity are invariably associated, and with the archangels there is a dramatic exhibition of order and tranquillity. With the angels there is a peacefulness and disposition for order, but not freedom from motion. With the apparitions of the tutelary spirits, commotion and disorder are present. With the potentates the visions witnessed are analogous to each of the orders of which we spoke before; those ruling over matter being made known by the tumult, but those ruling in the cosmical region standing firmly by themselves. The apparitions of the half-gods are subject to motion and change; those of the souls are indeed like those of the hero-gods, but at the same time are inferior to them.

In connection with these specific peculiarities, there blazes

<sup>1</sup> The order of angels and archangels is peculiar to the Assyrian and Persian Theology; where seven Kabeiri, or Amshaspands, preside over the planets, and the Yezdis or *malachim*, with Mithras at their head, rule over the universe in a subordinate capacity. The dæmons, half-gods, and souls belong rather to the western countries. — [A. W.]

forth from the presence of the gods a transcendent beauty, which holds the witnesses fixed with admiration, imparts a profound tranquillity of mind, exhibits the arcane harmony, and exalts the mind above other forms of comely appearance. The glorious visions of the archangels have themselves the greatest beauty, yet it is not in like degree arcane and admirable as that of the gods. The figures of the angels exhibit imperfectly the beauty which they receive from the archangels. Those of the tutelary spirits and half-gods, the spirits which are present at the Autopsia,<sup>1</sup> both orders of them have well-defined forms of the supernal beauty; but that of the tutelary spirits is arranged in modes which define essence, and that of the half-gods exhibits the quality of manly fortitude. The apparitions of the potentates are witnessed in their peculiar twofold character. One class displays a dominating and self-originated radiance, and the other an ingenious mock-representation of beauty of shape. The figures of souls are themselves set forth in well-defined forms; but these are more diverse than is the case with the half-gods, as being imperfectly constituted and dominated by a single ideal. If, however, it is necessary to make a concise statement about them all in common, I say of the whole of them, that every one is constituted according to a specific principle and in conformity to its inherent nature, so that it participates of the supernal Beauty according to the existing allotment.

#### OTHER ATTENDANT CONDITIONS.

IV. Pushing the matter of these peculiarities further, however, we remark that with the gods there is a vividness in energies, and although these are stationary and immutable in themselves, they are displayed more rapidly than the Mind itself. With the archangels the rapidity is blended in some manner with efficacious energies. The rapidity peculiar to the angels is sometimes influenced by a specific motion and does not, in a corresponding manner, conduce to effectiveness in expression. With the tutelary spirits the appearance of rapidity in action is greater than the reality. But with the order of half-gods a certain stateliness appears in the movements, yet it is not in their power to accomplish effectively what they desire so rapidly as is the case with the tutelary spirits. In the visions of the potentates the first operations appear imposing and full of power, but the subsequent ones have more display, and nevertheless come short in respect to the final accomplishment. Those of the souls are seemingly in more incessant motion than those of the hero-gods, but nevertheless are feebler.

#### EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENA.

In addition to these things the manifestations by the gods are displayed in such magnitude as sometimes to hide the whole sky, the sun, and the moon; and when they descend, the earth itself is not able to stand still. At the appearing of the archangels parts of the universe are in commotion, and a rapid, divided light goes before. They display this luminous appear-

ance to a degree according with the extent of their dominion. The angelic manifestation is inferior, and is distinguished from it by a greater thinness and a less degree of purity. That of the tutelary spirits is still farther separated, and its density is observed to be not always equal to theirs. The manifestation of the half-gods appears less imposing, and exhibits more of a state of high-mindedness. Those of the potentates who rule over the cosmical races appear great and overbearing; but those who belong to the sphere of matter employ more ostentation and arrogance. The apparitions of souls do not seem all to be alike, and they are inferior in appearance to those of the half-gods. Finally, by this principle and by the magnitude of the visible manifestations they are very properly arranged in every particular, according to the greatness of power in the several orders, and the amplitude of the dominion through which they extend and in which they have predominance.

#### THE LUMINOUS FIGURES EXPLAINED.<sup>1</sup>

Let us now give a comprehensive statement in regard to the Luminous Figures (*αὐτοφανῶν ἀγαλμάτων*). At the Autopsias, the representations of the gods are witnessed more brilliant than reality itself, exhibiting a minute exactness in particulars, and as plainly visible as a distinct organic form. Those of the archangels also appear true and perfect. Those of the angels preserve the figure itself, but they come short in completeness of outline. Those of the tutelary spirits are obscure, and those of the half-gods appear inferior to them. Those of the potentates of the cosmical region are clearly defined, but those of the rulers of the sphere of matter have figures that are scarcely discernible; but both are manifest as endowed with authority. Those of souls appear like mere shadows.

#### THE PECULIAR CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LUMINOSITY.

We will accordingly treat of the peculiar luminosity. The figures of the gods are radiant with a transcendent brightness. Those of the archangels are full of preternatural brilliancy. Those of the angels are also luminous; but the tutelary spirits exhibit the appearance of a smouldering fire. The half-gods display a mixture of various substances. The potentates of the cosmical world are more pure; but those of the sphere of matter exhibit a crude medley of dissimilar and opposite elements. Souls are rendered manifest by a fire constituted from a crude compound of many heterogeneous substances belonging to the transition-world.

#### THE SUPERNAL FIRE WITNESSED AT INITIATIONS.

In the very same manner as set forth, the fire of the gods shines in undivided flame without sound, and fills the immense space of the universe like a conflagration; but not as if it belonged in the cosmical region. That of the archangels is unbroken, but a great mass of smoke is seen around it moving before it or coming along with it. The fire of the angels is broken up, yet it displays very accurate forms. That of the tutelary spirits is circumscribed into briefer limits by a division-line, is expressed by a word, and is not worthy of looking at by those who witness the superior orders. That of the half-gods is in a degree the same, but at the same time comes far short of exact resemblance. That of the potentates appears more distinct in the case of those of the superior class, but of darker hue with those of the region

<sup>1</sup> The *autopsia*, or personal view, was the last scene in the Drama of Initiation. The candidates had been interrogated at the confessional in regard to their purity of life, and had come into the *Sekos*, or Hall of Arcane Rites. "Here," says Mr. Robert Brown, "deeply excited and agitated by all they had gone through, ready to believe anything and everything, in that state of abstinence which is, or is supposed to be, most favorable to the reception of supernatural displays, with their minds more or less affected by drugs, and their whole being permeated with the impression and expectation of a revelation of the more-than-mortal, they were allowed TO SEE. This is the Autopsia, or Personal Inspection, the Crown of Mysteries, the Epopteia or Divine Beholding, which was used as a synonym to express the highest earthly happiness, and he who had enjoyed it became an Epoptes, or Contemplator, beyond which this world could give him nothing." — [Great Dionysiac Myth, VI. II., 3.]

<sup>1</sup> PROKLOS: *Commentary on the Republic*. — "In all initiations and mysteries the gods exhibit many forms of themselves, and appear in a variety of shapes; sometimes a formless light shining from themselves is thrown forth for contemplation; sometimes this luminosity is in a human figure, and sometimes it takes a different shape."



of matter. That of the souls themselves exhibits many shades and many forms, mingled together from innumerable substances about the universe.

To repeat: the fire which is from the gods is always stable to the view; that of the archangels is mild; that of the angels, gently moving; that of the tutelary demons, flickering; that of the half-gods, rapidly vibrating. With the potentates of the superior class it is mild, but with those of the inferior race it is full of fluctuations; and with souls, the flame changes about in innumerable motions.

#### PURIFICATION.<sup>1</sup>

V. The purification of souls is done perfectly among the gods; it is also promoted with the archangels. The angels also dissolve the bonds which attach them to matter. The tutelary spirits attract into the sphere of nature; and the half-gods draw them into the anxiety of the world of the senses. The potentates either place them in charge of cosmical affairs, or else hand over to them the superintendence of things of the material world; and souls, when they come into view, hasten after a manner toward the sphere of transition.

Observe this fact, that you are to impute everything pure and stable in the visible figure, to the superior orders. Hence, its extraordinary brightness and whatever remains immutable in itself, you are to ascribe to the gods. But whatever is aglow and yet existing as by some other principle, you may credit to the archangels; and that which abides permanently in some other energy, to the angels. Whatever is borne along and not stably fixed, and is filled with incongruous substances, all which pertains to inferior order, you may ascribe to one of the other races.

This assignment may also be made according to the different blendings. With the tutelary spirits are mingled exhalations from the cosmical universe, and they are borne along in an uncertain manner by the motion of the universe. With the half-gods groups of spirits having an active tendency toward the transition-sphere are associated, around which they are in motion. The potentates of the cosmical region remain the same, manifesting the cosmical nature which they possess; those of the sphere of matter are full of material exhalations. Souls are characterized by innumerable blotches and incongruous spirits, with which every one of these orders exhibits itself at these visible manifestations.

#### ANOTHER TOKEN.

The instantaneous disappearance of matter in the presence of the gods, will be no small evidence for you. In the presence of the archangels it consumes in a very short time. Before the angels there is a letting go and withdrawing from it. Before the tutelary spirits there is an arranging of it carefully, and with the half-gods an accommodating to it in convenient measures and a bestowing of a diligent oversight upon it. The potentates ruling over the cosmical region stand above it and so manifest themselves; but those belonging to the material sphere exhibit themselves completely saturated with emanations from matter. The pure souls are also manifest entirely free from matter, but those of the opposite character wholly enhanced by it.

#### BENEFITS RECEIVED AT THE AUTOPSIA.

VI. Indeed, the benefits received from the manifestations are

<sup>1</sup> This purification, it will be noticed, has been repeatedly set forth, as incident to the elevation of the soul from its psychic to the angelic or divine rank. Containing in itself the ideal forms of the higher essences, the soul is able to transcend its prior conditions to attain that of a hero-god, guardian angel, or even divine being. — [A. W.]

not all alike, nor do they have the same fruits. The coming<sup>1</sup> of the Gods imparts to us soundness of body, nobility of soul, purity of the interior mind, and in a word elevates all the faculties in us to their proper source. It takes away the cold and deadly principles in us, augments the vital warmth, makes it more potent and more predominating, and causes the whole nature to be in perfect accord with the soul and interior mind. In the divine [*νοητός*] harmony the light shines, and that which is not body it exhibits as body to the eyes of the soul through those of the body. The advent of the archangels itself offers the same boons; but it does not bestow benefits without intermission, nor in all conditions, nor sufficiently or perfectly, or not liable to be cut off; nor do they shine forth equal in any way to the visible manifestations of the gods. The presence of the angels confers benefits distinctly after the manner of a general distribution, and the energy by which it becomes apparent it possesses in a far less degree of consciousness. The approach of the tutelary spirits oppresses the body, afflicts it with disorders, draws down the soul into the nature-sphere, does not enable it to separate from the bodily conditions or the sensitiveness innate in bodily conditions, and holds those in this present place who are moving toward the supernal fire, and liberates none from the hands of fate. The influence of the half-gods is in different respects similar to that of the tutelary spirits, but it is peculiar in the fact of rousing to generous and magnanimous deeds. The Autoptic vision of the potentates of the cosmical region brings with it benefits incident to the cosmical world, and all sorts of things pertaining to this life; but those of the sphere of matter reach after things of material existence and such works as are earthly. The vision of souls, such as are pure of material contamination and permanent in the order of angels, is elevating and wholesome to the soul; it exhibits a sacred hope and bestows the benefits which the sacred hope in its turn also confers. But the vision of other souls occasions the descent into the transition-sphere; it corrupts the fruits of hope, and overcharges the seers with receptive dispositions which nail them fast to corporeal natures.

#### HOW THE SUPERIOR ORDERS ARE EXHIBITED.

VII. Indeed, there is in the Autopsias an exhibition of the rank which the beings possess that are then beheld. The gods have gods and archangels surrounding them; the archangels have angels going before or in concert with them, or following after, or they display a multitude of other angels arranged after the manner of life-guards. Angels have the peculiar work of the order to which they belong. The good demons present for contemplation their own creations and the benefits which they bestow; the vindictive display their various forms of punishment; and the other evil kinds are surrounded by hurtful, blood-sucking, and ferocious monsters (*θηρία*). The one class of potentates exhibits specific parts of the cosmical universe; but the potentates of diverse character attract to themselves the disorder and discord incident to material substance. A soul that is in entirety and circumscribed in no degree by particular specific distinction, is visible as a formless flame over the universe, thus manifesting itself as the entire, sole, indivisible, unshapen soul of everything. But the purified soul appears as a fiery figure, and a pure, uncontaminate fire; and there is witnessed its enhearted light, and its pure and stable form; it follows its leader upward, rejoicing with good will, and manifests its appropriate rank by its deeds. But the soul

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Taylor reads it *παρουσία*, but the text, as it stands, reads *περιουσία*, which signifies bounty. — [A. W.]



that inclines downward, draws after it the symbols of bondage and punishment; it is weighed down by the multitude (*πολυπλοκία*) of spirits belonging to matter; it is held in check by the disturbing perplexities of the material world, and it sets before itself as guardians the tutelary spirits that impel it into the transition-sphere.

In short, all these orders make their respective ranks distinguishable; those of the air exhibit an aerial flame; those of the earth an earthy and gloomier fire, and those of the celestial regions a more splendid luminosity. All the orders are distributed within these three districts by the threefold rank of beginning, middle, and end. The orders of gods manifest the highest and purest causes in this triple arrangement. But those of the angels are included with the archangels. Those of the tutelary spirits appear to be attendants to these, and those of the half-gods are in like manner ministering spirits, not, however, in the same kind of service with the tutelary dæmons, but very different. The orders of potentates, as they have their place, the superintendence of the universe or the sphere of matter, exhibit their peculiar arrangement. Those of the souls are manifest as comprising the last of all the superior orders. Hence they exhibit with themselves their respective positions: the first class the first places, the second class the second places, in their specific ranks in the three orders, and the others in the places as they are severally arranged.

#### THE SUPERNAL LUMINOUS DISPLAYS.

VIII. Moreover, the gods pour forth a luminous atmosphere of such fineness that bodily eyes cannot receive it, but are affected the same as fishes when they are drawn up from muddy and thick water into thin and transparent air. The persons who contemplate the glowing atmosphere of the gods are unable to breathe because of its thinness. They become faint when it appears in sight, and lose their natural breath. The archangels likewise have an atmosphere not tolerable to breathe in, yet they do not send forth a pure emanation like the superior order, nor are in like manner intolerable. The presence of the angels makes the condition of the air endurable, so that it can be inhaled by those engaged in the sacred offices. With the tutelary spirits there is nothing affecting the air; nor does that which circulates around them become at all less dense; nor does a light go before them, in which they may make their own likeness visible; nor does a radiance shine everywhere around them. At the coming of the half-gods, parts of the earth are moved, and hollow sounds are heard all around; but, on the whole, the air does not become more rarefied nor unwholesome to those engaged in the sacred offices, so that it cannot be inhaled. At the appearing of the potentates, there is an attendance of innumerable apparitions hard to withstand; but whether they are earthly or belong to the cosmical region, there is no rarity of the air such as is incident to the cosmical universe, or to the elements on high. With the psychical manifestations, the air appears to be more natural, and, being in harmony with them, admits their forms into its own substance without apparent disturbance.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

#### ON THE VIRTUES.

Enn. I., Lib. 2.

[Translated from the original Greek of Plotinos.]

(CONCLUDED.)

V. We must, however, show how far purification proceeds. For thus it will be evident to whom the similitude is made, and

with what Divinity the soul becomes the same. But this is especially to inquire how far it is possible to be purified from anger and desire, and all the other perturbations, such as pain and things of a kindred nature, — and to separate the soul from the body. And perhaps, indeed, to separate the soul from the body, is for the soul to collect itself, as it were, from different places so as to become entirely impassive, and to make the necessary sensations of pleasures to be only remedies and liberations from pain, in order that the soul may not be disturbed in its energies. It likewise consists in taking away pain, and if this is not possible, in bearing it mildly, and in diminishing its power, in consequence of the rational part not being co-passive with it. Moreover, in taking away anger to the utmost of our ability, and, if possible, entirely; but if not, the rational part must not at the same time be angry, but the anger must be the passion of another part, and unaccompanied with deliberation. And this sudden impulse must be small and imbecile. Fear, however, must be entirely removed; for the purified soul will fear nothing. Here, also, the energy must be unattended with deliberation, except it be requisite to admonish. With respect to desire, it is evident that there must not be a desire of anything base. And as to the desire of meats and drinks for the sake of a remission of pain, the soul herself will be without it. This, likewise, will be the case with the venereal appetite. But if the soul is desirous of connection, it will be I think in the natural way, and this not unattended with deliberation. If, however, it should be an unadvised impulse, it will only be so far as it is accompanied with a precipitate imagination. But in short the rational soul herself will be purified from all these. She will also wish to render the irrational part pure, so that it may not be agitated. And if it is, that the agitation may not be vehement but small, and immediately dissolved by proximity to the rational part. Just as if some one being near to a wise man, should partake of his wisdom by this proximity, or should become similar to him, or through reverence should not dare to do anything which the good man is unwilling to do. Hence there will be no contest. For reason being present will be sufficient, and the inferior part will reverence it, so as even to be itself indignant if it is at all moved, in consequence of not being quiet when its master is present; and it will, on this account, blame its own imbecility.

VI. In conduct of this kind, therefore, there is no sin, but a correction of the man. Nevertheless the endeavor is not to be without sin, but to be a God.<sup>1</sup> Hence, if anything among the above-mentioned particulars should be done without deliberation, such a one will be both a God and a dæmon, being a two-fold character; or rather, having another with him, possessing another virtue. But if nothing is done unadvisedly he will be a God alone. He will, however, be a God in the number of those that follow the First; for he it is who came from thence. And if he becomes by himself such as he came, he is still there. But coming hither he will associate with intellect; and will as-

<sup>1</sup> That is, to be a God according to a similitude to Divinity itself. For through this similitude good men are also called by Platon Gods. Hence, too, Empedokles says of himself:

"Farewell! no mortal, but a God am I."

From this magnificent conception of human nature by the Pythagoreans and Platon, considered according to its true condition, the lofty language of the Stoics about their wise man was doubtless derived. For they assert of him that he possesses continual hilarity and sublime joy; that he is blessed even in torments; that he is without perturbation, because he is stable and remote from error; that he does not opine, because he does not assent to anything false; that nothing happens to him contrary to his expectation; and that he is sufficient to himself, or is contented with himself alone, so far as pertains to living blessedly, and not to merely living; for to the latter many things are necessary, but to the former nothing is requisite but a sane and erect mind, which looks down upon fortune with contempt.

simulate this to himself, according to the power of it. Hence, if possible, he will not be agitated, nor do anything which may be displeasing to the master, intellect. What, therefore, is each of the virtues to such a man as this? Wisdom indeed will consist in the contemplation of what intellect contains. But he will possess intellect by contact. Each of the virtues, however, is two-fold; for each is both in intellect and in soul. And in intellect, indeed, each is not properly virtue, but virtue is in soul. What, then, is it in intellect? The energy of intellect, and that which is. But here that which is in another is virtue derived from thence. For Justice itself, and each of the Virtues, are not in Intellect such as they are here, but they are as it were paradigms. But that which proceeds from each of these into the soul is Virtue. For Virtue pertains to a certain thing. But each thing itself pertains to itself, and not to anything else. With respect to Justice, however, if it is the performance of appropriate duty, does it always consist in a multitude of parts? Or does not one kind consist in multitude, when there are many parts of it, but the other is entirely the performance of appropriate duty, though it should be one thing. True justice itself, therefore, is the energy of one thing towards itself, in which there is not another and another. Hence, Justice in the soul is to energize in a greater degree intellectually. But Temperance is an inward conversion to intellect. And Fortitude is apathy, according to a similitude of that to which the soul looks, and which is naturally impassive. But soul is impassive from virtue, in order that she may not sympathize with her subordinate associate.

VII. These Virtues, therefore, follow each other in the soul, in the same manner as those paradigms in intellect which are prior to virtue. For there intelligence is wisdom and science; a conversion to itself is temperance; its proper work is the performance of its appropriate duty and justice; and that which is as it were fortitude is immateriality, and an abiding with purity in itself. In soul, therefore, perception directed to intellect is wisdom and prudence, which are the virtues of the soul. For soul does not possess these in the same manner as intellect. Other things also follow after, similarly in soul. They are likewise consequent to purification, since all the virtues are purifications, and necessarily consist in the soul being purified — for, otherwise, no one of them would be perfect. And he indeed who possesses the greater virtues has necessarily the less in capacity; but he who possesses the less has not necessarily the greater. This, therefore, is the life which is the principal and leading aim of a worthy man. But whether he possesses in energy, or in some other way, the less or the greater virtues, must be considered by a survey of each of them; as for instance of prudence. For if it uses the other virtues, how can it any longer remain what it is? And if also it should not energize? Likewise, it must be considered whether naturally the virtues proceed to a different extent; and this temperance measures, but that entirely takes away what is superfluous. And in a similar manner in the other virtues, prudence being wholly exerted. Or perhaps the worthy man will see to what extent they proceed. And perhaps sometimes according to circumstances he will energize according to some of them. But arriving at the greater virtues he will perform other measures according to them. Thus, for instance, in the exercise of temperance, he will not measure it by political temperance, but in short he will separate himself as much as possible from the body, and will live not merely the life of a good man, which political virtue thinks fit to enjoin, but leaving this he will choose another life, viz., that of the Gods. For the similitude is to these, and not to good men. The similitude, indeed, to good men is an assimilation of one image to another, each being derived from the same thing; but a similitude to Divinity is an assimilation as to a paradigm.

SELECTIONS FROM IBN-BADJA.<sup>1</sup>

[Translated for THE PLATONIST by ALEXANDER WILDER & Mlle. A. PEONI.]

## SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR.

Abu-Bekr Mohammed ben Yahya, sometimes familiarly called Ibn-al-Sayeg (or the goldsmith's son), but more commonly known by the designation of Ibn-Badja, or son of solitude, was a philosophical writer of distinction among the Arabians or Moors of Spain. He was born at Saragossa in the later years of the Eleventh Century, and studied medicine and the Liberal Sciences at Granada; after which he made his home at Fez, in Africa, where he died in 1138, it is said of poison which had been administered to him at the hands or by the connivance of other physicians who were jealous of his power and eminence. He was destined like other philosophers to encounter the hostility of fanatics, who have been as numerous and powerful in the Mohammedan as in the Pagan and Christian countries. While he lived in Spain, Al-Fat'h ibn-Khakan, a celebrated writer of Andalusia, denounced him as destructive to religion and an affliction to the good, by reason of his errors and folly, neglecting religion and occupying himself with vain studies, such as mathematical (philosophical) knowledge, the celestial bodies, and variations of climate instead of the Koran, etc. Ibn-Badja was the author of several works on mathematics and medicine, several philosophical treatises, and commentaries upon the works of Aristoteles. His principal philosophical works were unfinished and are enumerated as follows: Several treatises on Logic, now in the Library of the Escorial; a treatise on *The Soul*, and another entitled in French, *Du Régime du Solitaire*, a *Rule of Life for the Isolated Person*. He is also credited with a work on *The Unity of the Mind with Man*, and *Farewell Letters* upon the Philosophical Life. The Tract entitled *Du Régime du Solitaire* was perhaps the most distinguished of his writings, but the existing copies appear to be in a mutilated condition. The portions given in this translation are from a work of Moses de Narbonne, the celebrated Jewish philosopher of the Fourteenth Century.

It was a complaint of other philosophical writers that Ibn-Badja was not always clear in the statement of his ideas, and indeed we perceive that Moses de Narbonne endeavors to supplement his expressions by parenthetic notes. "It is difficult to understand his ideas at all times," says Ibn-Rashid, the author of *L'Intellect Hylique*, "We endeavor to point out in another way the object of which this author was the proposer; for he is the only one who has treated of this subject; and all those that preceded him advanced nothing on this point."

This aim of Ibn-Badja, it will be seen, was to set forth the manner by which the individual, by the development of his faculties in due order, would attain to union with the Divine Energy or *Active Intellect*. He considers him as in a peculiar sense isolated and apart from the community, partaking in whatever it has of good, but at the same time under the influence of its vices. He by no means recommends for the consecrated individual, or *solitaire* as he denominates him, a secluded life, but indicates the way by which he can, in the midst of the impediments of life in society, attain the Supreme Good. This way, he shows, can be followed successfully by many persons of like character, having the same sentiments and aiming at the same end, or by a society all together, if it should be perfectly organized. Accepting Society as it is, Ibn-Badja only advises us to seek to live in the best Body Politic (*etat*) that is possible, — that is, in the one

<sup>1</sup> [From *Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe*, par S. MUNK, Membre de l'Institut, Paris; Chez A. Frank, Librairie, Rue Richelieu, 67, 1859.]



which includes in its embrace the greatest number of sages and philosophers. This treatise, *Régime du Solitaire*, is considered by Moses de-Narbonne, in eight chapters, of which the translation here given is a synopsis. — [A. W.]

#### THE PROPER GOVERNMENT OF LIFE FOR THE INDIVIDUAL.

##### CHAPTER I.—INTRODUCTION.

This work having for its purpose the exposition of the proper government of life for the Individual [*Régime du Solitaire*], which forms a constituent part of the City [or commonwealth], the author begins by explaining the meaning of the Arabic word *TEDBIR* (*régime*). That word in its broadest sense, he says, means a concurring of actions directed alike to a certain purpose. That is the reason why we cannot apply to any single action the word *régime* [here translated *proper government of life*], which is only used when treating of many actions directed according to a certain specific plan and a certain purpose, as for example the *political régime*, the *military régime*. In this sense we also speak of the government of God, that he *reigns over* or *governs* the world; for his *régime* according to the notion of common people, resembles the government of political bodies, although in the view of philosophers this is only an expression of dubious meaning. The orderly course of conduct which demands our consideration, relates only to the human soul.

The *régime* [or proper government of life] for the individual [*solitaire*] must be the image of the political *régime* of the Perfect Body Politic [*état*], the Model Commonwealth, — which fact leads the author to enter into details in regard to the political *régime*. One of the principal characteristics of this Ideal State is the absence of physicians and judges. The Medical Art is of no use there because the citizens will eat and drink in the way most promotive of health, and will take no food which can injure them by its quality or quantity. As for sicknesses the immediate causes of which come from without, they very often cure themselves by their own operation. It will be equally useless to make provision for a resort to courts of justice, for the relations of the citizens will be based upon Love, and there will be no disagreement among them. It is manifest also, that in the Perfect Commonwealth every one will attain the greatest perfection of which man may be susceptible; all will have in mind the conduct which is most just; nobody will disregard the customs and laws; and in their conduct there will be no wrong-doing, no levity of manners, no knavery. There will be no need, therefore, for *Remedial Treatment of Souls* (or curative treatment of morals). All these establishments, nevertheless, will be necessary in other commonwealths (which are not perfect), such as the aristocratic, the oligarchical, the democratic, and the monarchical.

Individuals in an imperfect government should endeavor to become constituent members of the Perfect Commonwealth. We give to them the name of *Plants*, because they are analogous to plants that grow spontaneously (naturally) in the midst of their kind (which are artificially reared).

After being possessed of everything that constitutes the perfect Body Politic, and having explained that it originates from the *plants* which exist in the other political bodies, Ibn-Badja declares that it is his purpose in this work to indicate the regulation (*régime*) of those *plants*, that they ought to guide themselves according to the rules of the Perfect Commonwealth, in order that they may have no need for the three kinds of remedial treatment;<sup>1</sup> for God alone is their physician. These *plants* will attain to the happy condition of the interior man (*solitaire*),

for their discipline will not be unlike that of the person who lives the interior life (*le solitaire*). It is of no consequence, adds Ibn-Badja, whether there is only one such person, or many; or to speak more precisely, the designation of separate [*solitaire*] may be applied to a single citizen or to a group of citizens, so long as the whole people or the Commonwealth has not adopted the same sentiments as they entertain, they are the ones whom the Sufis<sup>1</sup> denominate *Strangers*; for by reason of their opinions they are, after a fashion, strangers in their family and in the community which surrounds them; and by their way of thinking they transport themselves into ideal republics which are in a manner their Fatherland.<sup>2</sup>

##### CHAPTER II.—HUMAN AND ANIMAL ACTION.

Entering afterwards upon the subject-matter of his discourse, Ibn-Badja discusses the different kinds of human actions, in order to designate those which will lead to the object sought, and which alone may be considered as truly *human*. There are *rappports* [or peculiar relations] between man and animal analogous to those which exist between animal and plant, and between the plant and minerals. The actions peculiar to Man and truly *human* are those which are the outcome of *free will* (*libre arbitre*), that is, as Ibn-Badja adds, of a will (*volonté*) emanating from reflection, and not from a certain instinct which is also found in animals. Thus, for example, a man who breaks a stone to pieces because it has hurt him does an *animal* action; but if he breaks it to pieces in order that it may not hurt others, it is a *human* action. In the same way the person who swallows cassia<sup>3</sup> as a cathartic medicine performs a *human* action which is accidentally an animal act. So then the animal action has for its moving impulse the simple instinct originating spontaneously in the animal soul, while the human act has for impelling cause an opinion or veritable conviction. It does not matter whether the thought has, or has not, been preceded by a specific instinctive affection of the soul. Most of the actions of mankind under the four modes of *régime* which were mentioned before, are composed of animal and human elements. It is a rare thing to encounter actions purely animal in mankind, but we often find those which are purely human; and such must be those of the *separated person* (*solitaire*).

"The person," says Ibn-Badja, "who acts under the sole influence of reflection and justice without having any regard to the animal soul, deserves that his conduct (*action*) shall be called *divine* rather than *human*; and it is of such that it is proposed to treat in this work upon the *Proper Rule of Life*. It is necessary that a man of this sort shall excel in the moral virtues, in such a way that when the rational soul [*νοῦς*] decides a thing, the animal soul [*θῦμῶς*], so far from opposing it, itself makes the same decision, because reflection wills it so. Under this peculiar relation, it is in the very nature of the animal soul to attain moral virtues, for these are the *entelechy* [or realized purpose] of the animal soul; for which reason the *divine* man must necessarily excel in the moral excellencies. Such is the underlying principle of the *Régime for the Individual*; for if he does not excel in these virtues, and if the animal soul inter-

<sup>1</sup> Sages, from *ἁγιοί*. The designation of a class of philosophers in Moslem countries who disregard the Koran and formal religion, but cherish mystic sentiments. They have been supposed to be successors of the Platonic philosophers exiled by the Roman Christian Emperors. — [A. W.]

<sup>2</sup> This is a comparison borrowed from Al-Farabi who speaks of these choice ones as *strangers* in the community in the midst of which they dwell. This word *stranger* would be a very good equivalent for *solitaire* — one who is, "while in, above the world." — [A. W.]

<sup>3</sup> Not the fragrant spice of India, but a leguminous plant sometimes employed in medicine; combining in its genus the dwarf cassia, American senna, and wild sensitive plant.

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the same as the Hebrew *DEBIR*, a word, oracle, regulation. — [A. W.]  
Medical treatment of the body, moral medical treatment, and that of justice.



poses obstacles at the moment of action, this will be defective and without result; or if it is not so, he (the *solitaire*) will soon become disgusted and it will appear to him too difficult. In fact, it is in the nature of the animal soul to obey the rational soul, except in the person who is not in his natural state, as for example, one who is of inconstant habits, or who lets himself be overcome by anger. That person, then, in whom the animal soul has the upper hand of the rational soul, to such a degree that he is carried away by his passion, which always opposes itself to his reflection — that person, I say, though he is a human being, follows the bent of the animal nature, not knowing how to do any better. I will even say that the beast is better than such a person, for it follows its own nature. Indeed, we can call him *animal* in the absolute sense who possesses human thought by means of which he could do the right, and in spite of it does that which is not right; for in that case he is not man, and the brute is superior to him. He is absolutely animal, since he, having by virtue of his reason entire cognizance of the good, follows the animal nature. At such times, thought is for the person a burden of evil; I mean, when by means of his reason he has the consciousness of good, and then, in spite of it, the animal nature takes absolutely the upper hand over his reason. It is analogous to excellent food administered to a sick body, which, as Hippokratēs says,<sup>1</sup> will only aggravate the malady. As for the action of inanimate things, such as falling, which happens naturally, and going upward, which is occasioned by some impelling cause, it is evident that it takes place by necessity, and there is absolutely neither freedom nor purpose in it; we do not, therefore, have to keep ourselves from it, for the movement in such an action does not come from ourselves. [It does not depend upon our will not to fall or not to be sent forcibly upward.] The *animal* action in the soul, to nourish, generate, and increase in dimension, is accomplished alike without any fixed purpose (that is, it is done naturally and spontaneously); but as it proceeds from ourselves it is in our power from our own accord to stop and abstain from it. The *human* action always goes forth with purpose and from ourselves; and that is the reason why it is always in our power to stop it when we like. It is evident, then, that the *ENDS* (or final causes) can be determined only by actions solely human."

### CHAPTER III. — DOCTRINE OF FORMS.

After having established the proposition that it is solely by means of *human* actions that *ends* may be determined, and that the ultimate end which the person [*solitaire*] ought to have in view is the perception of *spiritual* things, our philosopher goes into details in regard to *spiritual forms*<sup>2</sup> and their different species, in order, he says, to establish accurately the ultimate purpose of the individual here entitled the *solitaire-plant*. He begins by setting forth that order and regulation in human conduct proceed from the faculty of Reason, and this exists for a purpose, or as we commonly say, for an *end*. This end, as will be seen, is the second species of *spiritual* forms.

"The word *SPIRIT*," says Ibn-Badja, "which is (commonly) taken in the same sense as the word *soul*, is used by philosophers in a vague and equivocal manner. Sometimes they mean by the word

the natural heat which is the first faculty (*organe*) of the soul; hence physicians are wont to say that the spirits (or energies) are three in number, namely: the *natural*, *spiritual*, and *impelling*.<sup>3</sup> This name is applied to the soul, not in so much as it is soul in general, but in so much as it is a principle of motion; and in that sense the two words *spirit* and *soul* have the same substratum (or they are synonyms). The word *spiritual* is applied (particularly) to the spirit here named as of the second class (the *spiritual* or *vital*). At other times they designate by the word *spirit*, immobile and *separate*<sup>4</sup> substances which set other substances in motion, and which are not bodies but forms for bodies. The Philosophers, however, do not very often make use of the word *RUH* (spirit) when treating of that matter (that is, of those substances), as the Arabian lexicographers are in the habit of doing; but they by preference say *RUHANI* (spiritual),<sup>5</sup> a word formed according to their method (of derivation), like the Arabic terms *djismāni* (corporeal) and *nafsāni* (psychical). The more a substance is eliminated from the corporeal investment, the more it deserves to be designated by this word (*spiritual*); for which reason it is evident that substances which are the most properly entitled to this denomination are the *Active Intellect* and the (other) which set the spherical bodies (or celestial spheres) in motion."

"Spiritual forms are of (four) different species: The *FIRST* embraces the forms of the spherical (or heavenly) bodies; the *SECOND*, the *Active Intellect* and the *Emanated Intellect*; *THIRD*, the *hylic* or material intelligential forms;<sup>6</sup> and *FOURTH*, the ideas which exist in the faculties of the Soul, — that is, in the common [or natural] sense, the imagination and memory. The first species has absolutely no rapport with matter. The second species has not (in itself) anything of the *hylic*, for it never becomes a *hylic* form,<sup>7</sup> but it is in *rapport* with matter in this respect: that it completes *hylic* forms after the manner of *emanated* intellect, or it creates them as though it was the *Active* (operative) *Intellect*. The third species is in direct rapport with matter. It is called *hylic* because it embraces the *material* things possessing intelligence; — that is, those which are not *spiritual* by virtue of their essence; having their existence in matter and being distinct from the corporeal condition only. They are after a certain fashion forms (which abide) in the rational faculty (of the soul) when the *particular rapport* which had been between it and the individual thing has ceased to exist; for, so long as this particular *rapport* exists, it (the rational faculty) is always influenced by a certain bodied condition which causes the rapport to be corporeal. When, however, the embodied condition is at an end, and the faculty becomes purely spiritual [immaterial], it only conserves the *universal rapport*, that is to say — the peculiar

<sup>1</sup> The latter two of these are commonly styled the *vital* spirit and the *psychical* or soul-like. The view generally taken in the *miscellany* is that of Rabbi Solomon-Ibn-Gebriol, or Avicenna, that the soul and the body are two opposites, to which the spirit is intermediary, not to say catalytic, but rather the band uniting them. The ancient writers treat of three spirits or energies: the *natural*, *vital*, and *animal*, all which Avicenna includes in the one term *RUH*, and which the redactor considers admit of no other interpretation. — [A. W.]

<sup>2</sup> The author, it will be observed is speaking of the *Intelligences des Spheres*, denominated likewise *Intelligences Separées*.

<sup>3</sup> In the judgment of the redactor, the author here means that, in the philosophical technology, separate substances are not merely denominated *spirits*, but *spiritual beings*, or entities.

<sup>4</sup> These are forms apprehended by the higher reason, or ideas abstracted from things themselves.

I have taken the liberty to render the word *intelligible*, which popularly means only capable of being understood, by this word, which though not graceful is more expressive of the unbodied mind to which it relates. It is easy to perceive Emanuel Swedenborg derived his classification of *natural*, *spiritual*, and *celestial*, from these philosophers with whose theorems he was familiar. — [A. W.]

<sup>5</sup> A *hylic* or material form is an ideal or form that is associated with a material vehicle or embodiment. Hence we have rendered *matière* by those equivalents. The substance denominated *ether* by scientists, is doubtless the *hylic* of the old philosophers. — [A. W.]

<sup>1</sup> "When bodies are not free from disorder, the more that food is given the more sick they become."

<sup>2</sup> The distinction which is made in the Peripatetic Philosophy between the words *form* and *matter* [*ὕλη*, *hylē*] should be carefully observed. *Form* as here spoken of, is not *shape* in any instance, but *idea* or *ideality*. Similar care must be used in regard to the word *spiritual*. It is about the complement of the Greek *νοερός*, non-material; pure from all matter; the abstract idea of all the faculties of the human soul. The human soul receives such forms, and constitutes a *vahan*, vehicle, or embodiment for them. — [A. W.]

relation to all individuals.<sup>1</sup> The fourth species is intermediate between the hylic intelligential forms and those (purely) material.

As for the first species, we will not busy ourselves with it in this treatise, for it has no peculiar relation with what we are desirous to explain. We will speak only of one single form absolutely *spiritual* [πνευματική, non-material], and that is the *Active Intellect*, and what is in rapport with this, the intelligential (forms). These (forms) which are apprehended by the higher reason are called *universal spiritual*, while the forms which are inferior to them and have their existence in the common sense-perception are named *individual spiritual*, because they permanently continue individual. Indeed, the assignment is made according to these two *rappports*. The universal rapport is nothing else than the universal assignment of each of the individuals (of a kind), which also gives birth to the individual designation in which the assignment is universal. On the contrary, the individual *rapport* (or peculiar relation) gives place to the individual designation in which the assignment is individual."

#### CHAPTER IV. — HUMAN ACTION.

Human actions are divided according to forms which have just been explained :

1. Some of these actions have no aim except as relating to the corporeal form ; as for example, drinking, eating, clothing of one's self, providing for one's self a home. At first, actions of this kind have only material enjoyment for an object ; but they are destined to perfect the corporeal form and we must not neglect them.

2. Other actions have regard to particular or individual spiritual forms. They are of different kinds, according to the nature more or less noble of the ideal forms which they have for an object. These are as follows : (a.) Actions which are directed toward the spiritual forms which are in the *common sense-perception* (the first of the faculties which have been denominated *interior perceptive*). This kind, although in *rapport* with corporeal actions, is nevertheless superior to them. The author quotes for example the vanity of certain persons clothing themselves elegantly on the outside, while they take less care in regard to the apparelling of the interior man ; the satisfaction which is to be found is not a specific matter of external sense, but appertains to an interior perception which possesses something of spirituality. (b.) Actions which are directed toward this spiritual form which is in the *imagination*, as for example, the putting on of armor when there is no battle. (c.) Actions which have diversions and pleasure for their object, as for example, reunions of friends, sports, gallantries, luxury of houses and furniture, eloquence and poetry. (d.) Actions in which only the purpose is had of becoming perfect in the moral and intellectual sense, as for example, when a person studies certain sciences for the sole purpose of cultivating his mind (*esprit*), without seeking any material advantage, or when he performs liberal and generous acts without any interested view. All these actions ought to be done for their own sakes, and ought not to have any other purpose outside of them than the perfecting of the spiritual form of the person himself. There are some, however, who seek only glory and renown in these actions, and who think that the greatest happiness for a human being is to go down to posterity. The Arabs, the author adds, attach much more importance to *future memory* than many other peoples, and one of their poets has said : *The memory which a man leaves after him is his second life.*

<sup>1</sup> In other words, the forms denominated *hylic intelligibles* are forms separate and apart from things, which the hylic (or passive) intellect, influenced by the embodied condition, possessed *potentially* and which the active intellect causes to pass into *activity*, after such a manner that they are perceived in all their universality.

3. Actions which have as their object the universal spiritual forms and are the most perfect among *spiritual* actions. The forms which are mentioned here hold the middle place among the preceding ones, which are mixed up after a fashion with corporeal existence, and the absolute spirituality, which is the final aim of the person who seeks happiness, or the ulterior purpose of the *recluse* (*solitaire*).

#### CHAPTER V. — AIMS OF LIFE.

After having thus classified human actions according to the forms to which they tend, our philosopher specifies the *aims* of these actions particularly for each form. The aims, as we have seen, are of three kinds, for they pertain either to the corporeal form, or to the individual spiritual, or to the universal celestial form. The actions purely corporeal, which assimilate man to the beast, may be left entirely out in this discussion. As for *individual spirituality*, it puts the moral or intellectual qualities into active operation in the individual. Certain *moral* qualities of man are also met with in animals ; as for example, courage in the lion, pride in the peacock, vigilance in the dog, etc. But these properties are by no means peculiar to certain individuals of the species ; they are instinctive qualities belonging to the whole species, and are not met with as *individual* qualities in man only, who can give them the character of *virtues* by exercising them in just measure and in a manner always opportune. Intellectual qualities constitute a particular class in human spiritual forms with which the other qualities have nothing in common. Intellectual actions and ascertained truths (*sciences*) in their actual being (*réalité*), all of them, are absolute perfections which give to man the superlatively true existence, while the individual spiritual form sometimes gives him an existence of a certain duration, as for example that which is had from renown, but which is nothing in comparison with that which is obtained by means of the moral and intellectual qualities.

To have the corporeal idea alone in chief regard would be to place one's self on the level with the brute. But it would be equally acting against nature to forget entirely the corporeal existence. That is only permissible in certain circumstances in which it is a duty for man to despise life, as for example, when it becomes him to die for the defense of his country or for religion. No material [or unspiritual] person can attain to happiness, and it is necessary in order to attain it to be absolutely spiritual and truly divine.

"In the same way," the author continues, "it is apparent that the *spiritual* man ought to do certain corporeal actions, but not for their own sake, although he performs actions of a spiritual character on their own account. So also it is necessary for the philosopher to perform many actions of the *spiritual* character, without doing them for their own sake ; although he ought to do *intelligential* actions on their own account. He will take from the corporeal sphere only that which serves as the instrumentality to prolong his existence, but he will not banish it entirely away from the spiritual. He will take by a similar rule from the spiritual sphere, even the most exalted, only what is necessary for the *sphere of intelligence*, and he will finally hold to the absolute *Intelligence*. In respect to the *corporeal* sphere he will be simply a human being ; by the means of the *spiritual* he will be a more exalted being ; and by the *intelligential*, he will be a superior and divine being. The philosopher is necessarily, therefore, a superior and divine man ; but on condition that he shall choose only that which is nobler in every kind of actions ; that he associates with men of every class for the sake of that which is most worthy in the qualities possessed by them, and that he distinguishes himself



from every one by the most exalted and most glorious conduct. And when he shall have attained the final aim (*fin dernière*), that is, when he shall come to understand the *simple intelligences* and *separate substances* in all their essence, he will himself be one among them, and it may justly be said of him that he is an absolutely divine being. The imperfect conditions of *corporeal existence*, and even the higher qualities of the *spiritual mode of being* (*spiritualité*) will be far behind him, and he will deserve the single attribute of *divine*, without having anything of the corporeal or of the spiritual. All the qualities aforesaid are those of the isolated person, the citizen of the Perfect Commonwealth."

#### CHAPTER VI. — UNIVERSAL IDEALITIES.

The individual spiritual forms (or ideals), as has just been seen, are not the essential object which the individual proposes for himself. Although they are in *rappor*t, in a degree, with the universal spiritual forms, or the intelligible forms, they have their place mainly in *common sense-perception*, as though they had been there from the beginning, or had come to it as an emanation from the senses. They rise gradually, and are of four kinds: 1. The most common are those which abide in the senses, or in sense-perception. 2. Another species is in *nature*,<sup>1</sup> "for," says the author, "he who is thirsty finds in himself a spiritual form to make him seek for water; whoever is hungry to seek for food, and whoever desires anything whatever, to seek for the object desired. This form (idea) which comes from nature, does not correspond to any particular bodily substance; for he that is thirsty does not wish for some particular water, but any water of the kind that he needs. This is the reason why Galieus has maintained that animals perceive species (or universals)." 3. The third species is the spiritual form which induces *thought*, or the form which supervenes through reflection and demonstration. 4. The fourth kind comprises the forms which are produced by the influence of the Active Intellect, without the agency (*secours*) of thought and demonstration. In this category come the prophetic inspirations and true dreams,<sup>2</sup> which are true *from their essence*, and not solely *from accident*.

The first two species are common to man and beast. Those endowments which the animal needs for his physical completeness nature gives equally to all animals. There are some, however, says the author, which nature dispenses by simple liberality. These are found in certain animals only, and in this last case it takes place above all with animals which have not [red] blood, as bees and ants.<sup>3</sup> The last two species of spiritual forms (ideals) pertain only to human beings, and hold in some way the middle place between individual spiritual forms and the forms which have relation to the higher reason; for they are not individual forms by means of their bodies, nor indeed are they individual spiritual forms as being endowed with sensibility, and they are not entirely abstracted from matter in such a way that they can be called *universal*, like forms which are purely of the sphere of the higher reason. We may ordinarily recognize by the

look of more or less animation, the higher or lower degree of spirituality and pure intellect to which the person has attained.

#### CHAPTER VII. — THE DUTY OF ISOLATION.

After having thus analyzed all the spiritual forms and the actions which correspond to them, Ibn-Badja sets forth that it is not proper for the isolated individual to shape his action in regard to the spiritual forms by themselves, — for they are not *final* [or first causes], although they aid to attain the final purpose. It is also indeed required that he shall separate himself from those who only possess these forms; for they are liable to leave in his soul certain traces which would prevent him from attaining true felicity. We let the author speak for himself: —

"Spiritual forms, individual as much as *intermediary*,<sup>1</sup> must not by any means be regarded as the final end; for they are things which, for the most part, happen naturally, and are not in general the result of the will. The best among them, those which appear to be the result of the will, are in the three following categories: They are (1) either purely corporeal, like [those which have for their purpose] agriculture and other similar arts; or (2) individual spiritual forms [having for their] object certain other arts; or (3) intelligential forms [having for their] end esoteric knowledge (*mathématiques*), poetry, etc.

"These forms, all of them, do not constitute the final purpose, but it is by means of them that we attain to the others (that is, to the *final* forms) of which they are the causes. Let us suppose a man entirely virtuous, like the Mahdi,<sup>2</sup> and another superlatively wicked, as the poet Abu-Dolama.<sup>3</sup> Each of the two, possessing the (essential) form which properly belonged to the other, and each spiritual form putting in motion the body in which it happens to be, the form of Abu-Dolama will influence the Mahdi to the pursuit of pleasure and levity, by means of this conception of the vices of the former, while the form of the Mahdi will lead Abu-Dolama to modest and upright conduct, because he will be made humble through having received the exalted nature of the Mahdi and his noble spiritual form. It is evident, therefore, that modesty and uprightness are qualities superior to an aimless life and wantonness; hence, by the influence of the [ideal] form of the superior man, I mean by the conception of that form, the inferior person is able to make himself nobler; and in like manner, through the [ideal] form of the inferior person, the superior one can be made vile. We ought therefore to isolate ourselves; and in this manner the most vile will purify himself and proclaim aloud the excellence of the superior man, and the superior person will escape from the impulsion which he might receive from the impure man, and will think only of isolating himself. Every one, then, will attract his neighbor to the side where he happens to be; and the religious poet Seid Ibn-'Adi had good reason for saying, '*He does not ask for the prince, but he asks for his own likeness; for everyone is attracted by means of his own likeness.*'"

"The isolated individual will meanwhile continue pure [from the contact] of his own likenesses; for it is his duty to keep himself from alliance with the *material* man, and even from him who has for aim only the absolutely *spiritual*<sup>4</sup> (or non-material); on the contrary, it is his duty to associate himself with men of true

<sup>1</sup> By *nature* Ibn-Badja appears to mean the natural inclination or the appetite which originates only with the concurrence of the *imagination*, whereas the forms of the first species come from sense-perception.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is here made to the *HILUM A SYDER* mentioned by Rabbi Solomon Ibn-Gebrol, *Source de la Vie*, book V. Treating of Universal Matter and Universal Form, he sets forth that the forms (ideals) of all things exist in the supreme form of the Universal Reason. The Soul thinks and goes forth to what is in the individual intellect; whence it makes a representation of the forms of things by means of the Imaginative Faculty in mature life, and also by the *true dreams* (*HILUM A SYDER*), which contains in it the genuine interior perception which it is easy to interpret. — [A. W.]

<sup>3</sup> Aristotelés has made the observation that certain animals which have not [red] blood, as bees and ants for example, are endowed with a prudence which is nowhere found among the others.

<sup>1</sup> The author means by *intermediary*, the third and fourth kind of individual spiritual forms, as set forth in Chapter VI.

The name *Mahdi* means a guide, and by implication, one directed by God. It is used to designate a person of great sanctity, especially the twelfth and last *imam* of the race of Ali, who lived in the third century of the Hegira.

<sup>3</sup> The name of an Arabian poet of the eighth century, who had the reputation of being an immoral and vicious man.

<sup>4</sup> *La spiritual absolu*: the most exalted spiritual ideals.



knowledge (*les hommes de science*).<sup>1</sup> As, however, men of true knowledge, though numerous in some places are scarce in others, and are sometimes entirely wanting, it is the duty of the isolated individual in some places to detach himself completely from mankind, as much as it is possible, and to mingle with them only for necessary things and to a necessary degree. He must put them away from him, for they are not of his kind; he may not mix with them, nor listen to their vitious discourse, in order that he may have no need to deny their falsehoods, and to pursue with his indignation the enemies of God and inflict His judgment upon them. Would it be proper for the *isolated individual* to make himself the judge of those among whom he dwells? Certainly it will be better for him to devote himself to his divine service (*culte*), and to cast far from him this heavy load while perfecting himself and giving light to others as a bright luminary. He ought to conform himself to the worship of the Creator in secret, as though it was an immodest thing;<sup>2</sup> and in this way he will perfect himself as much in his knowledge as in his religion, and it will please God; . . . or else he will go into places, if he finds any, where (philosophical) science flourishes, and will ally himself with men of mature age who excel by their judgment, their knowledge and intelligence, and in general by virtue of the powers of reason; with accomplished men, and not with young persons without experience.

"This which we have just stated is not in contradiction of what political science declares, namely, that it is a wrong thing to shut one's self away from mankind; nor of what has been shown in physical science, that man is naturally a social being;<sup>3</sup> for that is only true in *substance*, (that is, in principle), when men are possessed of their physical perfections, but *incidentally*, it may be a right thing [to withdraw from society]. Thus, for example, flesh and wine are aliments which may be wholesome to a person, while colocynth and opium destroy life; and it may sometimes be true, nevertheless, that these last are salutary, and the natural aliments kill; but this is rare and only happens incidentally. It is similar to this in the régime of souls."

#### CHAPTER VIII. — THE SPHERE OF THE HIGHER REASON.

We have seen Ibn-Badja eliminate in succession as *non-finalities*, not only bodily ideal forms but also spiritual forms the most exalted. Next, he is about to tell us what this final point is, which the individual must attain, and what the actions are that lead thither. The final goal of the individual is in the ideals of the intelligential or metaphysical plane of thought, and the actions which enable us to attain them, are all from the domain of pure reason, or philosophical thought. It is by study and meditation that a person comes to these *speculative forms*, which have their actual existence in themselves, and which are, so to speak, the ideals of ideas; the most elevated is the *acquired intellect*, an emanation of the *Active intellect*, by which the person comes to be himself comprehended as an intuitional (*intellectual*) being.

"We give the name of *intelligential*," says Ibn-Badja, "to the *species* of all the substances. Man is one of these species, and consequently the (true) form of man is his *generic* form, which

among all spiritual things is the *spiritual* in a superior sense. So, then, as man is distinguished from all other beings, his (ideal) form is distinguished from those of all beings which are born and perish; it is like the forms of celestial bodies, for these are self-conscious, and the substratum qualified by them is their substratum in the second point of view [of which he is about to speak]. Indeed, if the word *substratum* is employed in this connection, it is uttered under two points of view: Firstly, it is said of the thing which relatively *receives* the impression, and is therein the substratum for the manifesting of the form; afterward, it is said in respect to the corporeal being, relatively to what there is of the *superior intelligence* in him. The celestial bodies, therefore, are the substrata for the higher *intelligences*, by means of which they are what they are, and are by no means simple substrata for the manifesting of the forms in them; for they have not received them in order to be a *hylé* [or material basis] for them, and to retain for them their permanent existence, but that which they actually perceive of [ideal] forms, subsists by itself; it is the *cause* of their existence and it exists prior to them, as the parts of the definition exist before the thing defined. It is otherwise of the different species of bodies which *are born*: for these bodies are *substrata* in this sense, that what they have of universality serves to them for a form,<sup>4</sup> and we do not admit that they *perceive* these (universal) things of the pure reason (*intelligibles*), although they *receive* them, and these things of the higher mind have their existence in them. They are, in some way, like *impressions* in material substances; I mean, like the impression of a form in the *hylé*.

"As for the human species, the substratum *qualified* by it is its substratum in the second point of view, and in whatever is man is the *species* of man, although that which receives it may receive the *ideal* form of man in two ways at once; I mean, at one time as form and another time as *perception*, and that is not inadmissible, for it is from two different points of view. Indeed, man has this privilege from the wonderful nature which has caused him to exist. Man, we say, unites in himself many things, and he is *man* only when they are all found united: he has from the beginning the faculty of nutrition which is not that which receives his (true)<sup>2</sup> form. He has in addition the faculty of imagination and memory, which are not, however, any more than the former, the receptacle of his true being. Lastly, he has the faculty of Reason, which perceives its own essence as it perceives other essences, with this difference: that it perceives its own essence in all its reality, while it perceives the other essences only in what they are distinct from its own,<sup>3</sup> considers them as abstract entities, and makes of them things of the *higher intellect*. It is clear that these things of the *higher reason* are in *rapport* with the *hylé* [or material substratum]; for they are not abstract in themselves, because they exist entirely from the beginning only as what there is of the *higher reason* in material things. In fact, it is after their abstraction from the individuals that the universal *rapport* continues which is the *rapport* (of the species) with all the individuals, although the particular *rapport*, — that is, the *rapport* with every individual in particular, — may be destroyed; for matter,<sup>4</sup> being the cause of *corruption* (*φθορά*), the *rapport* (of the form) with it does not remain, so that we say that the '*rational*' of Aristotélès is not the '*rational*' of Platô in regard to forms of the imagination, which differ in themselves according to the difference of the individuals from whom they

<sup>1</sup> By this expression is to be understood sages or philosophers; those who aim at the forms of pure intellect; the *noumena*.

<sup>2</sup> Gospel according to Matthaios, vi: "But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father who is in secret."

<sup>3</sup> It does not appear manifest why the author speaks here of *physical science*; for he evidently alludes to a passage in the *Political Economy* of ARISTOTLES (iv: 1): "Man is by nature a social being."

<sup>1</sup> In other words, their (ideal) form is the *specific* form, or general idea which constitutes their *species*.

<sup>2</sup> That is, the true ideal human form.

<sup>3</sup> In other words, it perceives them after a negative manner, and does not penetrate to real being.

<sup>4</sup> Here the Hebrew text from which this is rendered is very obscure.

have been abstracted, and which have become *things of the higher reason* through the raying out of the Active Intellect."

"Thus, then, the purpose toward which the individual (*solitaire*) must tend who desires immortality, is not in connection with matter; wherefore it leads to the *true* end, where even this universal *rapport* of which we have spoken disappears. There, indeed, the (ideal) form is completely despoiled of its corporeality, and is not a *hylic form* one single moment; for he (the individual) perceives the forms separately and by themselves, while they have not been abstracted from matter. Indeed, their true existence is their existence in themselves, although they may be *abstracted*. This is the conception of the higher reason. I mean the higher intellect in its real manifestation, or the intellect *in actuality*; it is the manifestation of the emanated intellect, which, above all things else, resembles the Active Intellect. This *emanated* form has not any *rapport* with matter, except in one specific point of view: that is, as the absolute perfection of the hylic entities possessing intelligence; for it is after a certain fashion *intellect in actuality*, which is the substratum of *intellect acquired* or *emanated*. Indeed, when forms have become entities of the intellect *in act* they come within the limit of beings of this world; and by virtue of this very thing that they are intellectual *actually*, they count in the number of living beings. As therefore it is in the nature of all beings to be thought of and to become thoughts of forms by substance (which thinks) it is not inadmissible, as Abu-Nasr says, that things thought — inasmuch as they are intelligential *in act*, that is, *intellect in actuality*, think in their turn.<sup>1</sup> That, therefore, they think cannot be anything else than *intellect in reality*; but that which is *intellect in reality*, because it has the intelligential (*intelligible*) for (its ideal) form is *intellect in act* [or operative intellect] only by *rapport* with this form or with those forms (which it thinks<sup>2</sup>), while for every other object of the higher intellect it is *potential* only. When the intellect is in act by reason of *rapport* with all intelligential things, and is the limit of all the beings, having become itself the intelligential things in act, then thinking of the being which is intellect in act, it does not think of any being other and apart from itself; but it thinks of itself without *abstraction*,<sup>3</sup> for its own being in itself, before any thinking, is *intellect*, or the *intelligential in act*.

"In this, also, it differs from the other objects of intelligences; for these are *thought* at first by virtue of that which they have abstracted from their material embodiment in which they subsist. If, therefore, after having been intelligential *potentially*, they happen to be thought a second time, their being is no more the former being, but is separate from their embodiment; for they are (ideal) forms which are no more in their embodiment, and intelligential things *in actuality*. So, then, when the intellect in act thinks things of the higher intelligence which are its (ideal) forms in so much as they are intelligential in action, this same intellect which we have from the outset designated *intellect in act*, is henceforth *acquired intellect*."<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Al-Farabi says: "They alone who have mastered the first step of (philosophical) knowledge may, by their own efforts and by the influence of their Active Intellect, attain the Supreme Good which they seek to know and to hold fast for their purpose, both by the travail of their mind and all their actions. They who are perfectly in a state of harmony attain at the beginning to the degree of *intellect in act*; and afterward to that of *acquired intellect*, to which the former serves as foundation; and only then are they ready to be joined to the Active Intellect and to receive its activity in a perfect manner. When the person has attained to this degree, it may be said of him that he has received the prophetic endorsement; for man is truly a prophet when he remains immovable without anything to separate, any veil between him and the Active Intellect."

<sup>2</sup> BULWER LYTTON (*Zanoni*): "Every thought is a soul."

<sup>3</sup> That is, this act of thinking does not consist in the abstracting of the (ideal) form from its substratum.

<sup>4</sup> Rabbi Ibn-Gebriol (or Avicbron) says: "The particular soul, that which

"As therefore there are entities that are forms without a material embodiment, forms that have never been so embodied, these entities, whenever one thinks them, exist as things (purely) of the intellect, *such as exist before having been thought*. For if, as we have said, to think a thing from the first start is to *abstract* hylic form; from their embodiment, they (the forms) acquire thereby a mode of existence other than their first existence. As, however, it operates here with things which are (purely ideal) forms without embodiment, the substance has no need to be considered abstractly from its embodiment; on the contrary, the intellect being *in act*, finds them abstract and thinks them such as they exist in themselves, — that is, as things intellectual and immaterial. And when it thinks them, its own being, as a thing intellectual, becomes a *second intellect*, of which however the essential before the thinking was the same intellect. This it is necessary to understand in this sense that, as it concerns immaterial forms, these, when they are thoughts, exist absolutely the same as they existed in themselves, before, having become intelligential in the full force of the expression. For in the same way in which we speak of the intellect which is in ourselves, that it is in us *in actuality*, we should speak likewise of these intellects which are in the universe (outside of us.) These (ideal) forms can be thoughts in all their completeness, when all the objects of our interior nature, or at least the most of them, have become *intelligential in act*. The intellect then becomes *acquired intellect*, and the aforesaid intellectual forms become forms for the intellect as *acquired intellect*. The acquired intellect is, in some way, the substratum of these forms, while it is itself a form for the intellect in act, — which, in its turn is as a substratum and an embodiment for the acquired intellect; (on the other hand) the *intellect in act* is a form for the substance (in which it resides),<sup>1</sup> and that substance is as an embodiment."

"Since, then, the *Active Intellect* is indivisible, I mean, since all the specific forms together are in it as only one alone, or at least, since their essences are indivisible things [I mean, since all their specific forms exist in it as a unit],<sup>2</sup> the knowledge of that separated intellect, by reason of its superiority, is a *unit*, though the objects of that knowledge are manifold, according to the multiplicity of species. If the (ideal) forms which come from it are manifold, it is only because they are produced as (different) embodiments. Indeed, the forms which exist to-day in certain embodiments, are one (sole) *abstract* form in the *Active Intellect*; but not in that sense in which they have been abstracted, after having existed in embodiments, as that is the place for the *intellect in act*. Nothing hinders the intellect in act from making efforts to bring these separated forms little by little, near to itself,<sup>3</sup> till it attains the (purely) intelligential conception, — that is, the *acquired intellect*; wherefore the human essence, or man by virtue of that which constitutes his essence, is the entity which approaches nearest to the *Active Intellect*. Nothing any more hinders this (acquired) intellect

is called the *first intellect*, is from the outset as an embodiment (*hylis*) which receives the (ideal) form, and (this intellect) after having received the form of the universal intellect, which is the *third intellect*, passes into activity and is then called the *second intellect*."

The Arabian philosophers generally designate this "first intellect," the *material* or *hylic intellect*, as having in a manner the office of a material body, or embodiment. It is a simple potentiality, a disposition of the rational faculty to abstract or draw forth the ideal forms in order to consider them by themselves. When this intellect has learned to do this, it becomes *intellect in act*; and when this intellect in action has become in a certain sense the *property* of the person, in such a manner that it may at any moment and without new efforts, become identified with intelligential forms, it is called the *acquired intellect*. — [A. W.]

<sup>1</sup> This is, for the *hylic intellect*, as for the man.

<sup>2</sup> The author means: Since the Active Intellect embraces all forms in general, and these constitute one unity in it, or since, at least, all individual forms belonging to one same species are in it as sole specific form, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, "bring them near little by little (making them return), from the state of separation."



from bestowing at times what the other intellects [the hylic intellect and the intellect in act] have been bestowing from the outset, namely, the impulse of self-consciousness; and thence comes the true conception of intelligence, that is, the perception of [real] being, which, by virtue of its own essence, is *intellect in actuality*, without having had need either now or heretofore of something which could enable it to go forth from the state of *potentiality*. This is the conception of the *separate* intellect, I mean the *Active Intellect* such as it is, conceived in itself, and this is the end of all impelling movements."<sup>1</sup>

## THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS TAYLOR, THE PLATONIST.

(CONCLUDED.)

In 1820 appeared Mr. Taylor's version of one of the most erudite and profound productions of antiquity, viz.: "The Commentaries of Proklos on the *Timaios* of Platon, in Five Books; containing a Treasury of Pythagoric and Platonic Physiology." 2 vols. 4to.

"Of that golden chain of philosophers who, having themselves happily penetrated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Platon, Proklos is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link. Born with a genius transcendently great, and accompanied through life with a fortune singularly good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power concurred with will, the benefit resulting from genuine philosophy with the ability of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. The eulogium, therefore, of Ammonios Hermeias, that "Proklos possessed the power of unfolding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of things, in the highest perfection possible to humanity," will be immediately assented to by every one who is an adept in the writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice, therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Coryphean philosopher; though unfortunately, like most of his other works, it has been transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain a third part of the *Timaios*; and from a passage in Olympiodoros, On the *Meteors* of Aristoteles, there is every reason to believe that Proklos left no part of the *Timaios* without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable from what Marinos says in his life of him, "That he was a man laborious to a miracle;" for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater part of one of the most important dialogues of Platon unelucidated, and particularly as these Commentaries were written by him, as the same Marinos informs us, in the flower of his age, and that he preferred them beyond all his other works.<sup>2</sup>

Fortunately, however, the most important part of this work is preserved; or that part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are unfolded; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and demiur-

gic sections, and distributed with divine numbers; and soul is produced from the Demiourgos, and is filled with harmonic ratios, and divine and fabricative symbols. The whole mundane animal too is here shown to be connected according to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world; and the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmonize with the whole, both such as are corporeal, and such as are vital. For partial souls such as ours are introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane gods, and become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected. The progression of the elements likewise from their first incorporeal subsistence to their subterranean termination, and the nature of the heavens and heavenly bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific reasoning, it is shown that every planet is surrounded with satellites, that the fixed stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is to us unknown; and that the stars, which at times disappear and again become visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of a more primary dignity, behind the splendors of which they are occasionally concealed. These and many other most interesting particulars are unfolded in these Commentaries with an accuracy and perspicuity which have seldom been equaled, and have never been excelled.

When I speak, however, of the perspicuity with which these particulars are developed, I do not mean that they are delivered in such a way as to be obvious to every one, or that they may be apprehended as soon as read—for this pertains only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day;—but my meaning is that they are written with all the clearness which they are naturally capable of admitting, or which a genuine student of the philosophy of Platon can desire. And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since the revival of letters, has been generally entertained of the writings of Proklos and other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter Platonists, and to show the cause from which it originated.

The opinion to which I allude is this, that Plotinos and his followers, or in other words, all the Platonists that existed from his time to the fall of the Roman Empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinianus, corrupted the philosophy of Platon by filling it with jargon and revery, and by ascribing dogmas to him which are not to be found in his writings, and which are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they profess to have detected; and that they had studied the writings of the men whom they so grossly defame. This, however, is very far from being the case. For since the philosophy of Platon, as I have elsewhere shown, is the offspring of the most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior and others as posterior, and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in Euklides,—certain preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doctrines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathematics, have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted with physics. He must also be an adept in the writings of Aristoteles, as preparatory to the more sublime speculations of Platon. And in addition to all this he must possess those qualifications enumerated by Platon in the 7th book of his Republic, viz: he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, be magnificent and orderly, and the friend and ally of justice, truth, fortitude, and temperance. Since the revival of letters, however, this philosophy has not been studied by men who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably

<sup>1</sup> C'est là la conception de l'intellect séparé, je veux dire de l'intellect actif, tel qu'il se conçoit lui-même, et c'est là la fin de tous les mouvements.

<sup>2</sup> The late Dr. Charles Burney, on being once asked by me whether he had ever read these Commentaries, candidly replied, "that they were too much for him;" at the same time exclaiming, "what a giant was Proklos compared to Longinos." This confession, as the Doctor had never studied the philosophy of Platon, displayed a degree of good sense which is seldom to be met with in a grammarian and philologist, on such an occasion; and his candor is still more remarkable when it is considered that he had been a reviewer.



necessary, or who have attempted the acquisition of it in this regular and scientific method. Hence they have presumed to decide on the excellence of works, with the true merits of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand. They appear likewise to have been ignorant that Platon, conformably to all the other great philosophers of antiquity, wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing that they would only be profaned by them without being understood; the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being sufficiently strong to bear the light of truth. Hence, as Proklos (Com. in Parmen.) well observes, "it is needless to mention that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of dogmas before the multitude, Platon himself asserting that all these are ridiculous to the many, but in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also the Pythagoreans said: that of discourses, some are mystical, but others adapted to be delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise some are esoteric, and others exoteric; and Parmenides himself wrote some things conformable to truth, but others to opinion; and Zenon calls some assertions true, but others adapted to the necessary purposes of life." The men therefore who have defamed the latter Platonists, being thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing adopted by the great ancients, finding from a superficial perusal of the most genuine disciples of Platon many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them were delirious, and that they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It may also be added, as Olympiodoros justly observes, that the writings of Platon, like those of Homeros, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and in short, multifariously; and that he who does not thus consider them will in vain attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain. By the latter Platonists, however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing himself of the elucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men will find the arduous sublimities of Platon accessible, his mystic narrations conformable to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity the veil of conceptions truly luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of the prevailing iniquitous opinion respecting the writings of the latter Platonists, for the authors of it I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will confirm the decision, that whoever they were they were no less ignorant than arrogant, no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, I have only to observe that I have endeavored, to the utmost of my ability, to unite in it faithfulness with perspicuity, and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original. Independent of the difficulties inseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this work, the original abounds with errors not of a trifling, but of the most important nature—errors which so materially affect the sense that no one can read these Commentaries unless he corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them unless he is well acquainted with the philosophy of Platon. Of this the reader may be convinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will find upwards of eleven hundred *necessary* emendations. I call them *necessary* because they are not the offspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably demands. Of translations, too, of this work, I could not avail myself, for of the whole of it there is none; and a Latin translation of a part of the third book, by Nicholaus Leonicius Thomæus, is the only aid that has been afforded me in this

arduous undertaking. From this translation I have been able, as the learned reader will perceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original, and not unfrequently to add to it not only particular words, but entire sentences that were wanting.

And now I shall conclude with observing, that though like most others who have labored greatly for the good, not merely of their country but of all mankind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labors; and that though on this account I am not much indebted,<sup>1</sup> yet I sincerely wish well to my native land, and to every individual in it. That I have neither been influenced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honors of the multitude, in the prosecution of these labors, must be evident from the nature of them, to the most careless observer. The most perfect conviction, indeed, that a greater good than the philosophy of Platon and Aristoteles was never imparted by Divinity to man, and the consequent persuasion that I could not confer a more real benefit on the present age and posterity than by a dissemination of it in my native tongue, as they induced me to engage in such a difficult undertaking, have also been attended with the purest delight, from a conviction that I was acting rightly, and therefore in a way pleasing to Divinity. Hence in accomplishing this Herculean task I have been satisfied with exploring myself and imparting to others the treasures of ancient wisdom; and with endeavoring to deserve the favorable regard of that Ineffable Principle, whose approbation is not only the highest honor that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most desirable and substantial gain." (Entire Introduction.)

Prof. C. E. C. Schneider, in his edition of this work of Proklos (Breslau, 1847), quotes Taylor on almost every page, and adopts many of his emendations.

In 1820 also appeared a second edition, with additions, of Mr. Taylor's "Miscellanies in Prose and Verse."

Mr. Taylor in 1821 presented the philosophic public with a translation of a treatise, the true value of which can only be apprehended by those who have profoundly studied the mystical philosophy of the ancients. This work was "Iamblichos on the Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians."

"It appears to me that there are two descriptions of persons by whom the present work must be considered to be of inestimable worth, the lovers of antiquity and the lovers of ancient philosophy and religion. To the former of these it must be invaluable, because it is replete with information derived from the wise men of the Chaldeans, the prophets of the Egyptians, the dogmas of the Assyrians, and the ancient pillars of Hermes; and to the latter, because of the doctrines, contained in it, some of which originated from the Hermaic pillars, were known by Pythagoras and Platon, and were the sources of their philosophy; and others are profoundly theological, and unfold the mysteries of ancient religion with an admirable conciseness of diction, and an inimitable vigor and elegance of conception, to which may also be added, as the colophon of excellence, that it is the most copious, the clearest, and the most satisfactory defence extant of genuine ancient theology.

"This theology, the sacred operations pertaining to which called *theurgy* are here developed, has for the most part, since the destruction of it, been surveyed only in its corruptions among barbarous nations, or during the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, with which, overwhelmed with pollution, it gradually fell, and at length totally vanished from what is called the polished part of the globe. \* \* \*

<sup>1</sup> According to Platon in the seventh book of his Republic, "that which springs up spontaneously should not be forward to pay anyone for its nurture."

"The difficulties attending the translation of this work into English are necessarily great, not only from its sublimity and novelty, but also from the defects of the original. I have, however, endeavored to make the translation as faithful and complete as possible; and have *occasionally* availed myself of the annotations of Gale, not being able to do so *continually*, because for the most part, where philosophy is concerned, he shows himself to be an inaccurate, impertinent, and garrulous smatterer." (Introduction.)

In 1822 was published Mr. Taylor's version of the "Political Fragments of Archytas, Charondas, Zaleukos, and other ancient Pythagoreans; and also Ethical Fragments of Hierokles, the celebrated Commentator on the Golden Pythagoric Verses."

"The collection of Pythagoric Fragments contained in this volume must be considered by every one as highly valuable if their antiquity only is regarded; but by the lover of genuine wisdom they will be deemed inestimable, as proceeding from the school of the father of philosophy. \* \* \*

"Of Hierokles, the author of the Ethical Fragments, something more is known than of the authors of the Political Fragments, through what is said of him by Suidas, Damaskios, and Aeneas Gazaios. For from the last of these we learn that he flourished about the end of the fifth century of the Christian era; and from the other two that he was a Platonic philosopher of Alexandria—that his conceptions were magnificent and his genius sublime; that he was very eloquent, astonished his auditors by the beauty and copiousness of his language, and contended with Platon himself in elegance of diction and fertility of intellect." (Introduction.)

Mr. Taylor also published his translation of another important work in 1822, viz.: "The Metamorphosis, or Golden Ass, and Philosophical Works of Apuleius."

"With respect to the treatises translated in this volume, the Metamorphosis is the most celebrated of all the works of Apuleius. A great part of the fable may be said to be a paraphrase of the Ass of Lukianos, which was originally derived from a work of Lukios Patrensis, who wrote in Greek, and was of Patrae, a city of Akhaia. The most important parts however of the Metamorphosis, viz: the fable of Cupid and Psyche, and the eleventh book, in which Apuleius gives an account of his being initiated in the mysteries of Isis and Osiris, are not derived from any sources with which we are at present acquainted. I call these the most important parts, because in the former, as it appears to me, the very ancient dogma of the pre-existence of the human soul, its lapse from the intelligible world to the earth, and its return from thence to its pristine state of felicity, are most accurately and beautifully adumbrated. \* \* \*

"What then was the real design of Apuleius in composing this work? Shall we say with Makrobios, that Apuleius sometimes diverted himself with the tales of love, and that this is a kind of fable which professes only to please the ear, and which wisdom banishes from her temple to the cradles of nurses? This, however, is by no means consistent with that dignity and elevation of mind which are essential to the character of a Platonic philosopher. Is it not therefore most probable that the intention of the author in this work was to show that the man who gives himself to a voluptuous life becomes a beast, and that it is only by becoming virtuous and religious that he can divest himself of the brutal nature and be again a man. For this is *the rose* by eating which Apuleius was restored to the human and cast off the brutal form; and, like the moly of Hermes, preserved him in future from the dire enchantments of Kirke, the Goddess of Sense. \* \* \*

"With respect to the treatises on Natural and Moral Philosophy, they may be considered as a good epitome of the Physiology and

Ethics of Platon; certain parts of those sciences being excepted, the depths of which Apuleius had not fathomed, in consequence, as I before observed, of the more abstruse dogmas of Platon not having been developed at the time in which he lived. And his treatise on the Categorical Syllogism is a useful introduction to the Logic of Aristoteles. The treatise on the God of Sokrates is on the whole an admirable work, and contains some things of a most interesting and remarkable nature. \* \* \*

"I shall conclude with observing that I trust the readers of this work will candidly peruse it as one labor more, among many of no common magnitude, of a man who has spent the far greater part of his life in endeavoring to obtain himself a knowledge of the Philosophy of Platon, and to elucidate and promulgate it for the benefit of others; who also, in accomplishing this, has had to encounter the hiss of Envy, and the bite of Detraction, the laugh of Folly, and the sneer of Contempt, unmerited unkindness, and unfeeling neglect, together with domestic ills of an overwhelming nature, and of the rarest occurrence. In short, the present translation is the work of a man whose life has been most eventful and singularly disastrous, a few splendid circumstances excepted, which have illuminated and enlivened the oppressive gloom of adversity like a 'sunbeam in a winter's day,' and which, whenever he may deem it expedient to give the *detail* of his literary career to the public, he will most gladly and gratefully record." (Introduction.)

"The publication and elucidation of all the works that remain of Plotinos, Porphyrios, Iamblichos, Syrianos, Proklos, Damaskios, and Olympiodoros, will form a new and most important era in philosophy; and will contribute more than anything else to prevent the circulation of the stupid and false accounts of the heathen theology and mythology, and of many other fungous and frivolous productions, under which the European press in general, and particularly that of England, at present groans.

The celebrated Franciscus Patricius was so fully convinced of the inestimable value of the writings of these men that, in the preface to his Latin translation of the Theological Elements of Proklos, a book at present uncommonly rare, and printed at Ferrara, 1583, he says: "There are also extant, in this kind of Platonic Philosophy, the most elegant Commentaries of Hermes, the father of Ammonios, on the Phaidros, and likewise certain excerpts from the Commentaries of the very learned Olympiodoros on the Phaidon and Philebos, and his entire Scholia on the Gorgias. But among all these the *Inquiries of Damaskios concerning the principles of things*, are the most eminent. All of which, if they were published, would excite the most ardent love of divine wisdom in the breast of those who apply themselves to philosophy, not for the sake of disputing, but for this one thing alone, that they may become wise. And if at any time these works should proceed into light, through the laborious, but yet glorious efforts of some one, who will be a man in reality, it will at length be seen how great a part of wisdom lies buried in darkness, while we alone pursue and love this modern wisdom to which we are accustomed, and which is taught in the schools."—Note.

In 1823 was published Mr. Taylor's version of the "Select Works of Porphyrios; containing his Four Books on Abstinence from Animal Food; his treatise on the Homeric Care of the Nymphs; and his Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligible Natures. With an appendix explaining the Allegory of the Wanderings of Odysseus. By the Translator."

"Porphyrios, the celebrated author of the treatises translated in this volume, was dignified by his contemporaries and by succeeding Platonists, with the appellation of *the philosopher*, on account of his very extraordinary philosophical attainments. He is likewise called by Simplicios *the most learned of the phi-*



losophers, and is praised by Proklos for his *ιεραρχη νοήματα*, or conceptions adapted to sanctity; the truth of all which appellations is by the following treatises most abundantly and manifestly confirmed. \* \* \*

"With respect to the works of Porphyrios, which are translated in this volume, the first, which is on Abstinence from Animal Food, is a treatise not only replete with great erudition, but is remarkable for the purity of life which it inculcates, and the sanctity of conception with which it abounds. \* \* \* This treatise is also highly valuable for the historical information which it contains, independently of the philosophical beauties with which it abounds.

"The Explanation of the Homeric Cave of the Nymphs, which follows next, is not only remarkable for the great erudition which it displays, but also for containing some profound arcana of the mythology and symbolical theology of the Greeks.

"And the third treatise, which is denominated Auxiliaries to the Perception of Intelligibles, may be considered as an excellent introduction to the works of Plotinos. \* \* \* This Porphyrian treatise also is admirably calculated to afford assistance to the student of the Theological Elements of Proklos, a work never to be sufficiently praised for the scientific accuracy, profundity of conception, and luminous development of the most important dogmas which it displays." (Introduction.)

In 1823 Mr. Taylor also sent forth an original work of great merit, viz., "The Elements of a New Arithmetical Notation, and of a New Arithmetic of Infinities, in Two Books; in which the Series discovered by modern Mathematicians for the Quadrature of the Circle and Hyperbola are demonstrated to be aggregately Incommensurable Quantities; and a Criterion is given by which the Commensurability or Incommensurability of Infinite Series may be accurately ascertained. With an Appendix concerning some Properties of Perfect, Amicable, and other Numbers, no less remarkable than novel."

"Although I have not studied this profound treatise with that persevering and long-sustained attention which is absolutely necessary to justify a decided opinion, yet in the cursory examination which I have bestowed on it I have seen quite sufficient to warrant my recommending it to my scientific readers as a work of considerable elegance, subtlety, and ingenuity. Le Croix, the celebrated French mathematician, has been commissioned by the Academy to make a report on it." (A Brief Notice of Thomas Taylor by J. J. Welsh.)

In 1824 Mr. Taylor sent forth a second edition, "with considerable emendations, alterations, and additions," of his translation of the Mystical Hymns of Orpheus. Mr. J. J. Welsh, an intimate friend of Taylor's, writing of this work, says: "In the second edition, which is dedicated to the most learned and enlightened prince in Europe, Mr. Taylor thinks he has incontrovertibly proved that these Hymns were used in the Eleusinian Mysteries. He has performed the very difficult task of translating them in a manner that reflects the greatest credit on his abilities, taste, and judgment. His ear for metrical harmony is exceedingly good; and there is a rich yet varied melody in his versification which often reminds me of the happiest efforts of Pope. If the reader refers to pp. 24-26 of the masterly Introduction to the second edition, he will find a truly beautiful passage descriptive of the sublime and scientific theology promulgated by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Platon—and which has been copied nearly verbatim by the author of 'The Rev. C. Judkin's Oriental Mission,' but without giving the slightest hint of the source from whence he obtained it. I am sorry to add, that this is not the only instance I have met with of writers freely availing themselves, without acknowledgment, of the inestimable labors of my erudite and philosophic friend."

The writer's copy of this work—the Mystical Hymns of Orpheus—formerly belonged to Prof. Victor Cousin, and was presented to him by Taylor himself. It has on the fly-leaf the following inscription, in Taylor's chirography: "Presented by the Translator to the most learned Professor Cousin, ως τιμηματος και εννοιας τεκμηριον."

In 1824 also appeared an enlarged second edition of Mr. Taylor's version of Pausanias' Description of Greece, 3 vols. 8vo. In this edition there are "several additional notes of very great value."

In 1825 Mr. Taylor published his translation of the valuable "Fragments that remain of the Lost Writings of Proklos, sur-named the Platonic Successor."

"To the lovers of the wisdom of the Greeks any remains of the writings of Proklos will always be invaluable, as he was a man who, for the variety of his powers, the beauty of his diction, the magnificence of his conceptions, and his luminous development of the abstruse dogmas of the ancients, is unrivalled among the disciples of Platon. As, therefore, of all his philosophical works that are extant I have translated the whole of some, and parts of others, I was also desirous to present the English reader with a translation of the existing Fragments of such of his works as are lost.

"Of these fragments, the largest, which is on the Eternity of the World, and originally consisted of eighteen arguments, wants only the first argument to render it complete; and of this I have endeavored to collect the substance, from what Philoponos has written against it." (Preface.)

Mr. Taylor published in 1830,—though his name is not attached to it, for obvious reasons,—a small volume entitled "Arguments of Celsus, Porphyry, and the Emperor Julian against the Christians; also, Extracts from Diodoros Sikulos, Josephus, and Tacitus, relating to the Jews." This book is probably a revised and enlarged edition of the work published in 1809—entitled "Arguments of the Emperor Julian against the Christians,"—which was rigidly suppressed.

In 1831 Mr. Taylor gave to the public a noteworthy volume, which contained versions of the following treatises: "Okellos Lukanos On the Nature of the Universe. Tauros the Platonic Philosopher On the Eternity of the World. Julius Firmicus Maturnus of the Thema Mundi; in which the positions of the stars at the commencement of the several mundane periods is given. Select Theorems On the Perpetuity of Time, by Proklos."

"The Tracts contained in this small volume will, I trust, be perused with considerable interest by every English reader who is a lover of ancient lore; and whatever innovations may have been made in the philosophical theories of the ancients by the accumulated experiments of the moderns, yet the scientific deductions of the former will, I am persuaded, ultimately predominate over the futile and ever-varying conclusions of the latter. For science truly so-called is, as Aristoteles accurately defines it to be, the knowledge of things eternal, and which have a necessary existence. Hence it has for its basis *universals* and not *particulars*; since the former are *definite*, *immutable*, and *real*; but the latter are *indefinite*, are so incessantly changing that they are not for a moment the same, and are so destitute of reality that, in the language of the great Plotinos, they may be said to be 'shadows falling upon shadow, like images in water, or in a mirror, or a dream.'" (Introduction.)

Mr. Taylor published in 1833 his translation of "Two Treatises of Proklos, the Platonic Successor; the former consisting of Ten Doubts concerning Providence, and a solution of those Doubts; and the latter containing a development of the Nature of Evil."



"No subjects of discussion are, perhaps, more interesting or more important than those of which the present volume consists. For what can more demand our most serious attention, or what can be more essential to the well-being of our immortal part, than a scientific elucidation and defence of the mysterious ways of Providence, and a development of the nature of Evil? For, as Divinity is goodness itself, it is requisite that all the dispensations of His providence should be beneficent, and that perfect evil should have no real existence in the nature of things. That this is necessary is demonstrated by Proklos in the following Treatises with his usual acuteness and eloquence, by arguments which are no less admirable for their perspicuity than invincible from their strength." \* \* \*

I shall only further observe, that in the following translation I have endeavored to give the accurate meaning of Proklos, and to preserve as much of his manner as is possible, from an original which, as Fabricius justly observes, is "all but barbarous;" and that the reader will find in these Treatises a demonstration of those great Platonic dogmas which Pope has so eloquently celebrated in his Essay on Man, but without attempting to prove that they are true. The dogmas I allude to are the following: that "there must be somewhere, such a rank as MAN;" that "all partial evil is universal good;" and that "whatever is, is right." Hence Proklos proves by incontrovertible arguments that evil has no real existence, but has only a shadowy subsistence, and that Divinity concealed it in the utility of good. (Preface.)

The last work of Mr. Taylor's transcendent genius and indefatigable industry appeared in 1834, and was entitled "Translations from the Greek of the following Treatises of Plotinos, viz: On Suicide, to which is added an extract from the Harleian MS. of the Scholia of Olympiodoros on the Phaidon of Platon respecting Suicide, accompanied by the Greek text; Two Books on Truly Existing Being; and extracts from his Treatise on the Manner in which the Multitude of Ideas subsists, and concerning The Good; with additional notes from Porphyrios and Proklos."

This is a very valuable and noteworthy volume, and should be read and studied by all those who desire accurate information concerning some of the most abstruse problems of Philosophy.

The list of Mr. Taylor's intellectual productions is almost finished. The period of his triumphant exit from the corporeal prison was now (1834) rapidly approaching. We can find no record of his having published any work after the year 1834. During the latter part of his life he corresponded extensively with foreign scholars, especially the celebrated Frederick Creuzer. The subject of his correspondence with Creuzer was chiefly the new edition of the works of the great Plotinos, which the latter was then engaged in preparing. No one was better qualified than Mr. Taylor to correct the Plotinian text, and he sent Creuzer many important emendations and explanations, most of which were adopted. It may be remarked here that Creuzer's noteworthy edition of Plotinos (3 vols. 4to., Oxford) appeared in the early part of 1835, and is a magnificent specimen of typography and scholarship. Mr. Taylor is quoted frequently, and his Platonic knowledge and scholarship are mentioned in terms of the highest commendation.

Mr. Taylor preserved the philosophic equanimity of his great mind to the very last moments of his corporeal life. "That he endeavored to carry into practice the precepts of the ancient philosophers is sufficiently notorious; that he did so to the last hour of his existence I myself had a proof: the day before he died I went to see him, and to my inquiry, 'how he was?' he answered, 'I have passed a dreadful night of pain, — but you remember what Posidonios said to Pompey,' (that pain was no evil)."

Early on Sunday morning, the first day of November of 1835, the spirit of Thomas Taylor, which for seventy-seven long, weary years had been

"An exile straying from the orb of light,"

returned to its native country — the intelligible sphere, where it now dwells with such congenial associates as Pythagoras, Platon, Plotinos, Proklos, and other spirits of exalted nature that constitute "the choir of immortal love."

Mr. Taylor wrote his own epitaph, and no other hand could have written a better or more appropriate one:

"Health, strength, and ease, and manhood's active age,  
Freely I gave to Plato's sacred page.  
With Truth's pure joys, with Fame my days were crown'd,  
Tho' Fortune adverse on my labors frown'd."

"Mr. Taylor has nothing remarkable in his exterior; he is of the middle size, well proportioned and firmly put together; his countenance is regular, open, and benevolent. There is a dignified simplicity and unaffected frankness of manner about him which are sure to win the affections of all who have the pleasure of seeing him. In his dress he is simple and unpretending; in his conduct, irreproachable. Among friends he is unreserved and sincere; a determined foe to falsehood; and always ready to make sacrifices when the end to be obtained is worthy of a noble mind. I verily believe that no man had ever a more passionate love of virtue, a loftier aspiration after truth, or a more vehement zeal for its diffusion. His manners, as already hinted, are peculiarly soft and graceful, alike destitute of pride, haughtiness, or vanity, which, together with his venerable appearance, never fail to inspire both love and reverence. Being gifted with a very extraordinary memory, he is not only enabled to retain the immense stores of knowledge which in the course of a long life, assiduously devoted to study, he has amassed, but to bring them into complete action at his will. Such is the comprehension and vigor of his mind, that it can embrace the most extensive and difficult subjects; such the clearness of his conception that it enables him to contemplate a long and intricate series of argument with distinctness, and to express it with precision. An acute observer of men and manners, he possesses an inexhaustible fund of anecdote, so that the flow of his familiar chat, the cheerfulness of his disposition, and his easy communicativeness, are as attractive as his mental are commanding. Very rarely has an understanding of such strength and comprehension been found united with a heart so pure and ingenuous. '*Nihil unquam produxit rerum natura, aut pudentius, aut prudentius, aut candidius, aut benignius.*' — [Erasmus, Epist. 14, lib. 4, p. 286.]

"I have the honor to know him most intimately, and can truly say that his whole conduct is in perfect harmony with the principles of his sublime philosophy; that his every thought is in accordance with the whole tenor of his blameless life, and that his intentions are wholly unsullied by views of personal interest. I could adduce many splendid instances of his great disinterestedness and singularly amiable disposition; but "*on ne cherche point à prouver la lumière.*" His very profound and extensive mathematical acquirements, his fine poetical taste and ready powers of harmonious versification, would have raised other men to distinction; but in him are only the accompaniments of still higher gifts. I regret that my limits compel me to bring my few cursory remarks to an abrupt conclusion; but I do not think that I can more truly and concisely sum up the character of this great and good man than by applying to him what Shakespeare's Mark Antony says of Brutus:

"His life is gentle; and the elements  
So mix'd in him that Nature may stand up  
And say to all the world, This is a man."

<sup>1</sup> Rev. Alexander Dyce, the noted editor of Shakespeare.

(A Brief Notice of Thomas Taylor, the Celebrated Platonist, by J. J. Welsh. Published in 1831.)

Mr. Taylor was a sincere believer in philosophic Polytheism, *i. e.*, the doctrine that there is one Supreme Divinity and many subordinate deities. He believed that these inferior deities are entitled to our respect, veneration, and even worship. There is even a tradition that once, at his house in Walworth, he sacrificed a bull to Zeus, the Creator of the World, who, it must be remembered, is not the Supreme Divinity. Mr. Taylor disseminated his Platonic tenets with great zeal and ardor, "and his enthusiasm was not at all abated by finding himself alone in his worship."

He formulated his belief in a Creed, which I insert "for the purpose of presenting the intelligent reader with a synoptical view of that sublime theology which was first obscurely promulgated by Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Platon, and was afterwards perspicuously unfolded by their legitimate disciples," among whom Mr. Taylor holds a high rank.

#### THE CREED OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHER.

1. I BELIEVE in one First Cause of all things, whose nature is so immensely transcendent that it is even super-essential; and that in consequence of this it cannot properly either be named, or spoken of, or conceived by opinion, or be known, or perceived by any being.

2. I believe, however, that if it be lawful to give a name to that which is truly ineffable, the appellations of THE ONE and THE GOOD are of all others the most adapted to it; the former of these names indicating that it is the Principle of all things, and the latter that it is the ultimate object of desire to all things.

3. I believe that this immense Principle produced such things as are first and proximate to itself, most similar to itself; just as the heat *immediately* proceeding from fire is most similar to the heat in the fire; and the light *immediately* emanating from the sun to that which the sun essentially contains. Hence this Principle produces many principles proximately from itself.

4. I likewise believe that since all things differ from each other, and are multiplied with their proper differences, each of these multitudes is suspended from its one proper principle. That in consequence of this, all beautiful things, whether in souls or in bodies, are suspended from one fountain of beauty. That whatever possesses symmetry, and whatever is true, and all principles are in a certain respect connate with the First Principle, so far as they are principles, with an appropriate subjection and analogy. That all other principles are comprehended in this First Principle, not with interval and multitude, but as parts in the whole, and number in the monad. That it is not a certain principle like each of the rest; for of these, one is the principle of beauty, another of truth, and another of something else, but it is *simply principle*. Nor is it simply the *principle of beings*, but it is the *Principle of principles*; it being necessary that the characteristic property of principle, in the same manner as other things, should not begin from multitude, but should be collected into one monad as a summit, and which is the Principle of principles.

5. I believe, therefore, that such things as are produced by the First Good, in consequence of being connascent with it, do not recede from essential goodness, since they are immovable and unchanged, and are eternally established in the same blessedness. All other natures, however, being produced by the One Good, and many goodnesses, since they fall off from essential goodness, and are not immovably established in the nature of divine goodness, possess on this account The Good according to participation.

6. I believe that as all things considered as subsisting *causally*

in this immense Principle are transcendently more excellent than they are when considered as effects proceeding from him, this Principle is very properly said to be all things *prior* to all; *prior* denoting exempt transcendency. Just as number may be considered as subsisting occultly in the monad, and the circle in the centre; this *occult* being the same in each with *causal* subsistence.

7. I believe that the most proper mode of venerating this great Principle of principles is to extend in silence the ineffable parturitions of the soul to its ineffable co-sensation; and that if it be at all lawful to celebrate it, it is to be celebrated as a thrice unknown darkness, as the God of all gods, and the Unity of all unities, as more ineffable than all silence, and more occult than all essence, as holy among the holies, and concealed in its first progeny — the Intelligible Gods.

8. I believe that self-subsistent natures are the immediate offspring of this Principle, if it be lawful thus to denominate things which ought rather to be called ineffable unfoldings into light from the Ineffable.

9. I believe that incorporeal forms or ideas resident in a divine intellect, are the paradigms or models of everything which has a perpetual subsistence according to nature. That these ideas subsist primarily in the highest intellects, secondarily in souls, and ultimately in sensible natures; and that they subsist in each, characterized by the essential properties of the beings in which they are contained. That they possess a *paternal, producing, guardian, connecting, perfective, and uniting* power. That in *divine beings* they possess a power fabricative and gnostic; in *nature* a power fabricative but not gnostic; and in *human souls* in their present condition through a degradation of intellect a power gnostic, but not fabricative.

10. I believe that this world, depending on its divine artificer, who is himself an intelligible world, replete with the archetypal ideas of all things, is perpetually flowing, and perpetually advancing, to being; and, compared with its paradigm, has no stability, or reality of being. That considered, however, as animated by a divine soul, and as being the receptacle of divinities from whom bodies are suspended, it is justly called by Platon a blessed god.

11. I believe that the great body of this world, which subsists in a perpetual dispersion of temporal extension, may be properly called a *whole with a total subsistence*, or a *whole of wholes*,<sup>1</sup> on account of the perpetuity of its duration, though this is nothing more than a flowing eternity. That the other wholes which it contains are the celestial spheres, the sphere of æther, the whole of air considered as one great orb, the whole earth, and the whole sea. That these spheres are *parts with a total subsistence*, and through this subsistence are perpetual.

12. I believe that all the parts of the universe are unable to participate of the providence of Divinity in a similar manner, but some of its parts enjoy this eternally, and others temporally; some in a primary and others in a secondary degree; for the universe being a perfect whole must have a first, a middle, and a last part. But its first parts, as having the most excellent subsistence, must always exist according to nature; and its last parts must sometimes exist according to, and sometimes contrary to, nature. Hence the celestial bodies, which are the first parts of the universe, perpetually subsist according to nature, both the whole spheres, and the multitude co-ordinate to these wholes; and the only alteration which they experience is a mutation of figure,

<sup>1</sup> As little as the eye of a fly at the bottom of the largest of the Egyptian pyramids sees of the whole of that pyramid, compared with what is seen of it by the eye of a man, so little does the greatest experimentalist see of the whole of things, compared with what Platon and Aristoteles saw of it through scientific reasoning founded on self-evident principles.



and variation of light at different periods; but in the sub-lunary region, while the spheres of the elements remain on account of their subsistence, as wholes, always according to nature; the parts of the wholes have sometimes a natural, and sometimes an unnatural, subsistence—for thus alone can the circle of generation unfold all the variety which it contains. I believe, therefore, that the different periods in which these mutations happen are with great propriety called by Platon, periods of *fertility* and *sterility*—for in these periods a fertility or sterility of men, animals, and plants takes place; so that in fertile periods<sup>1</sup> mankind will be both more numerous, and, upon the whole, superior in mental and bodily endowments to the men of a barren period. And that a similar reasoning must be extended to irrational animals and plants. I also believe that the most dreadful consequence attending a barren period with respect to mankind is this: that in such a period they have no scientific theology, and deny the existence of the immediate progeny of the Ineffable Cause of all things.

13. I believe that as the divinities are eternally good and profitable, but are never noxious, and ever subsist in the same uniform mode of being, that we are conjoined with them through similitude when we are virtuous, but separated from them through dissimilitude when we are vicious. That while we live according to virtue we partake of the gods, but cause them to be our enemies when we become evil; not that they are angry—for anger is a passion, and they are impassive,—but because guilt prevents us from receiving the illuminations of the gods, and subjects us to the power of avenging demons. Hence, I believe, that if we obtain pardon of our guilt through prayers and sacrifices, we neither appease the gods, nor cause any mutation to take place in them; but by methods of this kind, and by our conversion to a divine nature, we apply a remedy to our vices, and again become partakers of the goodness of the gods. So that it is the same thing to assert, that Divinity is turned from the evil, as to say that the Sun is concealed from those who are deprived of sight.

14. I believe that a divine nature is not indigent of anything. But the honors which are paid to the gods are performed for the sake of the advantage of those who pay them. Hence, since the providence of the gods is extended everywhere, a certain habitude or fitness is all that is requisite for the reception of their beneficent communications. But all habitude is produced through imitation and similitude. On this account temples imitate the heavens, but altars the earth. Statues resemble life, and on this account they are similar to animals. Prayers imitate that which is intellectual; but characters, superior ineffable powers. Herbs and stones resemble matter; and animals which are sacrificed, the irrational life of our souls. From all these, however, I believe that nothing happens to the gods beyond what they already possess; for what accession can be made to a divine nature? But a conjunction of our souls with the gods is by these means effected.

15. I believe that as the world, considered as one great comprehending whole, is a divine animal; so likewise every whole which it contains is a world, possessing in the first place a self-perfect unity proceeding from the Ineffable, by which it becomes a god; in the second place, a divine intellect; in the third place, a divine soul; and in the last place, a deified body. That each of these wholes is the producing cause of all the multitude which it contains, and on this account is said to be a whole prior to parts; because considered as possessing an eternal form which holds all its parts together, and gives to the whole perpetuity of

subsistence, it is not indigent of such parts to the perfection of its being. And that it follows by a geometrical necessity, that these wholes which rank thus high in the universe, must be animated.

16. Hence I believe that after the immense Principle of principles in which all things causally subsist absorbed in super-essential light, and involved in unfathomable depths, a beautiful series of principles proceeds, all largely partaking of the Ineffable, all stamped with the occult characters of Deity; all possessing an overflowing fullness of Good. That from these dazzling summits, these ineffable blossoms, these divine propagations—Being, Life, Intellect, Soul, Nature, and Body depend; *monads*<sup>1</sup> suspended from *unities*, deified natures proceeding from Deities. That each of these monads is the leader of a series which extends to the last of things, and which, while it proceeds from, at the same time abides in, and returns to its leader. Thus all beings proceed from and are comprehended in the First Being; all intellects emanate from one First Intellect; all souls from one First Soul; all natures blossom from one First Nature; and all bodies proceed from the vital and luminous Body of the World. That all these great monads are comprehended in the First One, from which both they and all their depending series are unfolded into light. And that hence this First One is truly the Unity of unities, the Monad of monads, the Principle of principles, the God of gods, One and all things, and yet One prior to all.

17. I also believe, that of the Gods some are mundane, but others supermundane; and that the mundane are those who fabricate the world. But of the supermundane, some produce essences, others intellect, and others soul; and on this account they are distinguished into three orders. Of the mundane gods also, some are the causes of the existence of the world; others animate it; others again harmonize it, thus composed of different natures; and lastly others guard and preserve it when harmonically arranged. Since these orders likewise are four, and each consists of things first, middle, and last, it is necessary that the governors of these should be twelve. Hence Zeus, Poseidon, and Hephaistos fabricate the world; Demeter, Hera, and Artemis animate it; Hermes, Aphrodite, and Apollon harmonize it; and lastly, Hestia, Athena, and Ares preside over it with a guardian power. But the truth of this may be seen in statues, as in enigmas. For Apollon harmonizes the lyre; Pallas is invested with arms; and Aphrodite is nude; since harmony produces beauty, and beauty is not concealed in subjects of sensible inspection. I likewise believe that as these Gods primarily possess the world, it is necessary to consider the other mundane Gods as subsisting in them; as Dionysos in Zeus, Aiskulapios in Apollon, and the Graces in Aphrodite. We may also behold the spheres with which they are connected, viz.: Hestia with the earth, Poseidon with water, Hera with air, and Hephaistos with fire. But Apollon and Artemis are assumed for the Sun and Moon; the sphere of Kronos is attributed to Demeter; Aither to Pallas; and heaven is common to them all.

18. I also believe that man is a microcosm, comprehending in himself *partially* every thing which the world contains divinely and *totally*. That hence he is endued with an intellect subsisting in energy, and a rational soul proceeding from the same causes as those from which the intellect and soul of the universe proceed. And that he has likewise an ethereal vehicle analogous to the heavens, and a terrestrial body composed from the four elements, and with which also it is co-ordinate.

19. I believe that the rational part of man, in which his essence

<sup>1</sup> The monad is that which contains things separated from each other unitedly; just as the inerratic sphere contains the fixed stars. But the one is the summit of multitude; and hence the one is more simple than the monad.

<sup>1</sup> The so much celebrated *heroic age* was the result of one of these fertile periods, in which men transcending the herd of mankind both in *practical* and *intellectual* virtue abounded on the earth.



consists, is of a self-motive nature, and that it subsists between intellect, which is immovable both in essence and energy, and nature, which both moves and is moved.

20. I believe that the human as well as every mundane soul uses periods and restitutions of its proper life. For in consequence of being measured by time it energizes transitively, and possesses a proper motion. But everything which is moved perpetually, and participates of time, revolves periodically, and proceeds from the same to the same.

21. I also believe, that as the human soul ranks among the number of those souls that *sometimes* follow the mundane divinities, in consequence of subsisting immediately after dæmons and heroes, the *perpetual* attendants of the gods, it possesses a power of descending infinitely into the sublunary region, and of ascending from thence to real being. That in consequence of this, the soul while an inhabitant of earth is in a fallen condition, an apostate from Deity, an exile from the orb of light. That she can only be restored while on earth to the divine likeness, and be able after death to re-ascend to the Intelligible World, by the exercise of the *cathartic* and *theoretic* virtues; the former purifying her from the defilements of a mortal nature, and the latter elevating her to the vision of true being. And that such a soul returns after death to her kindred star from which she fell, and enjoys a blessed life.

22. I believe that the human soul essentially contains all knowledge, and that whatever knowledge she acquires in the present life is nothing more than a recovery of what she once possessed, and which discipline evocates from its dormant retreats.

23. I also believe that the soul is punished in a future for the crimes she has committed in the present life; but that this punishment is proportioned to the crimes, and is not perpetual; Divinity punishing, not from anger or revenge, but in order to purify the guilty soul, and restore her to the proper perfection of her nature.

24. I also believe that the human soul on its departure from the present life will, if not properly purified, pass into other terrene bodies; and that if it passes into a human body, it becomes the soul of that body; but if into the body of a brute, it does not become the soul of the brute, but is externally connected with the brutal soul in the same manner as presiding dæmons are connected in their beneficent operations with mankind,—for the rational part never becomes the soul of the irrational nature.

25. Lastly, I believe that souls that live according to virtue shall in other respects be happy, and—when separated from the irrational nature, and purified from all body—shall be conjoined with the gods, and govern the whole world, together with the Deities by whom it was produced.

The bold, candid avowal of his "heathen" faith caused the hiring, bigoted scribblers of that day to repeatedly ridicule and denounce Mr. Taylor. The mildest and most complimentary epithets they saw proper to apply to him were, "The Modern Pletho,"<sup>1</sup> "the Apostle of Paganism,"<sup>2</sup> "England's Gentile Priest,"<sup>3</sup> and the "self-created Polytheist of Great Britain."<sup>4</sup>

These imbecile, irrational attacks gave Mr. Taylor no personal annoyance. Occasionally, for the sake of the Philosophy he advocated, he replied to their slanders and malevolent insinuations, exposed their gross brutal ignorance about things of the highest importance, and conclusively demonstrated that their "criticisms" were utterly ridiculous and worthless.

He refers to these "literary sharpers" in his vigorous verses

<sup>1</sup> Curiosities of Literature.

<sup>2</sup> Analytical Review.

<sup>3</sup> Pursuits of Literature.

<sup>4</sup> Porson.

entitled "On My Attempting to Unfold in English the Depths of Plato's Philosophy," which I quote entire:—

"Vent'rous I tread in paths untrod before,  
And depths immense, and dazzling heights explore;  
Anxious from Error's night to point the way  
That leads to Wisdom's everlasting day;  
To check my flight in vain *blind Folly* tries,  
For, Heav'n my friend, I conquer as I rise."

Mr. Taylor's Motto, written by himself, was:—

"No servile scribe am I, nor e'er shall be,  
My sire is Mind, whose sons are always free."

This Motto, it may be remarked, is a very different one from that adopted by venal critics, which is generally "my employer's interests."

In 1798 the celebrated Prof. B. G. Niebuhr made a trip to England. One of his letters gives a curious description of Mr. Taylor, of whom he appears to have heard considerable.

"I read lately the biography of a very singular man, a Mr. Taylor of London, whom I may perhaps have mentioned to you before; for, though I never saw him, everything that is said of him interests me as if I had known him. There is something fearful about his history and character that makes one half afraid to seek his acquaintance. He grew up and passed his life under very unfavorable circumstances. Through a singular philosophical mysticism, derived from the Platonists, he became an orthodox polytheist, and adherent of the mystical interpretation of the popular religion of the Greeks; a kind of insanity which manifests itself with a strange sublimity in his translations of the Greek philosophers and his own writings, especially his poems.

"Well, this man made his choice in his earliest youth; and the maiden who was the first and only love of the boy, became the wife of the youth, when her parents wanted to force her into a rich marriage. During more than a year they had only seven English shillings a week, which he earned by copying. And although their circumstances somewhat improved, poverty was their companion during many after years. Yet their spirit was not broken. Taylor had much self-will, but at the same time much fortitude. But I blessed our fate that we were not born in this country. A similar lot would very likely have awaited us; for the crime of not being rich can only be atoned for here by the striving to become so; and he who tries to live for his genius without this effort, if not pensioned by some great man or by government—in which case he must renounce his independence and his pride,—will sink, heaven knows where. I should like to bring the best writings of this extraordinary man for our Moltkes."<sup>1</sup>

In the memoir prefixed to "Literary Anecdotes and Reminiscences, from the Manuscript Papers of the late E. H. Barker" (Lond. 1852), it is said that Mr. Taylor was "somewhat more irritable than became a philosopher." This notion probably arose from the fact that Mr. Taylor justly felt at times a noble indignation—a righteous wrath—against the stupid, stolid, and malevolent classes. When he saw men who claimed to be *intelligent* indulging in every species of foolishness and frivolity—stupidly ridiculing the sublimest doctrines because they could not apprehend them, and malevolently denouncing himself solely because he differed in his habits and belief from the rabble—it is no wonder that he was occasionally animated by a generous, philosophic indignation against certain species of mankind. Folly of every kind is hateful to the philosopher, and Mr. Taylor did not hesitate to express himself in vigorous language concerning the innumerable irrational and senseless acts of

<sup>1</sup> Niebuhr's Life and Letters. London, 1862; vol. 1, p. 148.

the multitude. Mr. Taylor's conduct, and its motives, were something novel and incomprehensible even to the "thinkers" of that age, who every day complacently witnessed the deeds of Folly's votaries, and they therefore ascribed it to what they were pleased to term "irritation." Would that this species of "irritation" always animated the human race!

Mr. Taylor possessed one of the most select and valuable libraries of philosophic works ever collected in modern times. It was not large, but almost every book was an intellectual treasure. "The manuscripts and works upon the Platonic philosophy, collected by Mr. Taylor, and enriched by his hand with MS. emendations and notes, will, we are informed, be offered for sale to one of the Universities, or some of the public institutions. We trust that there will be sufficient liberality in one or the other, to preserve from dispersion a collection so complete and so unique."<sup>1</sup>

We regret to state that this generous "trust" was not realized, and that neither universities nor public institutions possessed "sufficient liberality" to purchase Mr. Taylor's library. It was dispersed, and probably many of its rare and inestimable volumes have been irrecoverably lost.

It is said that new editions of the following translations of Mr. Taylor have been published:

1. Proklos on Providence and Evil, London, 1841.
2. Arguments of Julianos against the Christians, London, 1873.
3. Proklos on the Timaios of Platon, London, 1867.

I have been unable to procure any of these late editions and therefore can give no particular account of them.

Mr. Taylor's scholarship was of a high order, despite the opinion of certain invidious verbal critics who have raised themselves to a "ridiculous visibility" by the attempt to measure Mr. Taylor's scholastic attainments by the depth of their own ignorance. He possessed an insight into the esoteric meaning of the Greek philosophic text which has never been equalled or even approached by any "scholar" of Modern times. It has been truly said that he knew more Platon if others knew more Greek. After all, true classical scholarship is the ability to apprehend and interpret the ideas of the Greek and Roman writers, not the mere power to grammatically analyze their respective languages.

The fact that such Continental scholars as Creuzer, Boissonade, Cousin, and others of almost equal standing, indorsed Mr. Taylor's renderings of the classical writers, and adopted many of his emendations of the Greek text, is a noteworthy proof that his scholarship was of a character that commanded the respect and tribute of all who were capable of appreciating it.

In the current January number of the *Princeton Review*, one of the leading periodicals of the country, there is an interesting and valuable article on the "Concord School of Philosophy," by Dr. James McCosh. A reference is made to Mr. Taylor, "of whom," Dr. McCosh says, "it has always been doubted whether he understood the works he translated." This absurd statement is hardly worth a notice. Is it probable that a man of Mr. Taylor's acknowledged abilities and genius could devote almost an entire lifetime to the study, elucidation, and translation of the Greek philosophers, and still fail to understand their works? Such an irrational supposition could hardly be seriously entertained by any one competent to investigate the subject. The fact that he expounded their esoteric doctrines in conversation, and original writings, would seem to be wholly decisive of this question, even if other evidence — of which there is an abundance — was lacking.

Take him all in all Thomas Taylor the Platonist was cer-

tainly the most extraordinary and admirable philosophic character of Modern times. In his own age he was not appreciated — save by a few discerning spirits — and his labors were received by the rabble with unmeaning ridicule, and by the superficially learned with senseless derision. Neither dismayed nor discouraged, however, he pursued his useful, philosophic course of life; trusting to Divinity for reward, and to posterity for appreciation. His trust in neither Divinity nor Posterity was misplaced. To-day, amid the business, turmoil, and strife of this commercial age, Taylor's memory and character are revered, and his immortal works studied and appreciated by hundreds of cultured philosophic minds living within themselves, apart from the mass of mankind.

"Here, while alive, thy genius was alone;  
Thy worth neglected, and almost unknown;  
Here thy disciples and thy friends were few,  
Nor these all just, magnanimous, and true.  
For some whom Heaven had blest with wealth and power,  
Turned mean deserters in the needful hour;  
While others praised thy genius and admired,  
But ne'er to ease thy wretched state desired;  
Basely contended Wisdom to receive,  
Without a wish its author to relieve.  
Such was thy fate while matter's drowsy ties  
Held thee an exile from thy native skies.  
But now, emerged from sense, and error's night,  
Thy soul has gained its ancient orb of light;  
Refulgent shines in Truth's immortal plain,  
And scorns dull body and her dark domain."

## THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.

BY PROKLOS.

[Translated from the original Greek.]

[Continued.]

### PROPOSITION LXXXVIII.

Everything which is truly being is either prior to eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity.

For that there is true being prior to eternity, has been demonstrated. But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the *always* in conjunction with *being*. And that which participates of eternity has both the being and always, according to participation. Eternity, however, possesses the *always* primarily, but *being* according to participation. But being itself is primarily being.

### PROPOSITION LXXXIX.

Everything which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it is impartible, and has the form of *the one*, through this it participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded. Moreover, it is impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power. Hence everything which is truly or primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

### PROPOSITION XC.

The first bound and the first infinity subsist by themselves, prior to everything which consists of bound and the infinite.

For if beings which subsist by themselves are prior to those which are certain beings, as being common to all essences and principal causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short, of

<sup>1</sup> *Athenæum*, for Saturday, November 21, 1835.



all beings, it is necessary that the first bound and the first infinity should be prior to that which consists of both these. For the bound in that which is mixed, or the first being, participates of infinity, and the infinite participates of bound. But of everything, that which is the first is nothing else than that which it is. It is not, therefore, proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that the first bound should have the form of infinity. These, therefore, subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.

#### PROPOSITION XCI.

Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power subsists from the first infinity.

For the powers which have an existence at a certain time are finite, falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis.

#### PROPOSITION XCII.

Every multitude of infinite powers is suspended from one first infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things which are endowed with power, but subsists by itself; not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself. For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite powers are infinite through the participation of infinity. Infinity itself, therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity. For infinity is not the first of things, or the ineffable principle of all, since that is the measure of all things, being *the good* and *the one*. Nor is infinity being. For this is infinite, but not infinity. Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being, and is the cause of all infinite powers and of all the infinity that is in beings.

#### PROPOSITION XCIII.

Every infinite which is in true beings is neither infinite to the natures that are above being, nor is it infinite to itself.

For that by which each thing is infinite, by this also it exists uncircumscribed. But everything which is in true beings is bounded by itself, and by all the things prior to it. It remains, therefore, that the infinite which is in true beings is infinite to subordinate natures alone, above which it is so expanded in power as to be incomprehensible by all of them. For in whatever manner they may extend themselves towards this infinite, yet it has something entirely exempt from them. And though all things enter into it, yet it has something occult and incomprehensible by secondary natures. Though likewise it evolves the powers which it contains, yet it possesses something on account of its union insurmountable, contracted, and surpassing the evolution of beings. Since, however, it contains and bounds itself, it will not be infinite to itself, nor much less to the natures situated above it, since it has a portion of the infinity which is in them. For the powers of more total natures are more infinite in consequence of being more total, and having an arrangement nearer to the first infinity.

#### PROPOSITION XCIV.

Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity is perpetuity.

For there are many infinities which have the infinite not on

account of *the always*, such, for instance, as the infinity according to magnitude, the infinity according to multitude, and the infinity of matter. And whatever else there may be of the like kind, which is infinite either because it cannot be passed over, or through the indefiniteness of its essence. That perpetuity, however, is a certain infinity is evident. For that which never fails is infinite. But this is that which always has its hypostasis inexhaustible. Infinity, therefore, is prior to perpetuity. For that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, and is more total, is more causal. Hence, the first infinity is beyond eternity, and infinity itself is prior to eternity.

#### PROPOSITION XCV.

Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is multiplied.

For if of powers the first infinity is nearest to *the one*, that power which is more allied to *the one* is in a greater degree infinite than that which recedes from it. For, being multiplied, it loses the form of *the one*, in which while it remained it possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers, being connected and contained through its impartibility. For in partible natures themselves the powers, when congregated, are united; but when divided they are increased in number, and become obscured.

#### PROPOSITION XCVI.

The power which is infinite in every finite body, is incorporeal.

For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite, the infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite, it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as it is body. Hence the power which is infinite in a finite body is incorporeal.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

### PLATONIC TECHNOLOGY:

*A Glossary of Distinctive Terms used by Platon and other Philosophers in an Arcane and Peculiar Sense.*

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*Glykothumia*, ἡ γλυκοθυμία. A quietness of mind; calm enjoyment.

*Gnómē*, ἡ γνώμη. The mind; mode of thinking; the judgment; the will or inclination; knowledge, especially esoteric learning; wisdom; a maxim. The same as νόμος, a song, or law; the laws being anciently in rhythmic sentences.

*Gnōsis*, ἡ γνώσις. Knowledge; cognition; wisdom; esoteric learning. The doctrine of the Gnostics, a sect of religionists who flourished in the earlier centuries of the Christian era. Basilides of Alexandria, Tatian of Assyria, Markion of Pontus, and Mani were the conspicuous teachers. Their system comprised a glomerate or digest of Chaldean theosophy, Mithraism and certain of the earlier Christian doctrines. They were "the most polite, the most learned, and most wealthy of the Christian name." They appear to have had secret worship, crypts, and signs or symbols of recognition; and some were Ophites, or serpent-worshippers. Mention is made of the Gnōsis in the Pauline epistles, apparently as being the doctrine of the Jew Apollōs. See *Gospel according to Luke*, xi: 52, where the lawyers are impugned for taking away the key of the Gnōsis or higher wisdom; also *Epistle to the Corinthians*, I, viii: 1, 11; xiii: 8; *Ephesians*, iii: 19; *Timothy*, I, vi: 20. Though many of their doctrines resembled the Platonic, they seem to have made a merit of depreciating Platō.

*Goēteia*, ἡ γοητεία, also τὸ γοητεύμα. Black magic; sorcery; fascination; witchcraft; juggling tricks; also the art of the orator. "They bewitch our very souls."—PLATO: *Menezenos*, 2.

**Grammateus**, ὁ γραμματεὺς and ὁ λογραμματεὺς. A scribe; a secretary; a teacher of the sacred laws; a theologian. The Hebrew books of *Chronicles* mention the Kenites of Southern Judea as Scribes; and traditions preserved elsewhere represent Moses as marrying a Kushiite or Kenite wife; also Saul, David, and others as familiar with them. The *nabaim* or prophets, the sages of Idumea, the *nazirim*, and perhaps the Essens, were of the same caste. The Scribes constituted a distinct class in Egypt, and appear to have been the Pharisaean Rabbis in Palestine and Babylonia.

**Hadēs**, ὁ Ἄιδης for ὁ Ἰδῆς. Helli, the invisible state of existence; the general receptacle of souls after bodily dissolution; the Underworld; the state of existence in which souls continue that have separated from the body before passing into other conditions; hence also perhaps the *γένεσις* or transition-sphere. Plato in the *Kratylos* hints its derivation from αἰεὶ δοῦς, always giving, the synonym of Ploutón, or from πλούτος, rich; Aidoneos or Hadēs being the reputed lord of the Underworld. He also assimilates the term to Ἰδῆς, Wise, the One who sees; which would make it appear that the Underworld was the region of fact. The term is closely related to οἰδῖος, perpetual; αἰδώς, reverence, awe, modesty; αἰδοῖν, to be revered; venerable — applied in the neuter gender to the sexual parts, which were sacred symbols in the *Mysteries* as typifying the arch-arcana of life. The Hel of the Northmen, Orcus of the Italians, Amenti of the Egyptians, Saöl of the Syrians, Ereb of the Assyrians, and Patalo of the Indians, all denoted the condition of disembodied souls.

**Haplōsis**, ἡ ἀπλῶσις. The simple selfhood; a condition of divestment from external conditions. — PLOTINOS.

**Harmonia**, ἡ ἁρμονία. Harmony; established order; the cosmos; agreement; concord. Some attempt to derive the term from Hermon, the name of a mountain in Syria; as denoting *Harmonia*, bride of Kadmos. It may be from n'r'm, a harem or home; but more likely it is from ἄρμα, union, marriage, connubial love. The proper name is doubtless the feminine of Hermes, a name of Kadmos, the patron of learning. One tradition gives the same rank to Harmonia, *whence four books are declared to be as old as the human race*. Iamblichos uses the term as the synonym of *κωσμος*.

**Hēbē**, ἡ Ἡβή. Youth; the time of bloom; the period of physical maturity; manhood; womanhood; the lower region of the body. Also the goddess of youth, said to have attended on all the gods, also to have become the wife of Herakles when immortalized. From the Phœnician *HEBA*, concealed, secret arcane; or *HEVA*, she who is; the source of being.

**Hedra**, τὸ ἔδρα. A sect; a throne; an assembly of suppliants; a basis, support, or foundation; vehan or vehicle of a god; an altar; a statue; something permanent.

**Hekaté**, ἡ Ἑκάτη. Hekaté; the same as Brimō, Artemis, and Persephonē; the goddess of Night, and queen of the Underworld. The name is *Egyptian*, Hakte being a form of Ino.

**Helenē**, ἡ Ἑλένη. Helena, the reputed wife of Menelaos. The etymology is as uncertain as the verity of the legend. Some derive it from ἐλένη, a basket, hence symbolical of a woman; and others from ἐλάνη, a torch, as bringing destruction to Iliad. Max Müller, however, identifies the name with Saranya, the Vedic goddess of the Dawn. It may be from the Phœnician *AL*, or ἡλιος, the sun.

**Hēlios**, ὁ ἥλιος. The sun; the greatest of the stars visible in the daytime; a fire in the sky only visible and the same from morning till night; an eternal living being with a soul. "We must therefore call the nature of the stars, and such things as we perceive existing together with the stars, the Visible Gods, the greatest and most worthy of honor, and who as seeing on every side the most acutely, are the first in rank." — PLATO: *Epinomis*, 8.

**Hen**, τὸ ἓν. The ONE; the Supreme Being; the Unity; the One *Nous* or Intelligence pervading the Universe; the comprehensive conscious thought or plan which binds all parts of the Universe in one great whole (τὸ πᾶν); the principle of Order; God as always the same, and not diverse, phenomenal, or existing in change.

**Hēnōsis**, ἡ ἑνωσις. Oneness; unity; union; the stonement or state of being at one. "In the reduction of your soul to its simplest selfhood (ἀπλῶσις), its divine essence, you attain this union (ἑνωσιν)." — PLOTINOS. See *Ekstasis*.

**Hermēs**, ὁ Ἑρμῆς or ὁ Ἑρμείας. Mercurius, or more properly the Egyptian Thoth, Tat, or Kodmos; the personification of the whole *Sacerdotal College*; the god of science; the interpreter of the will of the gods. He appears to have been nearly identical with the Nabu of the Akkadians and Assyrians, and the Buddha of India. He was represented by a phallic statue with a human head; also as the Mihr or winged disk, also as hawk-headed. All sacred learning, especially as relating to medicine, astronomy, and theosophy, was imparted to this divinity. — IAMBlichos: *Mysteries*, I. i.

**Hierophantēs**, ὁ ἱεροφάντης. A hierophant; the presiding priest at Eleusis who initiated the candidates; an initiating priest; a priest of the secret worship; an instructor in sacred and arcane knowledge.

**Hippa**, ἡ Ἥππα. Hippa; the soul of the world [PROKLOS]; the nurse of Bacchos; the Great Mother; a name of Rhea or Kybêlê. The derivation of this name appears to have been Phœnician, and to have been from the verb *HIPPA*, to veil; to perform secret rites [Kings II. xvii. 9]. It signifies the sexual parts, and therefore by Synecdochê became the designation of the Mother of the Gods. Pausanias states that Poseidôn, Arēs, Hērē, Athenē, and the Despoina of Arkadia were all denominated Hippian. Their worship was brought from beyond the Mediterranean, and they were non-Hellenian divinities. By a play upon words which was anciently very common, the *hippos* or horse became the symbol of the goddess as well as of Poseidôn. The horses Pegasos and Areiôn, are said to have been sons of Poseidôn; and the goddess Persephonē-Despina was represented with a horse's head. The designation became also a title of the priests. Jacob Bryant says that "the *Hippoi*, misconstrued mares, were priestesses of the goddess Hippa, who was of old worshipped in [Lydia, Phrygia] Thessaly and Thrace and many different regions." "The rites of Dionysos Hippios were carried into Thrace, where the horses of Diamedēs were said to be fed with human flesh." Moore would have called them priests of the Yoni. They immolated human victims in their rites; as indeed was universal in the worship of Dionysos and Poseidôn in earlier periods. It is not unlikely that many of the proper names compounded from *hippos* relate to the divinity in question, as was a common practice.

**Hydra**, ἡ ὕδρα. The Hydra; a water-snake; the many-headed serpent of Lernā reputed to have been slain by Hēraklēs. A serpent with a fiery body and seven heads was an ancient Akkadian and Assyrian symbol, as well as the device of the Naga tribes of India. The fabled Zobak (Dahaka or Deīokēs) was doubtless an Assyrian conqueror or dynasty, which was represented by a similar emblem. See *Kabeiroi*.

**Hylē**, ἡ ὕλη. Wood; fuel; weeds; gross material; dregs; material of any kind; the vehicle of the soul. The term is used by the philosophers to denote the elementary principle of physical nature; which they taught, involved the soul as it passed from heaven into the transition-sphere. It has of itself neither form, figure, species, or quality, but is receptive of all forms, and so the mother, nurse, and origin of all things, through Eros the demiurgic creator. Accordingly all unbodied souls which are involved in the sphere of change were denominated *hylē* or material, as being subject to influences toward material existence. The word is derived from *φύω*, to produce, to cause to exist; whence is *φύσις*, nature or the producer; *υἱός*, son or offspring: Latin *filius* and Spanish *hijo*. See *Hypodochē*.

**Hyparchonta**, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα. The essential properties; the principles; the things which are as contrasted with those which seem to exist.

**Hyparxis**, ἡ ὑπαρξις. Being; subsistence; the highest attainment of the soul; existence, wealth.

**Hypnos**, ὁ ὕπνος. Sleep; repose; the magnetic sleep, such as was occasioned by the manipulating priests at the temples of Apollō, Paion, and Asklepios; the prophetic sleep.

**Hypokeimenon**, τὸ ὑποκείμενον. The subject; the topic of consideration; the hypothesis; matter for thought as distinguished from ὕλη, or matter of potential manifestation. See *Hypothesis*.

**Hypodochē**, ἡ ὑποδοχή. A receptacle; receiving; the designation of matter as a vehicle of the soul. See *Hylē*.

**Hyponoia**, ἡ ὑπόνοια. The undermeaning; the real sense of a drama, allegory, fable, or myth; an allegory; a conjecture; a suspicion.



*Hypostasis*, ἡ ὑπόστασις. A foundation; a cause; basis; substraction; subject-matter; principle; inherent nature; underived existence; self-existing intelligence; confident persuasion. "Faith is the *hypostasis* of things hoped for, the *elenchos* of things not seen." See *Hypothesis*.

*Hypothesis*, ἡ ὑπόθεσις. A principle not demonstrated; the summary of a discourse; a basis laid for anything; a foundation; the subject; the object proposed; a plan; a condition; a philosophical opinion.

*Iadō*, ὁ ἰάω or ἰάων. *Iadō*, an ancient name of *Bacchos*, used chiefly in the *Mysteries*; perhaps the same as *Yau* or *Yio*, the Noëtic god or god of Intelligence in Babylon, called also *Ramaun*. The name was evidently arcane.

*Idea*, ἡ ἰδέα. An idea; that which is seen; the ideal; a form, shape, or figure; an abstract notion; a model or pattern; a species or kind; a plot in a drama; countenance, aspect. Upon an accurate perception of the Platonic definition of this term, the right understanding of the doctrine of the *Akadēmē* is based. The philosopher transcends the empirical method of reducing all knowledge to the accidental receptive quality of the organs of sense, with the faculties of conjecturing and reasoning superadded; by which there can be no certainty of anything. He taught that there is a world of Intelligence, governed by one grand and presiding Unity, yet diversified by innumerable intelligent essences. That which is changeable pertains to time; the intelligential is always in eternity. An idea is, therefore, an eternal principle which determines the power of thought, and both transcends and controls experience. "IDEA is, as regards God, a mental operation by Him; as regards us, the first things perceptible by mind; as regards matter, a standard; but as regards the world, perceptible by itself, a pattern; but as considered and demonstrated with reference to itself, an existence." — ALKINOUS: *Introduction to the Doctrines of Plato*, ix. Professor Cooker thus clearly sets forth the whole doctrine of Ideas: "Viewed in their relation to the Eternal Reason, as giving the primordial thought and law of all being, these principles are simply *ἰδέα αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτὰ*, — ideas in themselves, — the essential qualities or attributes of Him who is the supreme and ultimate Cause of all existence. When regarded before the Divine imagination giving definite forms and relations, they are the *τύποι*, the *παράδειγματα* — the types, models, patterns, ideals according to which the universe was fashioned. Contemplated in their actual embodiment in the laws, and typical forms of the material world, they are *εἰκόνες* — images of the eternal perfections of God. The world of sense pictures the world of reason by a participation (*μεθεξις*) of the ideas. And viewed as interwoven in the very texture and framework of the soul they are *δυναμῶματα* — copies of the Divine Ideas which are the primordial laws of knowing, thinking, and reasoning. Ideas are thus the *nexus* of relation between God and the visible universe, and between the human and the Divine reason [*νοῦς*]. There is something divine in the world, and in the human soul, namely: the eternal laws and reasons of things, mingled with the endless diversity and change of sensible phenomena. These ideas are 'the light of the intelligible world;' they render the invisible world of real Being perceptible to the reason of man." — COOKER: *Christianity and Greek Philosophy*, p. 337. The knowing of these ideas constitutes the *ἐπιστήμη* or actual knowledge, because the reality of things is from participating in an archetypal form. These forms or ideas are therefore "the eternal thoughts of the Divine Intellect; and we attain the truth when our thoughts conform with His — when our general notions are in conformity with the ideas." — THOMPSON: *Laws of Thought*, p. 119.

*Idiōma*, τὸ ἰδίωμα. A property; a peculiar endowment; a distinguishing characteristic; idiom. This term is much employed by the philosophers and theurgical writers in regard to the different orders of superior beings.

*Ilus*, ἡ ἰλύς. Dregs; slime; mud; the material principle by which the soul is involved in the sphere of change called *genesis*; chaotic substance; the objective entity, *hylē* or matter, by means of which psychic essences become embodied; the condition of the impure soul.

*Kabeiroi*, οἱ Κάβειροι. The Kabeiri; gods of the arcane worship. As the *Mysteries* cover the same ground, and typify what Philosophy explains, a notice of them is essential. The Kabeiri, whose rites were celebrated at Lemnos and Samothrakrā, appear to have antedated the Eleusinia, Thermophoria, and other western religious observances. They were Semitic deities, though probably of the earlier origin. The designation is formed with equal facility from *ARIR*, the mighty, *HABOR* (whence *Hebron*, or *Kiriath-Arba*, the city of the Few), an association, magic, — and *KABIR*, great, superior, ancient. Legends make them the seven sons of *Ptob* in Egypt and of *Sedek* in Palestine, *Esman* or *Æsculapios*, the *Apollō* *Ismenios* of Boiotia being included as the eighth, blending them into one. Other stories reduce the number to three or four, whose mystic names are rendered to us as *Demētēr*, *Peruphanē* or *Hekaté*, *Dionysos* or *Hadēs*, and *Hermēs*, *Kadmos*, *Kadmillos* or *Asklapios*. They are undoubtedly the divinities of the seven planets, as enumerated in the Pantheon of Assyria, who also presided in the Underworld. Their unity was represented by a fiery Dragon, *Asdar* or *Esmun*, with seven heads, and a luminous halo of ten rays or horns. (*Apocalypse of Iōannes Theologos*, xii: 3.) This dragon was the seven-headed Akkadian serpent, the Phœnician *Esculapius* or serpent on a pole, which was borne upon the standard of the "Great King" — first of Assyria, next of Persia, and afterward of Rome. The rites of *Osiris*, *Dionysos*, *Poseidōn*, *Demētēr*, and others, appear to have originated in the Kabeirian worship, and to have typified alike the *lépsis* of the soul, its probation, and final purification. From the *Mysteries* originated the Drama, and both culminate in Philosophy.

*Kadmos*, ὁ Κάδμος. The Ancient One; the Eastern. The legend of *Kadmos* makes him the son of *Agénōr*, the Ancient of Days, who sent him forth in quest of his sister *Europē* (*EREB*, the west, the future, the Underworld). He established many cities, gave the alphabet to the priests, and instituted Mystic rites. Indeed, he is one of the Kabeirian gods, and identical with *Hermēs*, *Thoth*, and *Hea* of Assyria. Another legend makes him the husband of the *Sphinx*, an Amazon; and another of *Harmonia*, the patroness of Order and Beauty.

*Kakon*, τὸ κακόν. That which is evil; the principle of badness; privation of good; disorder, whether of mind, body, or condition; class; depravity of the soul; in short, the democracy of the passions rising over the ascendancy of the interior mind. "It is not possible that evil should be destroyed; for it is necessary that there shall be always something contrary to good; nor can it be seated among the gods, but of necessity moves round this mortal nature and this region." — PLATÓ: *Theaitētos*, 84.

*Kallónē*, ἡ καλλόνη. Excellence; beauty; grace; personified merit and attractiveness. "Fate, *Eileithyia*, and *Kallónē* are the three who preside over the phenomenal world" — *γενεσις*. — PLATÓ: *Banquet*.

*Kalon*, τὸ καλόν. Excellence; beauty; "excellence of form as perceived by sight, utility, and benefit to others." The term is more commonly rendered beauty, but it relates to interior qualities, especially to utility.

*Katabasis*, ἡ κατάβασις. Descending; the *lépsis* or entrance of the soul into the sphere of transition, from which the *anabasis* is its emancipation.

*Katalepsis*, ἡ κατάληψις. A seizure; an apprehension; catching an idea; perception; conception; a condition induced by mesmerism; catalepsy. See *Kataphora*, *Ekstasis*.

*Katanoēsis*, ἡ κατανόησις. Discerning; perceiving; cognition; understanding; contemplation.

*Kataphora*, ἡ καταφορά. A descent; a fall; a blow; a deep sleep; a trance; as catalepsy. See *Ekstasis*, *Katalēpsis*.

*Katastasis*, ἡ κατάστασις. A condition; a permanent state; establishment.

*Katharos*, καθάρως, ἄ, ὄν. Pure; holy; free from matter or the material obversion; whole; divine. "If the soul is separated in a pure state from the body, taking nothing of the body with it, as not having been willingly in a common partnership with it in the present life, but having shunned it and gathered itself within itself

- as constantly studying this—this is nothing else than to pursue philosophy aright."—*PLATÓ: Phaidón*, 68.
- Katharotēs, ἡ καθαρότης*. Purity; freedom from coporeal contamination; clearness from material obsession; innocence; the state of the soul before its contact with material conditions, or its descent into the transition-sphere.
- Katharsis, ἡ καθάρσις*. A cleaning; a purification; a freeing from the taint of the material condition. "There are two sorts of purification: one is concerned with the soul and another with the body."—*PLATÓ: Sophist*, 27. *The preliminary rites of the Mysteries were entitled purifications. The Dramas acted at the Theatre were also regarded as of the same nature and purpose. Hence Iamblichos says: "When we contemplate the emotions of others in Comedies and Tragedies, we repress our own passions, moderate them, and are purified. In the Sacred Dramas, also, we are freed by the spectacles and narratives of vile and wicked matters, from the hurt which occurs from the actions illustrated by them."*—*Mysteries*, I., xi. In like manner Aristotelēs declares that Tragedy, by arousing pity, fear, or terror, purges the mind of these and similar passions,—tempering and reducing them to just measure, with a kind of delight, by seeing those passions so well imitated. As Philosophy was the outcome of the Tragedies and Mysteries, and accordingly the more complete accomplishing of their purpose, Platón made use of the Dialectic or *Elenchos* for that object. "This is the purification at which the spirit of the Dialectic wants to arrive, that of the soul or understanding." "Proof by argument (*ἐλέγχος*) is the greatest of purifications; and he who has not been convinced, though he be the Great King [of Persia] himself, is in the highest degree impure; he is uninstructed and uncomely in those respects in which he who would be truly happy, ought to be pure and fair."—*Sophistēs*.
- Kínēsis, ἡ κίνησις*. Motion; the first phenomenon of matter; the polarization of atomic bodies. The word *θεός*, or god, signifies the cause of motion.
- Kirkē, ἡ κίρκη*. Kirkē, the reputed sister of Aitēs of Kolchis, and a personage of the archaic religion. The name is apparently from *κίρκος*, a circle, and is evidently associated with the temend or sacred temple-precinct, as well as with the choric dance of the Mysteries, which is said to have originated in Kolchis. She transformed the companions of Odysseus into animals; which is a figurative expression for the bestial degradation of souls that covet the delights of sense-perception and the material life.
- Korybantismos, ὁ κορυβαντισμός*. The celebration of the Korybantic mysteries; an initiation into the Korybantic Mysteries; the religious frenzy incident to the worship of the Mother of the gods; a sacred fury. *The rites were like those of Baal in Syria. The priests were denominated Kadeshim or sacred ones. They ran in procession, crying, beating drums and timbrels, and especially playing on the flute, and cutting their flesh in honor of the slain god Atys.*
- Logismos, ὁ λογισμός*. A reckoning of accounts; reasoning; thinking; deliberation; the reasoning faculty.
- Logistikon, τὸ λογιστικόν*. The discursive reason; the logical faculty; the power by which we discern conclusions from premises.
- Logizesthai, τὸ λογίζεσθαι*. Reasoning; the tracing of relation.
- Logos, ὁ λόγος*. A word; a discourse; speech; the external expression of the interior thought; the thought itself; a definition; a reason; a science; an art; a proposition; the faculty of the mind which enables it to proceed from hypotheses or fundamental principles to their legitimate results. "*Logos is to make one's thought clear by the voice; . . . to describe it by its elements and defining.*"—*Theaitētos*.
- Magēia, ἡ μαγεία*. The doctrines of the Magi, a caste of priests in Media, Persia, and Assyria, who instructed the youth, took charge of the Sacred Fire, and performed religious offices; sacred knowledge; wisdom; latterly magic, enchantment, occult learning, the black art.
- Maieusis, ἡ μαίευσις*. The office of an accoucheur. Platón gives this designation to his method of drawing out the thoughts of his pupils, as delivering the mind of the disciple of the ideas with which it was pregnant. "I am not myself at all wise, and I have no such discovery as is the product of my own mind; but those who

- associate with me make a wonderful proficiency, and make it, without learning anything from me, but from their own resources finding and becoming possessed of many excellent things."—*Theaitētos*, 20. See *Amamnēsis*.
- Mania, ἡ μανία*. Entheasm; enthusiasm; prophetic or poetic fury; divine or demoniac possession; the peculiar frenzy incident to religious excitement; the Bacchic inspiration; raving; extravagant conduct. "You have all partaken with me of the mania and Bacchic fury of Philosophy."—*Banquet*, 41. "There were two kinds of mania; one produced by human infirmity, the other by a divine release from the ordinary ways of men. The divine mania was subdivided into four kinds,—prophetic (or mantic), teletic, poetic, and amatory."—*Phaidros*, 107, 108. Plotinos defines it as entheasm, an exaltation which assimilates the good and makes it at one with God.
- Mantikē, ἡ μαντικὴ*. The gift of prophecy; the prophetic art; prophecy; speaking from divine inspiration. "In proportion as prophecy is higher and more perfect than augury, both in name and reality, in the same proportion, the ancients testify, entheasm (*μανία*) is superior to a normal condition of mind (*σοφροσύνη*)—the one coming from Divinity and the other from human endowments alone."—*Phaidros*, 48.
- Mantis, ὁ μάντις*. An entheast; one under the influence of divine inspiration; a prophet; a person under the prophetic frenzy; a diviner. *Ancient prophets received their inspiration in trance or frenzy; and accordingly in the old languages the same terms are used for madness and divine inspiration.*
- Mathēma, τὸ μάθημα, plural μαθήματα*. Learning; instruction; what is learned; arcane learning; mathematical and especially geometrical science; the science of harmony; the art of discursive reasoning, which accepts hypotheses as first principles.
- Metempsychōsis, ἡ μετεμψυχώσις*. The metempsychosis; the continuing existence of the soul; the passing of the soul from one body or form of existence to another. "This, or something like this, is true of our souls and their abodes."—*PLATÓ: Phaidón*, 145. See *Anastasis*.
- Methexis, ἡ μεθεξις*. Participation, especially of ideas, thus uniting the human and the divine reason. Similar does not participate.
- Methodos, ὁ μέθοδος*. Method; regular order of proceeding; traveling in the same road; manner of investing; a close investigation.
- Mētis, ἡ Μῆτις*. Mētis; Wisdom personified; the first spouse of Zeus; the Hakamoth of the Gnostics; skill; intelligence.
- Mithras, ὁ Μίθρας*. Mithras, the chief of the Yezdis or angels; the angel of the Sun; the god of truth; the Friend; Truth; fidelity to plighted faith. "He who blesseth himself in the earth shall bless himself in the God of truth, and he that sweareth shall swear by the God of truth." Kings II.v. 20-27. Stephanus declares Mithras to have been originally an Ethiopian divinity, which is very likely, as he came into the Persian Pantheon at a later period of history. He was also an arcane divinity, worshipped in caves and by secret rites. After the conquest of Pontos by Pompeias, Mithraism was introduced into the Roman world and so became universal. The *Apocalypse* abounds with references to his ritual, as the tree of life (*kaoma*), the second death, the manna or honey-cake, the white pebble, the morning star, empire, white raiment, the enthroning of the "soldier," etc. The Gnostic worship, Christmas festival, and Holy Report, came from this source. The Emperor Constantinus was a "soldier of the Invincible Sun," and Paphyras represents Mithras as the divinity of the secret worship. The witchcraft or wisdom-craft of the Middle Ages was a remnant of the Arcane Mithra-worship.
- Mixis, ἡ μίξις*. A mixing or commingling, a mixture; the union of spiritual forms with the material principle; sexual connection; the alliance of gods and human beings.
- Mnēmē, ἡ μνήμη*. Memory; a remembrance; the faculty by which we preserve in the mind the truths of the Foreworld; a memorial; a tradition.
- Moirai, plural Moirae, ἡ μοῖρα, at Moirai*. The fixed order of things; destiny; lot; a part. There were three Fates. In the Norse mythology they were the *Norns* or *Weird Sisters*—*Urd*, the Past; *Verdanti*, the Present or Becoming; and *Skuld*, the Future. Another legend makes them two—*Kaun*, or the possible, and *Mass*, or the



inevitable. The Norns sit at the root of the tree Ygdracil, and mark out human fortune. "There were other three sitting round at equal distance from each other: the Fates, daughters of Necessity (*Ἀνάγκη*), clad in white vestments; Lachesis, Klothô, and Atropos, singing to the harmony of the Seirêns — Lachesis singing the Past, Klothô the Present, and Atropos the Future." — *Republic*, X. xiv.

*Monogenês*, ὁ, ἡ, *μονογενής*. Only-begotten; born alone; principal; chief; first. Persephone, who is so designated as disjoining the inner from the outer soul, and so producing the better part of man alone.

*Monoeidês*, ὁ, ἡ *μονοειδής*. Uniform; of one single nature; alike throughout.

*Morphê*, ἡ *μορφή*. Form; shape; figure; appearance. Not synonymous with *eidos*, but rather with *Logos* and *Energeia*.

*Muêsis*, ἡ *μύησις*. Initiation into the arcane worship; instruction, especially in mystic learning. Conjectured to be derived from the Sanskrit *moksha*.

*Mysterion*, τὸ *μυστήριον*, plural *μυστήρια*. A religious festival at which arcane rites are performed; secret worship; the secret rites of Démêtêr at Eleasis; the Dionysiac festival; religious orgies; any secret or occult matter; a drama in which gods and heroes were the principal characters; a dramatic representation or initiation, in which the human soul was represented as coming from the world of real being into the region of change and phenomenal existence, undergoing a remedial discipline, and so becoming purified and enabled to enjoy divine felicity. These rites were afterward modified, and became a source of public entertainment. After the accession of Peisistratos, the liturgies of the various festivals were revised. The Dionysia or Bacchic orgies were expanded into dramatic representation, — the Tragedies and Comedies, — in that the *Theatôn*. Philosophy was the endeavor to unfold the ideas which underlay the dramatic and mystic exercises. Hence Plato represents it as initiation into perfect Mysteries. The Christians established an analogous system of Mysteries, or dramas to represent scenes in the life and passion of Jesus. These in their turn evolved the Modern Theatre.

*Mystês*, ὁ *μύστης*. An initiated person; one who has been sworn, and purified, but has not yet been admitted to the *autopsia*. According to Plato and Sokrates, the philosopher, though never initiated, was the true *mystês*.

*Mystika*, τὰ *μυστικά*. Mystic rites; arcana; occult knowledge.

*Narthex*, ὁ *νάρθηξ*. Narthex or giant fennel; the strygos or staff, surmounted by a pine-cone, which was borne in procession at the Bacchic festivals, by neophytes.

*Nebriê*, ἡ *νεβρίς*. A fawn-skin; the spotted robe worn by the Bacchantes. The Sem or high priest of Osiris and Iris wore a leopard-skin; also certain of the priests of Mylitta at Babylon. The Assyrian name Nimrod and the Greek Nebrôd, both mean spotted, and seem to relate to the Bacchic rites.

*Nektar*, τὸ *νέκταρ*. Nectar; the beverage of the gods; honey; perfume. The word is Semitic, and denotes a sacred liquor prepared from honey, which was drunk by priests and worshippers, in Assyria.

*Noeros*, *νοερός*, ὁ, ὅν. Spiritual; intelligential; intelligent; capable of understanding; to be perceived by the interior understanding rather than by the senses.

*Noêma*, τὸ *νόημα*. Thought; an *a priori* idea; what is had in mind; intention; purpose; an invention; a plan; understanding; sentiment; the mind; a concept.

*Noôô*, *νόεω*. To revolve in mind; to consider; to know; to discern; to perceive; to know intuitively; to understand; to cognise. Hence τὸ *νοεῖν*, thought. "Thought and Being are identical." — PARMENIDES.

*Noêsis*, ἡ *νόησις*. Intuition; intuitive knowledge; intelligence; pure reason as distinct from discursive knowledge. "Analogous to these four departments of knowledge are four faculties of the soul: the *noêsis* or pure reasoning answering to the highest; understanding (*διδασκα*) to the second; belief (*πίστις*, or empirical knowledge, now Modern Science) to the third; conjecture to the last." — PLATO: *Republic*, VI. xxi.

*Noêtos*, *νοητός*, ὁ, ὅν. *Noêtic*; pertaining to the highest faculty of the mind; intelligential; conceivable in the mind only, and not as an object of sense; spiritual; divine; supreme, *Τόπος νοητός*, the world of intelligence, the region of spirit.

*Noos* or *Nous*, ὁ *νόος*, ὁ *νοῦς*. Intuitive Intellect; pure reason; the spirit; the Interior mind; the rational soul; the "inner man;" the daimonian; the intuitive principle as contrasted with the *λόγος* or reasoning faculty; God. Anaxagnas treats of the *νοῦς* αὐτοκρατής, the Absolute Mind, which moved and established Order in the Universe; Platô believed in a *νοῦς βασιλεύς*, or Royal Intelligence of the noumenal world; Aristoteles taught that the *νοῦς* alone, and not science, art, or sagacity could ascertain and evolve principles. He also classified the human intelligence into Receptive and Creative — *νοῦς παθητικός* and *νοῦς ποιητικός*. "The receptive intellect, which is as Matter, becomes all things by receiving their forms. The Creative reason gives existence to all things, as light calls color into being. The Creative reason transcends the body, being capable of separation from it, and from all things; it is an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter or affected by it; prior and subsequent to the individual mind. The Receptive intellect is necessary to individual thought; but it is perishable, and by its decay all memory, and therefore individuality, is lost to the higher and immortal region." — *The Soul*, III. v. He divided the Creative intellect again into the *ἐπιστημονικόν*, or Intuitive reason, and the *λογιστικόν*, or discursive faculty. In all cases he discriminates between the *νοῦς* and the soul, as distinct entities, assigning only to the former a place in eternity. Plotinos, when Augustinus denominated a "re-incarnation of Platô," carried the tendencies of the Great Teacher to their legitimate conclusions. Platô hesitated at the *ἐνώσις* or absolute identity of the *νοῦς* and the ideas which it comprehended. Plotinos asserted that the Intuitive reason was the object conceived, the subject conceiving and the act of conception at one. The *archê* or Absolute principle was τὸ *ἐν* — unity above essence; the second *νοῦς*, pure reason; the third, soul. The *νοῦς* contemplates the One and exists by it; and by thought constitutes all true existences. The soul is evolved and depends upon the *νοῦς*.

*Noumenon*, τὸ *νοούμενον*. The noumenal; an idea beyond sense-perception; a cognition of the things which are; an idea inherent in the mind, transcending sense. "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, nisi ipse intellectus." — LEIBNITZ.

*On* or *Ontôs On*, τὸ *ὄν*, τὸ *ὄντως ὄν*. Real being; Absolute Being; that which really is; the really-existing as distinguished from the transitory; the permanent, eternal, and unchangeable; the Eternal Goodness, Truth and Excellence; the real being underlying all existence; the whence and why of all things; God.

*Orgia*, τὰ *ὄργια*. Orgies; sacred rites; arcane observances; the Mysteries; the Bacchic rites; the frenzy peculiar to worship, often followed by temporary trance or *cataplexy*.

*Ouranos*, ὁ *ουρανός*. Heaven; the Sky; the expanse; the air; also Ouranos the camp of Gaia, the Earth and father of Kronos, the horned or rayed god. Probably the Aryan divinity Varuna, the god of the sky and the waters above the sky. His dethronement, by deprivation of the lingham or creative energy, is essentially after the Hindu method.

*Ousia*, ἡ *οὐσία*. Essence; substance; entity; the being and essence of things; the permanent reality; the grand and efficient cause of all phenomenal existence; the substance intermediate between the absolute identity and the outstanding objectiveness, combining both. Hence the order of essence, energy, and power; also of essence, transition (*γένεσις*), nature (*φύσις*).

*Pan*, ὁ *πάν*. Pan, perhaps Phan, a god of the Arkadians introduced into Athens after the Persian war; said to be the same as Amun; perhaps Phonax or Bacchus. Makrolios calls him lord of ὄλη; Orpheus names him Zeus, the lord of all, the Horned one with a flute; and Sophoklês, the leader of the Choral dance. He was worshipped in caves and like Bacchus, whom he appears to resemble. Sôkratês also invokes him in the last paragraph of the *Phaidros*.

*Pascho*, *πάσχω*. To be subject to action from without, one's self being passive; to be passive; to be affected; to experience; to have

- affection for; to undergo; to suffer. *Perhaps few words in the Platonic literature require more attention than this verb and its derivations.*
- Peirastikos*, περιστατικός, ἡ, ὄν. Tentative; a method much employed by Plato and Sokratēs to excite philosophical curiosity; nothing was asserted, but irony and ingenious questioning employed to lead to doubt and confusion in regard to received dogma.
- Periphero*, περιφέρω. To carry round; to make known; to bring back to recollection; to bring to the same point.
- Periphora*, ἡ περιφορά. Going about; Carrying or leading about; a revolution of a planet; an orbit; a journey; wandering; error; distraction.
- Peritropē*, ἡ περιτροπή. A turning round; a regular succession; a revolution; a change.
- Petra*, ἡ πέτρα. A rock; the *bēma* at the Pnyx at Athens; a rock-temple where secret rites were performed. "Mithras was born in a rock-temple." — PORPHYRIOS. Jacob Bryant derives this from the Semitic PETER, to expound; to interpret. The oracular terms of Patara, Patrai, Pethor, all seem to have had this etymology. Godfrey Higgins suggests that the Chaldaic term Peter was the designation of the Hierophant of the arcane worship, giving us to infer that it was the designation of the Roman Pontifex, and that his throne was the red chair of St. Peter, to which the Pope has succeeded.
- Petrōma*, τὸ πέτρωμα. A stone; the stone receptacle in which certain sacred symbols were kept in the temples; the tablet of stone which the hierophant at Eleusis expounded at the autopsyia; Semitece, PETRUN.
- Phantasia*, ἡ φαντασία. A show; an appearance; an apparition; an abstract form or idea; an image in the mind; a perception; an imagination; a fantasy.
- Philosophia*, ἡ φιλοσοφία. Love of the highest truth; desire for the knowledge of actual fact; ardor for knowing the real and permanent; love for the truth; the exercise of the art and faculty which lead to the knowledge of things human and divine; a withdrawing of the attention from external things, in order to attain to what is perceived by the interior mind; knowledge of divine and eternal actuality; divine wisdom; transcendent learning; metaphysical knowledge; philosophy; knowledge of causes and laws; noumenal science; the doctrines of a philosopher; now applied erroneously to physical sciences. The Platonic philosophy was in a predominating sense the outgrowth of the Orphic doctrines, as represented in the Mysteries; and indeed many of the discourses were affirmed to be dithyrambic at the time, as resembling the Estlocit Bacchic chants.
- Phrēn*, ἡ φρήν. The midriff or diaphragm; whence, by figure of speech, the mind, the understanding, reason, sense, prudence. Plural, φρένες: the parts about the heart; the powers of life; the faculties of the mind; the mind. Used as the synonym of φρονήσις.
- Phronēma*, τὸ φρόνημα. Sense; purpose; will; intelligence; prudence; bent of inclination; desire; propensity; tendency; pride; high spirit. "The will of the flesh is death, but the will of the spirit is life and peace." — *Epistle to the Romans*, viii: 6.
- Phronesis*, ἡ φρόνησις. Thoughtfulness; sagacity; right intention; right direction of the energy; guidance by reason; prudence; discretion; acuteness of intellect; ability to conjecture readily in regard to what is necessary.
- Phthora*, ἡ φθορά. Mortality; corruption; disease; contagion; motion from phenomenal existence toward dissolution, but not to actual annihilation; corruptible matter; the earthly condition; that which is corruptible. "So is the anastasis of the dead: the seed is sown in corruptible condition, it is raised in the state beyond change; a psychical body is sown, a spiritual body is raised. — *Epistle to the Corinthians*, xv: 42-44.
- Physiologia*, ἡ φυσικολογία. Study of arcane knowledge of causes; noumenal science; inquiry into the laws of nature; philosophy; physiology. "The ancient physiology, both among the Greeks and other peoples, was an exposition of nature, veiled in allegorical representations, hidden in enigmas and undermeanings, and a theology like that of the Mysteries — the things which were spoken having a more intelligible meaning for the common multitude than those signified in the silence, and those denoted by the silence requiring investigation rather than those which had been uttered. This is evident from the Orphic, the Egyptian, and Phrygian discourses. But most of all the orgies celebrated at the Mysteries, and the symbolical observances at the sacrifices, exhibit the interior meaning conveyed by the ancients." — *PLOUTARCHOS*.
- Physis*, ἡ φύσις. That which is produced; hence nature, character, disposition, kind or species, sexual distinctions, figure, stature, constitution, general custom, substance. The term was also employed by the philosophers to denote the physical world as distinguished alike from the world of cause, and even the sphere of transition; the principle of motion and rest; phenomenal existence; temporal manifestation; *maya*, or the illusion of the senses. Hence the word nature, as philosophically employed, denoted the passive principle of the universe, and was typified by the Great Mother. It signified no principle of causation, no energy or active agency, but only the evolution and outcome of what had been superinduced. The modern phrase laws of nature is therefore a paradox; and the notion which gave birth to it is closely allied to the androgynous religion of Phrygia.
- Plerōma*, τὸ πλήρωμα. What is filled up; fulness; abundance; perfection; completeness; sum; consummation; the populace. Also the effluence and potency imparted by the superior orders of beings. This word was much used by the Gnostics and Alexandrian Platonists.
- Pneuma*, τὸ πνεῦμα. Breath; a blast of wind; a tempest; the breath of life; the spirit; the *noûs* or interior mind; a spiritual being; an inspiration; the interior tendency toward goodness; the Supreme Being; Divine Wisdom. Little used by philosophical writers, and then in the sense of mind or faculty of thought rather than as the superior principle. It is in no proper sense identical with the soul or psychical essence. It is the *noûs* or τὸ λογικόν, whereas the soul is τὸ θυμικόν, and the *sarx* or corporal nature, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.
- Psychē*, ἡ ψυχή. The Soul; the principle of identity; self; the principle of life; the personality; a person; the temper; the animating principle; the ruling inclination; the part of man that is the seat of emotions, passions and affections; a butterfly; therefore by a press the symbol of the human soul.
- Psychikos*, ψυχικός, ἡ, ὄν. Psychical; relating to the soul; unspiritual; passionless; sensual; intellectual. "This is not the wisdom coming from above, but the earthly, psychical, daemon-like." — *Epistle of James*, iii. 15.
- Radamanthos*, ὁ Ῥαδάμανθος. Radamanthos; the judge of human souls. From ROT-AMEN-TI, the judge of Amenti, a name of Osiris.
- Rea*, ἡ Ῥέα. Rea; the Great Mother; the consort of Kronos; the same as Ri or Sar-Rai, the consort of Assur in Nineveh.
- Soma*, τὸ σῶμα. A body; perhaps from *sēma*, a sign, token, emblem. "A body is that being which hath these three dimensions: breadth, depth, and length; or a bulk which makes a forcible resistance; or whatsoever of its own nature possesseth a place." — *PLOUTARCHOS*.
- Sophia*, ἡ σοφία. Wisdom; expertness; skill; sagacity; learning; acquired ability; the doctrines of the philosophers; arcane knowledge; philosophy; the knowledge of things human and divine; the science of principles, as distinguished from accidents; the knowledge of ideas; the understanding of causes; religion as distinguished from worship; knowledge which pertains to the interior mind; that knowledge which embraces the actual truth and is beneficial to man; divine revelation; science relating to theology, medicine, divination, moral duty, eternity.
- Theos*, ὁ θεός. A god; a spiritual being; he who creates or sets in order, as from the Aryan deva, a divinity, a demon, a devil, perhaps also a priest. In the *Theogonies* there were many orders of gods, subordinate to whom were demons and heroes. The philosophers afterward classified them into orders, placing one Supreme Being over all, and subordinating the others in discrete degrees.
- Theosophia*, ἡ θεουργία. Divine wisdom; knowledge relating to divine things; philosophy.
- Theourgios*, ὁ θεουργός. A priest who officiates at the initiations; an adept at sacred rites; a diviner or theologian; a therurgist; per-



haps a magician or enchanter. The science of Iamblich times styled Therurgy.

*Thesmos*, ὁ θεσμός. Anything established; social regulation; usage; custom; a religious chant.

*Thesmophoria*, τὰ θεσμοφωρία. The Thesmophoria; seen honor of *Dēmētēr*, the institutor of social life. This, not only observed in the Hellenic and Ionian cities, but there appear to have been analogous assemblages of women in Egypt and Syria. That the rites of *Umura*, the *Bona Dea*, were of the same character, is not improbable. By ancient law, women who had been married by *Usus* were protected from absolute subjection to their husbands by separation three nights in the year. Hence, the Thesmophoria was not only a festival of social order, but also of uxorial freedom and household equality.

*Titan*, ὁ Τίτάν. Titan; the sun; one of the older gods worshipped before the time of *Zeus*. The name is Semitic, and probably belongs to the ruling classes of Assyria. The word *tit* signifies a spot; also mire, clay; so that the *Titans* or *Giants* were chthonians, or rather autochthons. This seems to indicate them as the aboriginal Pelargian or Ethiopic population of Greece, who endeavored to resist the innovation of Hellenic worship. The slaughter of the boy *Zagreus* would imply a like idea.

*Zeus*, ὁ Ζεύς. Zeus: from the Sanskrit *Dyans*, or *India*, god of the sky—the chief God in the later Grecian pantheon; the archaic divinity of the Pelargians, afterward represented as son of *Kronos*.

*Zōon*, τὸ ζῷον. A living creature; an animal; a heavenly being.

#### BOOK REVIEWS.

**THE CHRISTIAN SAINTS: THEIR METHOD AND THEIR POWER.** By George Wyld, M.D. Price, 6d. (Read before the British Theosophical Society, 31st July, 1881, and reprinted from the *Psychological Review*.)

This is a noteworthy little treatise by an eminent Theosophist. It well deserves perusal. "The Oriental Adept, by soul or will force and a systematic training of his soul and body, attempts to seize on the Spirit, and thus to scale the heavens and there to rule as a demigod."

"The Christian Saint, on the other hand, undergoes no systematic training, but he ardently wills or desires to shun the world, the flesh, and the devil, and to 'crucify those affections and lusts which war against the soul.'"

**OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTELES.** Compiled by Edwin Wallace, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Worcester College, Oxford. Second and considerably enlarged edition. Oxford and London: James Parker & Co. 1880.

This work may be profitably read and used by all who propose to study *Aristoteles* in his native language. It "strings together the more important passages in *Aristoteles*' writings, and explains them by a brief English commentary."

**THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT, ILLUSTRATED BY A NEW VERSION OF THE BHAGVAT GITA.** By William Oxley. (May be had from E. W. Allen, Ave Maria Lane, London, E. C., Eng. Price, 8s. 6d.)

This work will be cordially welcomed by all who are pursuing the study of the Oriental Theosophy, of which it is an able and noteworthy exposition. The *Bhagvat Gita* "forms the text book of the philosophy, discipline, and practice of that which is called *Yoginism*. It is written for the express purpose of defining, so far as language can do so, the wisdom and powers to which the human being may attain even while in embodied condition.

The powers could only be attained by a long and painful course of discipline, which tested the power of endurance and purity of motive on the part of the neophyte; and only those who could survive the ordeal and master the secrets by study and experience could pass to the easier degrees of Adeptship and become a *Yogin* of the *Yogins*." (p. 258.)

Mr. Oxley preserves much of the vigor and sublimity of the original, and will, we think, give the reader a better idea of the great Indian poem than he can obtain from the prose translations—excellent as they

are in many respects—of Wilkins and Thompson. It is, moreover, enriched with valuable illustrative comments which will prove a great help to the intelligent student.

**THE OCCULT WORLD.** By A. P. Sinnett. London: Trubner & Co. Ludgate Hill. 1881.

This is in many respects the most remarkable book on Occult Science that has appeared in modern times. The author, Mr. Sinnett, is an Englishman of ability and prominence, who has for years been a resident of India. Becoming acquainted with *Madame Blavatsky*, the celebrated Adept, he was an eye-witness of many extraordinary phenomena produced through her instrumentality. These phenomena occurring under test conditions converted him, though previously a skeptic as regards such matters, to a belief in the reality of Occult Science and the existence of Adepts.

Pursuing his investigations he finally was brought into communication with *Koot Hoomi Lal Sing*, a prominent member of that Brotherhood of Occultists which "ramifies all over the East, but the principal seat of which, for the present, I gather to be in Tibet." An extensive correspondence ensued between Mr. Sinnett and *Koot Hoomi*, and several of the latter's truly noteworthy letters are given in this work.

Mr. Sinnett's book will be read with interest by every student of the Occult Philosophy. He makes no draft on the readers' credulity. While he records many strange and apparently marvelous things, yet he supplies ample evidence, showing that they are facts and not mere figments of an excited imagination. In short, Mr. Sinnett's experience and narrative appeal to the intellect, the developed intellect be it remembered, and not to multifarious opinion, conjecture, or stolid skepticism. His work is divided into five chapters, which are entitled as follows: 1. Introduction. 2. Occultism and its Adepts. 3. The Theosophical Society. 4. Recent Occult Phenomena. 5. Teachings of Occult Philosophy. "Strange as the statement will appear at first sight, modern metaphysics and, to a large extent, modern physical science, have been groping for centuries blindly for knowledge which Occult Philosophy has enjoyed in full measure all the while. Owing to a train of fortunate circumstances I have come to know that this is the case. I have come in some contact with persons who are heirs of a greater knowledge concerning the mysteries of nature and humanity than modern culture has yet evolved, and my present wish is to sketch the outlines of this knowledge, to record with exactitude the experimental proofs that I have obtained that occult science invests its adepts with a control of natural forces superior to that enjoyed by physicists of the ordinary type, and the grounds there are for bestowing the most respectful consideration on the theories entertained by occult science concerning the constitution and destinies of the human soul." (Introduction.)

**FRAGMENTA PHILOSOPHORUM GRÆCORUM COLLEGIT, RECENSUIT, VERTIT, ANNOTATIONIBUS ET PROLEGOMENIS ILLUSTRAVIT, INDICIBUS INSTRUIT.** FR. GUIL. AUG. MULLACH. Volumen III. PLATONICIS ET PERIPATETICIS CONTINENS. Gr. et Lat. Paris: Didot. 1881. (Price, 16 fr. The work may be ordered through F. W. Christern, 37 West Twenty-third Street, New York, N. Y.)

Prof. Mullach's hope that this volume may prove useful to the lovers of ancient wisdom (*veteris sapientie studiosis probetur*) is well founded, and it has doubtless long ere this been realized. It renders accessible to the scholar many rare and valuable fragments, and some whole writings, of the Platonists and Peripatetics, which have hitherto been dispersed in various expensive books. The different works are illustrated by notes which are of great value. We think that we will do the scholar a genuine service by giving a list of the writings contained in this noteworthy volume:

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|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Eusebii Frag.                 | 8. Attici Platonici Frag.                       |
| 2. Albini Isagoge in Plat. Dial. | 9. Severi, Plat. Phil., Frag.                   |
| 3. Sallustius de Diis et Mundo.  | 10. Aristoclis Peripatet. Frag.                 |
| 4. Speusippi Frag.               | 11. Eudemi Rhod. Peripatet., Frag.              |
| 5. Xenocratis Frag.              | 12. Andronicus Rhod. Ethic. Nicom. Paraphrasis. |
| 6. Crantoris Frag.               | 13. Andronicus Rhod. De Affectibus.             |
| 7. Numenii, Plat. Phil., Frag.   |   |

The typography of this tome is all that could be desired. The Messrs. Didot deserve much credit for publishing this collection of the inestimable remains of the early Grecian thinkers.

We doubt whether a better editor than Prof. Mullach could have been selected. At all events he has performed his work admirably.